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28 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Paynegreen2 sentences2026The Supreme Court noted that: “a ‘proper occasion’ to give the witness-false-in-part instruction exists when, considering the testimony and other evidence a party has brought to the court’s attention in support of the requested instruction, the trial court concludes that sufficient evidence exists for the jury to decide that at least one witness consciously testified falsely and that the false testimony concerns a material issue.” State v. Payne, 366 Or 588, 600 , 468 P3d 445 (2020). 2026The Supreme Court noted that: “a ‘proper occasion’ to give the witness-false-in-part instruction exists when, considering the testimony and other evidence a party has brought to the court’s attention in support of the requested instruction, the trial court concludes that sufficient evidence exists for the jury to decide that at least one witness consciously testified falsely and that the false testimony concerns a material issue.” State v. Payne, 366 Or 588, 600 , 468 P3d 445 (2020). | 3 | 14 |
State v. Labossieregreen2 sentences2024See State v. Labossiere, 307 Or App 560, 569-70 , 477 P3d 1 (2020) (finding the failure to give the “witness false in part” instruction harmless where the defendant’s harm argument focused only on the significance of the false testimony that triggered the need for the instruction, and he failed to “identify any other jury findings that the witness-false-in-part instruction could have informed” (emphasis in original)). 2024See State v. Labossiere, 307 Or App 560, 569-70 , 477 P3d 1 (2020) (finding the failure to give the “witness false in part” instruction harmless where the defendant’s harm argument focused only on the significance of the false testimony that triggered the need for the instruction, and he failed to “identify any other jury findings that the witness-false-in-part instruction could have informed” (emphasis in original)). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Gocangreen2 sentences2026“The witness-false-in-part instruction is based on ORS 10.095(3), which provides that the jury is ‘to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions * * * [t]hat a witness false in one part of the testimony of the witness may be distrusted in others.’ ” State v. Gocan, 315 Or App 222, 227 , 500 P3d 85 , rev den 369 Or 211 (2021). 2026“The witness-false-in-part instruction is based on ORS 10.095(3), which provides that the jury is ‘to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions * * * [t]hat a witness false in one part of the testimony of the witness may be distrusted in others.’ ” State v. Gocan, 315 Or App 222, 227 , 500 P3d 85 , rev den 369 Or 211 (2021). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Kinstlergreen2 sentences2020Cf. State v. Kinstler, 307 Or App 517 , 478 P3d 595 (2020) (addressing whether the witness-false-in-part instruction was required and concluding that it was not). 2020Cf. State v. Kinstler, 307 Or App 517 , 478 P3d 595 (2020) (addressing whether the witness-false-in-part instruction was required and concluding that it was not). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Estrada-Roblesgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Estrada-Robles, 312 Or App 357, 358 , 492 P3d 731 (2021) (reversing and declining to address the remaining assignments where the record “may well develop differently on remand”). 2026See State v. Estrada-Robles, 312 Or App 357, 358 , 492 P3d 731 (2021) (reversing and declining to address the remaining assignments where the record “may well develop differently on remand”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bitzgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Bitz, 336 Or App 591, 601 , 561 P3d 151 (2024) (The witness-false-in-part instruction “assists a jury to evaluate a witness’s testimony when there is sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude first that the witness consciously gave false testimony.”) We therefore reject defendant’s third assignment of error. 2026See State v. Bitz, 336 Or App 591, 601 , 561 P3d 151 (2024) (The witness-false-in-part instruction “assists a jury to evaluate a witness’s testimony when there is sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude first that the witness consciously gave false testimony.”) We therefore reject defendant’s third assignment of error. | 2 | 2 |
Ireland v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2020In so concluding, the court overruled its holding in Ireland v. Mitchell, 226 Or 286 , 359 P2d 894 (1961), that directed appellate courts to review a refusal to give the witness-false-in-part instruction for abuse of discretion. 3 On appeal, the state does not argue that the requested witness-false-in- part instruction was incomplete or an incorrect statement of the law. 2020In so concluding, the court overruled its holding in Ireland v. Mitchell, 226 Or 286 , 359 P2d 894 (1961), that directed appellate courts to review a refusal to give the witness-false-in-part instruction for abuse of discretion. 3 On appeal, the state does not argue that the requested witness-false-in- part instruction was incomplete or an incorrect statement of the law. | 1 | 4 |
