six-month rule in New York

13 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
Matter of Elizabeth C. (Omar C.)green nyappdiv · 2017 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Initially, we agree with the parties that although the children were ultimately discharged to the father, after a six- month hearing, the issues raised on this appeal fall into an exception to the mootness doctrine in that they (1) are likely to reoccur; (2) typically evade review; and (3) involve "significant or important questions not previously passed on" ( Matter of Hearst Corp v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]; see Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.] , 156 AD3d 193, 198-202 [2d Dept 2017]).	1	1
Hearst Corp. v. Clynegreen ny · 1980 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Initially, we agree with the parties that although the children were ultimately discharged to the father, after a six- month hearing, the issues raised on this appeal fall into an exception to the mootness doctrine in that they (1) are likely to reoccur; (2) typically evade review; and (3) involve "significant or important questions not previously passed on" ( Matter of Hearst Corp v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]; see Matter of Elizabeth C. [Omar C.] , 156 AD3d 193, 198-202 [2d Dept 2017]).	1	1
Marsala v. New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Systemsgreen nyappdiv · 2005 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010“Rather, [petitioner’s injury] was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner’s job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom” (Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, 994 [2006]; see Matter of McKenna v Hevesi, 26 AD3d 584, 585 [2006]; Matter of Marsala v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 984, 985 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]).	1	1
McKenna v. Hevesigreen nyappdiv · 2006 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010“Rather, [petitioner’s injury] was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner’s job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom” (Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, 994 [2006]; see Matter of McKenna v Hevesi, 26 AD3d 584, 585 [2006]; Matter of Marsala v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 984, 985 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]).	1	1
Felix v. New York State Comptrollergreen nyappdiv · 2006 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010“Rather, [petitioner’s injury] was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner’s job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom” (Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, 994 [2006]; see Matter of McKenna v Hevesi, 26 AD3d 584, 585 [2006]; Matter of Marsala v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 984, 985 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]).	1	1
Garrison Protective Services, Inc. v. Office of the Comptrollergreen ny · 1999 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 1 sentence 2004That type of remedy may properly be granted in a proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel, but it is well settled that “[m]andamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act” (Matter of Garrison Protective Servs. v Office of Comptroller, 92 NY2d 732, 736 [1999]).	1	1
Empire State Restaurant & Tavern Ass'n v. New Yorkgreen nynd · 2003 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 1 sentence 2004Nevertheless, because respondent’s authority to grant waivers under the CIAA is discretionary (see Public Health Law § 1399-u; Empire State Rest. & Tavern Assn. v New York State, 289 F Supp 2d 252, 259 [2003]), we conclude that the court exceeded its authority in granting a six-month waiver to petitioner.	1	1
Sega v. State of New Yorkgreen ny · 1983 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984Although “a respondent may proffer in support of affirmance any legal argument that may be resolved on the record, regardless of whether it has been argued previously”, the matter must be “one which could not have been countered by the appellant had it been raised in the trial court” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190, n 2 ).	1	1
Morgenthau v. Erlbaumgreen ny · 1983 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984Even so, the New York State Legislature enacted the present CPL 340.40 (L 1971, ch 815, § 2) which provides, in pertinent part, that in New York City “a misdemeanor for which the authorized term of imprisonment is not more than six months must be a single judge trial” (CPL 340.40, subd 2; emphasis added; see, also, Matter of Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d 143 ).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. Osgood green ny · 1980 2 sentences 1986In reaching this conclusion, the court charged the People with the time period from April 7, 1983, the date when the original proceedings were dismissed, to July 25, 1983, the date when the defendants were reindicted for the same crime, a total of 109 days (see, People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ). 1981(See People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 ; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625, 627 , supra; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 398 .) The period of time from August 1, 1980 until the People’s readiness on April 27, 1981 was 269 days — approximately three months past the six-month standard if no exceptions apply. “[T]he right to a speedy trial guaranteed by CPL 30.30, which relates to prosecutorial readiness, is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant has expressed his readiness for trial” (People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934 ; emphasis added), i.e., excepted from the s	2	1981–1986
Baldwin v. New York green scotus · 1970 2 sentences 1984This six-month requirement was not set forth as a hard and fast rule (see Baldwin v New York, supra). 1981To arrive at this figure, I applied the six-month test of Baldwin v New York ( 399 US 66 ) to a chart containing the authorized sentences for prostitution convictions as reported in 1973 national survey.	2	1981–1984
State v. Patricia II green ny · 2005 1 sentence 2010“Rather, [petitioner’s injury] was the result of a training program constituting an ordinary part of petitioner’s job duties and the normal risks arising therefrom” (Matter of Felix v New York State Comptroller, 28 AD3d 993, 994 [2006]; see Matter of McKenna v Hevesi, 26 AD3d 584, 585 [2006]; Matter of Marsala v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 984, 985 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]).	1	2010–2010
