six-month hearing in California

2025(Fabian L., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030 .) Furthermore, the case plan (which was comprised of vocational and self-study services that the father completed) did not include services for the father’s drug abuse and domestic violence issues because such services were simply not available at the facility where he was incarcerated.

2021DCFS relies on J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 530, 533, 535 [juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing after terminating a father’s reunification services at the 12-month review hearing], and Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1022, 1028 , 1031–1032 (Fabian L.) [substantial evidence supported terminating the incarcerated father’s services at the six-month hearing], for this proposition.

2018Appeals Bd. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1435 , 1439, fn. 4, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 .) Although these subdivisions expressly restrict compensation for psychiatric injuries resulting from personnel actions, "courts have held that 'the six-month limitation expressed in subdivision (d) of section 3208.3 applies to all claims for psychiatric injury.' [Citations.] 'Although it is true that a claim for psychiatric injury which rests on an objective physical injury may be somewhat less likely to be fraudulent than one based on "stress," there remains a substantial potential for the fraudulent inflation of a cla

2018Appeals Bd. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1435 , 1439, fn. 4, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 .) Although these subdivisions expressly restrict compensation for psychiatric injuries resulting from personnel actions, "courts have held that 'the six-month limitation expressed in subdivision (d) of section 3208.3 applies to all claims for psychiatric injury.' [Citations.] 'Although it is true that a claim for psychiatric injury which rests on an objective physical injury may be somewhat less likely to be fraudulent than one based on "stress," there remains a substantial potential for the fraudulent inflation of a cla

2012Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1246-1247 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 ].) “Although it is true that a claim for psychiatric injury which rests on an objective physical injury may be somewhat less likely to be fraudulent than one based on ‘stress,’ there remains a substantial potential for the fraudulent inflation of a claim by adding alleged psychic injuries; thus, including such claims to meet the six-month standard is by no means unreasonable.” (Wal-Mart, at p. 1441.) Consequently, when an alleged psychiatric injury occurs within the first six months of employment, as it did here, the appl

2012Appeals Bd. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1246-1247 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 ].) “Although it is true that a claim for psychiatric injury which rests on an objective physical injury may be somewhat less likely to be fraudulent than one based on ‘stress,’ there remains a substantial potential for the fraudulent inflation of a claim by adding alleged psychic injuries; thus, including such claims to meet the six-month standard is by no means unreasonable.” (Wal-Mart, at p. 1441.) Consequently, when an alleged psychiatric injury occurs within the first six months of employment, as it did here, the appl

2023In certain cases involving incompetent adult defendants, courts have held that if “the statutes do not authorize . . . a [competency] hearing, the court’s convening of one . . . exceed[s] its jurisdiction.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380 ; accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 249-256 .) But as our Supreme Court has made clear, these cases are “not applicable where there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) For example, the statutory scheme for adults does not expressly require a court hea

2023In certain cases involving incompetent adult defendants, courts have held that if “the statutes do not authorize . . . a [competency] hearing, the court’s convening of one . . . exceed[s] its jurisdiction.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380 ; accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 249-256 .) But as our Supreme Court has made clear, these cases are “not applicable where there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) For example, the statutory scheme for adults does not expressly require a court hea

2023In certain cases involving incompetent adult defendants, courts have held that if “the statutes do not authorize . . . a [competency] hearing, the court’s convening of one . . . exceed[s] its jurisdiction.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380 ; accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 249-256 .) But as our Supreme Court has made clear, these cases are “not applicable where there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) For example, the statutory scheme for adults does not expressly require a court hea

2023In certain cases involving incompetent adult defendants, courts have held that if “the statutes do not authorize . . . a [competency] hearing, the court’s convening of one . . . exceed[s] its jurisdiction.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380 ; accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 249-256 .) But as our Supreme Court has made clear, these cases are “not applicable where there is a statutory basis for holding a competency hearing.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) For example, the statutory scheme for adults does not expressly require a court hea

2007(See In re Christina A., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 .) The question whether to return the child to parental custody properly focuses on the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing: “[Placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child’s removal from parental custody.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 900 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) Different rules apply at the six-month hearing stage if the dependent child was under the age of three on the date of the initial removal: “If ... the court finds by clear and con

2007(See In re Christina A., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 .) The question whether to return the child to parental custody properly focuses on the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing: “[Placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child’s removal from parental custody.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 900 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) Different rules apply at the six-month hearing stage if the dependent child was under the age of three on the date of the initial removal: “If ... the court finds by clear and con

2021A layperson's ignorance of the law is not “excusable neglect.” (Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 ; Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1778 [“[M]istake of law based solely on ignorance of the six-month claim requirement is not enough”].) An attorney’s failure to advise the client of his or her rights also is not excusable neglect.