Simpson v. Millergreen1 sentence2020In Simpson, for example, one of the first cases examining the witness-false-in-part instruction, this court explained that the instruction applies only when there is “a state of facts from which the jury may be authorized to believe, and they must believe the evidence willfully false in some particular before they are authorized to discredit the whole of the evidence of such witness[.]” 57 Or at 65 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2018When a trial court exercises discretion, it acts within certain legal boundaries to choose from several permissible outcomes: "Judicial discretion should * * * be exercised according to fixed legal principles in order to promote substantial *192 justice. * * * In short, judicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct outcomes." State v. Harrell/Wilson , 353 Or. 247 , 254, 297 P.3d 461 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rogers , 330 Or. 2018When a trial court exercises discretion, it acts within certain legal boundaries to choose from several permissible outcomes: "Judicial discretion should * * * be exercised according to fixed legal principles in order to promote substantial *192 justice. * * * In short, judicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct outcomes." State v. Harrell/Wilson , 353 Or. 247 , 254, 297 P.3d 461 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rogers , 330 Or. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Payne
neutral
2 sentences2021When this court reviews a decision by the Court of Appeals determining that a trial court’s error was or was not “harmless,” we review for “legal error” and not “abuse of discretion.” In State v. Payne, 366 Or 588, 608-09 , 468 P3d 445 (2020), for example, we reviewed the Court of Appeals decision, State v. Payne, 298 Or App 438, 442 , 447 P3d 71 (2019), in which that court concluded that the trial court’s refusal to give the witness-false-in-part instruction to the jury was harmless error, because that instruction tells the jury “what it is already free to do.” We reversed, not because the Co 2021When this court reviews a decision by the Court of Appeals determining that a trial court’s error was or was not “harmless,” we review for “legal error” and not “abuse of discretion.” In State v. Payne, 366 Or 588, 608-09 , 468 P3d 445 (2020), for example, we reviewed the Court of Appeals decision, State v. Payne, 298 Or App 438, 442 , 447 P3d 71 (2019), in which that court concluded that the trial court’s refusal to give the witness-false-in-part instruction to the jury was harmless error, because that instruction tells the jury “what it is already free to do.” We reversed, not because the Co | 3 | 2020–2021 |
State v. Hassan
neutral
2 sentences2026As jurors, you have the sole responsibility to determine which testimony or portions of the testimony you will or will not rely on in reaching your verdict.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 351 Or App 352 (2026) 357 We have reviewed the record and agree with the state that there is evidence from which the jury could find that defendant gave false testimony; thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the giving of the witness-false-in-part instruction. 2026As jurors, you have the sole responsibility to determine which testimony or portions of the testimony you will or will not rely on in reaching your verdict.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 351 Or App 352 (2026) 357 We have reviewed the record and agree with the state that there is evidence from which the jury could find that defendant gave false testimony; thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the giving of the witness-false-in-part instruction. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences2020The state argues that the record does not support an inference that S testified falsely, because there was only “one inconsistency between [S’s] account to police and her trial testimony.” Quoting our decision in State v. Walker, 291 Or App 188, 194 , 419 P3d 794 (2018), the state argues that the witness-false-in-part instruction was not required as a matter of law in this case because the inconsistency was “ ‘the type of inconsistency common to mistake, confusion, or the differences in recollec- tion that are innate to human perception.’ ” As a result, the state concludes, the trial court did 2020The state argues that the record does not support an inference that S testified falsely, because there was only “one inconsistency between [S’s] account to police and her trial testimony.” Quoting our decision in State v. Walker, 291 Or App 188, 194 , 419 P3d 794 (2018), the state argues that the witness-false-in-part instruction was not required as a matter of law in this case because the inconsistency was “ ‘the type of inconsistency common to mistake, confusion, or the differences in recollec- tion that are innate to human perception.’ ” As a result, the state concludes, the trial court did | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Jones
neutral