Elmwood-Anderson Corp. v. Novello neutral nysupct · 2004 2 sentences 2004Respondent appeals from a judgment (denominated order) granting the amended petition in part, annulling his determination, granting petitioner a six-month waiver, and remitting the matter to respondent for further review and consideration of petitioner’s application (Matter of Elmwood-Anderson Corp. v Novello, 3 Misc 3d 858 [2004]). 2004Supreme Court annulled respondent’s determination and granted petitioner a six-month waiver from the smoking ban, concluding that the County’s guidelines for waivers were “arbitrary and capricious as well as irrational” (Elmwood-Anderson Corp., 3 Misc 3d at 865 ).	1	2004–2004
People v. Kendzia green ny · 1985 1 sentence 1997Case law mandates that the six-month requirement of readiness be communicated by the People on the record and that they indicate their present readiness (see, People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 ).	1	1997–1997
In re Raquel Marie X. green ny · 1990 1 sentence 1990On July 10, 1990, several months after the Family Court ruled in favor of the adoptive parents, the Court of Appeals, in Matter of Raquel Marie X. (supra), held the six-month requirement of Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (e) unconstitutional.	1	1990–1990
People v. Russo neutral nyappdiv · 1984 1 sentence 1985Once defendant demonstrated that the People’s statement of readiness was made beyond the six-month period, the burden of proving excludable periods fell to the People (see, People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 ; People v Russo, 99 AD2d 498 ).	1	1985–1985
People v. Berkowitz green ny · 1980 1 sentence 1985Once defendant demonstrated that the People’s statement of readiness was made beyond the six-month period, the burden of proving excludable periods fell to the People (see, People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 ; People v Russo, 99 AD2d 498 ).	1	1985–1985
Argersinger v. Hamlin green · 1972 1 sentence 1983Although the six-month mark was not explicitly made a rigid dividing line whereby imprisonment for six months or less ipso facto denoted a petty crime, the Supreme Court cases that followed, such as Argersinger v Hamlin ( 407 US 25, 29 ), have at the very least implicitly adopted a six-month rule: “[t]he right to trial by jury * * * [is] limited * * * to trials where the potential punishment [is] imprisonment for six months or more.” The defendant cannot concur with the theory that length of sentence is the sole factor to be considered.	1	1983–1983
People v. Keaton green nyappdiv · 1979 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 71 AD2d 1030 , and People v Haynes, 72 AD2d 778 .) Both cases, however, were reversed in December, 1980 by the Court of Appeals (People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37, supra), which held that the CPL 30.30 rule in such cases ran from the date of the filing of the felony complaint.	1	1981–1981
People v. Griswold green nyappdiv · 1979 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 71 AD2d 1030 , and People v Haynes, 72 AD2d 778 .) Both cases, however, were reversed in December, 1980 by the Court of Appeals (People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37, supra), which held that the CPL 30.30 rule in such cases ran from the date of the filing of the felony complaint.	1	1981–1981
People v. White green ny · 1973 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 ; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625, 627 , supra; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 398 .) The period of time from August 1, 1980 until the People’s readiness on April 27, 1981 was 269 days — approximately three months past the six-month standard if no exceptions apply. “[T]he right to a speedy trial guaranteed by CPL 30.30, which relates to prosecutorial readiness, is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant has expressed his readiness for trial” (People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934 ; emphasis added), i.e., excepted from the s	1	1981–1981
People v. Sturgis green ny · 1976 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 ; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625, 627 , supra; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 398 .) The period of time from August 1, 1980 until the People’s readiness on April 27, 1981 was 269 days — approximately three months past the six-month standard if no exceptions apply. “[T]he right to a speedy trial guaranteed by CPL 30.30, which relates to prosecutorial readiness, is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant has expressed his readiness for trial” (People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934 ; emphasis added), i.e., excepted from the s	1	1981–1981
People v. Hamilton green ny · 1979 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 ; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625, 627 , supra; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 398 .) The period of time from August 1, 1980 until the People’s readiness on April 27, 1981 was 269 days — approximately three months past the six-month standard if no exceptions apply. “[T]he right to a speedy trial guaranteed by CPL 30.30, which relates to prosecutorial readiness, is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant has expressed his readiness for trial” (People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934 ; emphasis added), i.e., excepted from the s	1	1981–1981
People v. Lomax green ny · 1980 1 sentence 1981(See People v Osgood, 52 NY2d 37 ; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351 ; People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625, 627 , supra; People v White, 32 NY2d 393, 398 .) The period of time from August 1, 1980 until the People’s readiness on April 27, 1981 was 269 days — approximately three months past the six-month standard if no exceptions apply. “[T]he right to a speedy trial guaranteed by CPL 30.30, which relates to prosecutorial readiness, is not dependent in any way on whether the defendant has expressed his readiness for trial” (People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933-934 ; emphasis added), i.e., excepted from the s	1	1981–1981
Tang v. Appellate Div. of NY Supreme Ct., First Dept. neutral nysd · 1972 1 sentence 1979Supreme Ct., First Dept., supra), and although the Legislature amended the statute in June, 1978, it did not change the six-month requirement, so that the statute cannot be called archaic or neglected by its framers.	1	1979–1979

Where else courts name it

NM 142 (1989–2026) CA 58 (1962–2025) IL 16 (1973–2006) NY 13 (1979–2020) MT 8 (1990–2016) PA 6 (1979–2023) CO 6 (1982–2025) MA 6 (1973–2005) TX 5 (1981–2020) LA 4 (1976–2010) ID 3 (1990–2002) MS 3 (1997–2000) IN 3 (1972–1975) IA 3 (1997–2017) MI 2 (1980–2011) KY 2 (2015–2022) WI 2 (2021–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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