2021A layperson's ignorance of the law is not “excusable neglect.” (Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 ; Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1778 [“[M]istake of law based solely on ignorance of the six-month claim requirement is not enough”].) An attorney’s failure to advise the client of his or her rights also is not excusable neglect.

2021(Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 ; In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700, 712 .) At the six-month hearing in this case, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services had been provided and concluded that active efforts had been made but found that the parents failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered 15 treatment.5 The court additionally found that there was no substantial probability that E.M. might be returned to parental custody within six months.

2014(Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 .) Further, “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.); see also Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 .) Thus, when considering the adequacy of reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Misako R.

2017(See Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692 , 696-697, 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 [" 'claims statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to quickly rectify a dangerous condition and ... to take the potential claim into account in its fiscal planning' "].) Moreover, the Jaureguis have pointed to nothing in the language or legislative history of section 340.2 to suggest that the Legislature intended, sub silencio, to amend the six-month claim presentation deadline in the Government Claims Act.

2017(See Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692 , 696-697, 266 Cal.Rptr. 187 [" 'claims statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to quickly rectify a dangerous condition and ... to take the potential claim into account in its fiscal planning' "].) Moreover, the Jaureguis have pointed to nothing in the language or legislative history of section 340.2 to suggest that the Legislature intended, sub silencio, to amend the six-month claim presentation deadline in the Government Claims Act.

2016Bill No. 2341 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 18, 2008, pp. 4–5; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2016) § 2.129[1] at p. 2-454 [2008 amendments making reunification 9 periods mandatory and limiting judicial discretion to terminate earlier “resulted in a major policy change for California”].2) The language of section 361.5 was, thus, changed from providing that reunification services are “not to exceed” either six or 12 months, to specifying that services “shall be provided” for either a six- or 12-month period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B).) Section 361.5 a

2016She argues that the statutory scheme contemplates a procedure which includes a petition pursuant to section 388, subdivision (c) and a hearing on the petition in order to prematurely terminate reunification services and that the court could not do so at the six-month review hearing. “[R]eunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services.” (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242 (Aryanna C.).) Aryanna C. held the juvenile court had the “authority, on a proper record and after conducting a hearing, to exercise its discretion and

2014However, a parent is “not required to complain about the lack of reunification services as a prerequisite to the [D]epartment fulfilling its statutory obligations.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1014 .) Because it was the Department’s obligation to provide reasonable reunification services, we conclude that mother did not waive the issue in any respect by failing to challenge the case plan at disposition or the six-month hearing.

2004Once her attorney learned at the six-month hearing that the minor had not begun individual counseling, he set the matter for a contested hearing. *1158 A parent is “not required to complain about the lack of reunification services as a prerequisite to the department fulfilling its statutory obligations.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1014 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 ].) Under section 361.5, subdivision (a), whenever a minor is removed from the parent or guardian the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child’s moth

2014(See In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 594, fn. 5 [ 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ] [explaining that custody and visitation orders issued upon termination of jurisdiction are frequently referred to informally as “ ‘family law’ ” orders or “ ‘exit’ ” orders]; see id. at p. 596.) In sum, although mother is correct that the six-month hearing was governed by section 366.21, subdivision (e) rather than section 364, that statute did not require the court to return Maya to her custody in the absence of evidence establishing that doing so would create a substantial risk of harm to the child’s physical o

2014(See In re Ryan K. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 591, 594 , fn. 5 & 596 [explaining that custody and visitation orders issued upon termination of jurisdiction are frequently referred to informally as ‘“family law”” orders or ‘“exit” orders].) 22 In sum, although mother is correct that the six-month hearing was governed by section 366.21, subdivision (e) rather than section 364, that statute did not require the court to return Maya to her custody in the absence of evidence establishing that doing so would create a substantial risk of harm to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007(See In re Christina A., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 .) The question whether to return the child to parental custody properly focuses on the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing: “[Placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child’s removal from parental custody.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 900 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) Different rules apply at the six-month hearing stage if the dependent child was under the age of three on the date of the initial removal: “If ... the court finds by clear and con

2007(See In re Christina A., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160 .) The question whether to return the child to parental custody properly focuses on the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing: “[Placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the harm which had required the child’s removal from parental custody.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 900 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 ].) Different rules apply at the six-month hearing stage if the dependent child was under the age of three on the date of the initial removal: “If ... the court finds by clear and con

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2007The six-month hearing If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child must be reviewed every six months. ( In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 171 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ["In any matter in which a minor has been declared a dependent, the court must hold review hearings."]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 332 ["As long as a minor remains a dependent of the juvenile court, the court is statutorily required to hold review hearings every six months."].) That *656 initial six-month review hear

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr

2004We agree that the Tribe has waived the issue of the children's placement. "`An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.'" ( In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 , quoting In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 , 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 .) "[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order." ( In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 , 65 Cal.Rptr