1 sentence2025Nonprecedential Memo Op: 340 Or App 397 (2025) 401 Payne, 366 Or at 600 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2020Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, we must affirm the judgment below if we determine that there was “little likelihood that the error affected the verdict[.]” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003). 2020Under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, we must affirm the judgment below if we determine that there was “little likelihood that the error affected the verdict[.]” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Goff
green
2 sentences2020And in State v. Goff, 71 Or 352, 365 , 142 P 564 (1914), this court explained that, when a witness had “knowingly testified falsely as to a material point in a case,” the instruction “requir[ed] the jury to distrust other parts of his evidence[.]” (Emphasis added.) The court in Goff required what Ireland recognized as a factor in other cases: that the false testimony relate to a material issue. 2020And in State v. Goff, 71 Or 352, 365 , 142 P 564 (1914), this court explained that, when a witness had “knowingly testified falsely as to a material point in a case,” the instruction “requir[ed] the jury to distrust other parts of his evidence[.]” (Emphasis added.) The court in Goff required what Ireland recognized as a factor in other cases: that the false testimony relate to a material issue. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences2020See UCrJI 1029 (setting out the witness-false- in-part instruction); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510, 514-17 , 99 S Ct 2450 , 61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979) (distinguishing permissive inferences from conclusive and rebuttable presumptions).1 It tells the jury that, if it finds that a witness “has intentionally lied in part of his or her testimony, you may, but are not required to, distrust other portions of that witness’s testimony.” UCrJI 1029. 2020See UCrJI 1029 (setting out the witness-false- in-part instruction); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 US 510, 514-17 , 99 S Ct 2450 , 61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979) (distinguishing permissive inferences from conclusive and rebuttable presumptions).1 It tells the jury that, if it finds that a witness “has intentionally lied in part of his or her testimony, you may, but are not required to, distrust other portions of that witness’s testimony.” UCrJI 1029. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Long
green
1 sentence2019The uniform witness-false-in-part instruction is derived from ORS 10.095(3), which states that, "on all proper occasions," the jury is to be instructed "[t]hat a witness false in one part of the testimony of the witness may be distrusted in others." The instruction actually "makes no demand on the jury; it simply describes what the jury is empowered to do." State v. Long , 106 Or. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Harrell / Wilson
green
2 sentences2018When a trial court exercises discretion, it acts within certain legal boundaries to choose from several permissible outcomes: "Judicial discretion should * * * be exercised according to fixed legal principles in order to promote substantial *192 justice. * * * In short, judicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct outcomes." State v. Harrell/Wilson , 353 Or. 247 , 254, 297 P.3d 461 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rogers , 330 Or. 2018When a trial court exercises discretion, it acts within certain legal boundaries to choose from several permissible outcomes: "Judicial discretion should * * * be exercised according to fixed legal principles in order to promote substantial *192 justice. * * * In short, judicial discretion is always bounded by a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally correct outcomes." State v. Harrell/Wilson , 353 Or. 247 , 254, 297 P.3d 461 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rogers , 330 Or. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Weaver
green
2 sentences2013Finally, in State v. Weaver, 139 Or App 207, 211 , 911 P2d 969 , rev den, 323 Or 483 (1996), the defendant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in declining to give the instruction based on “a number of minor inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony at trial and what she had previously recounted to authorities about defendant’s alleged sexual acts.” We affirmed the trial court’s apparent conclusion that the discrepancies were not “material enough” to require the requested instruction, id,.; implicit in that decision was our recognition that a contradictory statement that 2013Finally, in State v. Weaver, 139 Or App 207, 211 , 911 P2d 969 , rev den, 323 Or 483 (1996), the defendant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in declining to give the instruction based on “a number of minor inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony at trial and what she had previously recounted to authorities about defendant’s alleged sexual acts.” We affirmed the trial court’s apparent conclusion that the discrepancies were not “material enough” to require the requested instruction, id,.; implicit in that decision was our recognition that a contradictory statement that | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.