6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1979–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re ZPgreen1 sentence2023See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5); see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118 . - 22 - J-A19026-23 The first factor is clearly met as the children have been in foster care for more than four-and-one-half years (almost ten times longer than the six- month requirement). | 1 | 1 |
Ashton Adoption Casegreen2 sentences1979Since conduct chargeable against a parent under either section cannot begin until the parent is at least aware of the pregnancy and birth of the child, Adoption of Ashton, 374 Pa. 185, 197-98 , 97 A.2d 368, 374-75 (1953); Adoption of Sheaffer, 58 Lanc.L.Rev. 15, 22 (1962), it is clear that the petition when filed did not set forth grounds under 311(1) which would have supported an order of termination in accordance with its prayer. 2 The majority employs sophistry to reach the conclusion that the six month requirement is not a jurisdictional fact and thus glibly concludes that the court below 1979Since conduct chargeable against a parent under either section cannot begin until the parent is at least aware of the pregnancy and birth of the child, Adoption of Ashton, 374 Pa. 185, 197-98 , 97 A.2d 368, 374-75 (1953); Adoption of Sheaffer, 58 Lanc.L.Rev. 15, 22 (1962), it is clear that the petition when filed did not set forth grounds under 311(1) which would have supported an order of termination in accordance with its prayer. 2 The majority employs sophistry to reach the conclusion that the six month requirement is not a jurisdictional fact and thus glibly concludes that the court below | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dengler
green
1 sentence2023Dengler, supra. Nor does Dr. Stein’s deviation from the six-month requirement of the DSM-5 render his opinion insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Machado is an SVP. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re ESM
green
1 sentence1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Com., Dept. of Public Wel. v. Uec, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993While it is true that estoppel can be properly applied to prevent the Commonwealth from asserting the six-month bar against claims, Department of Public Welfare v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A.2d 779 (1979), we must agree with the Board that the doctrine is not aptly applied in this case. 1993While it is true that estoppel can be properly applied to prevent the Commonwealth from asserting the six-month bar against claims, Department of Public Welfare v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A.2d 779 (1979), we must agree with the Board that the doctrine is not aptly applied in this case. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Roschak Et Ux. v. Vulcan Iron Works
green
2 sentences1980In view of the liberal construction to be afforded the provisions of the Act, Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 227 , 42 A.2d 280 (1945), we cannot allow the Commonwealth to avoid its heavy burden by relying on the absence of notification to a particular corporate entity, which the Commonwealth itself has failed to seek out, whose presence is relevant and necessary only to the Commonwealth’s defense. 1 We are strengthened in this conclusion by considering that, under Section 301(g), where the Commonwealth may be 100% liable, it is entitled to direct notice, while under normal 1980In view of the liberal construction to be afforded the provisions of the Act, Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 227 , 42 A.2d 280 (1945), we cannot allow the Commonwealth to avoid its heavy burden by relying on the absence of notification to a particular corporate entity, which the Commonwealth itself has failed to seek out, whose presence is relevant and necessary only to the Commonwealth’s defense. 1 We are strengthened in this conclusion by considering that, under Section 301(g), where the Commonwealth may be 100% liable, it is entitled to direct notice, while under normal | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.