defective claim in Pennsylvania

2020Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 302 n.3.4 Thus, even if Appellant suffered no prejudice at all, he is still entitled to relief due to the defective waiver of counsel colloquy.

2016When the issue of a defective waiver of counsel colloquy is raised on direct appeal, there is no requirement that that appellant independently prove prejudice; pursuant to Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296 (Pa. Super. 2012) citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997) and Commonwealth v. Houtz, 856 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 2004), no showing of prejudice is required.

2018CONCURRING OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Although I agree with the Majority's thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in *748 Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), on the issue of prejudice in the context of direct and collateral review, I would affirm on the PCRA court's finding that direct appeal counsel had a reasonable basis for not raising a defective waiver colloquy issue.

2018CONCURRING OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: Although I agree with the Majority's thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in *748 Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), on the issue of prejudice in the context of direct and collateral review, I would affirm on the PCRA court's finding that direct appeal counsel had a reasonable basis for not raising a defective waiver colloquy issue.

2024Our Court has stated that “[p]roper defenses to the writ include actual payment of taxes, a defective claim or lien, fraud, or lack of process or notice.” Valley Forge Sewer Authority, 121 A.3d at 1166 n.3. 8 By filing an affidavit of defense, wherein proper defenses to the writ of scire facias were raised, Graham showed cause why the trial court should not enter judgment against him.

2019Later, in Commonwealth v. Spotz , 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244 (2011), the PCRA petitioner challenged counsel's failure to object to a defective waiver of counsel colloquy.

2019Later, in Commonwealth v. Spotz , 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244 (2011), the PCRA petitioner challenged counsel's failure to object to a defective waiver of counsel colloquy.

2016When the issue of a defective waiver of counsel colloquy is raised on direct appeal, there is no requirement that that appellant independently prove prejudice; pursuant to Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296 (Pa. Super. 2012) citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997) and Commonwealth v. Houtz, 856 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 2004), no showing of prejudice is required.

2016When the issue of a defective waiver of counsel colloquy is raised on direct appeal, there is no requirement that that appellant independently prove prejudice; pursuant to Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296 (Pa. Super. 2012) citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1997) and Commonwealth v. Houtz, 856 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 2004), no showing of prejudice is required.

2015Moreover, as Clyburn observes, Pennsylvania cases which suggest that the defendant needs to show prejudice arising from a defective waiver are inapposite, because these cases had “different procedural postures”: Both Commonwealth v. Meehan, 628 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Pa.Super.1993), and Commonwealth v. Davis, 573 A.2d 1101 , 1108 n. 7 (Pa.Super.1990), were on appeal under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.

2010Pentlong Corp., 573 Pa. at 45 , 820 A.2d at 1247 .

2010Pentlong Corp., 573 Pa. at 45 , 820 A.2d at 1247 .

2003See, e.g., New *46 Kensington v. Gardner, 372 Pa. 72 , 92 A.2d 685 (1952); Commonwealth v. Turner Supply Co., 352 Pa. 288 , 42 A.2d 598 (1945); Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526 , 27 A. 8 (1893).

2003See, e.g., New *46 Kensington v. Gardner, 372 Pa. 72 , 92 A.2d 685 (1952); Commonwealth v. Turner Supply Co., 352 Pa. 288 , 42 A.2d 598 (1945); Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526 , 27 A. 8 (1893).

2003See, e.g., New *46 Kensington v. Gardner, 372 Pa. 72 , 92 A.2d 685 (1952); Commonwealth v. Turner Supply Co., 352 Pa. 288 , 42 A.2d 598 (1945); Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526 , 27 A. 8 (1893).

2003See, e.g., New *46 Kensington v. Gardner, 372 Pa. 72 , 92 A.2d 685 (1952); Commonwealth v. Turner Supply Co., 352 Pa. 288 , 42 A.2d 598 (1945); Harrisburg v. Baptist, 156 Pa. 526 , 27 A. 8 (1893).

2000Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Zeltins, 150 Pa. Cmwlth. 44, 614 A.2d 349 (1992).

2000Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Zeltins, 150 Pa. Cmwlth. 44, 614 A.2d 349 (1992).

1992Id., 363 Pa.Super. at 28-34 , 525 A.2d at 408-10 .

1992Id., 363 Pa.Super. at 28-34 , 525 A.2d at 408-10 .

1980In order for a valid waiver, the defendant must understand the essential ingredients of a jury trial which were set forth in the oft cited case, Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368 , 312 A.2d 597 : “These essential ingredients, basic to the concept of a jury trial, are the requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community, that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.” Appellant admits that he was advised of these essential ingredients of a jury trial in compliance with Williams, but then attempts to add ano

1980In order for a valid waiver, the defendant must understand the essential ingredients of a jury trial which were set forth in the oft cited case, Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368 , 312 A.2d 597 : “These essential ingredients, basic to the concept of a jury trial, are the requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community, that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.” Appellant admits that he was advised of these essential ingredients of a jury trial in compliance with Williams, but then attempts to add ano

1923Clair Coal Co. v. Martz, 75 Pa. 384 , in that here there is no special plea concluded to the court.

1923All of this would seem to indicate that it was the legislative intention to make the system ‘complete and exclusive’ in the method of procedure, as well as in the manner of filing the claim and in all other matters relating thereto.” And in the case of Deeds v. Imperial Brick Co., 219 Pa. 579 , that: “Ordinarily the affidavit of defence constitutes no part of the pleadings, but our recent act relating to mechanic’s lien contemplates that the real issue in such cases is to be defined through affidavit and counter-affidavit.” We do not think, however, that under this the pleadings raised the obj

1911It was said in Baskin v. Seechrist, 6 Pa. 154 , that: “It is true that a defective claim of title may be amended by presuming a conveyance from one shown to have title, where the presumptive grantee has exercised, for a long course of years, such acts of dominion over the lands as can only indicate a claim of beneficial ownership unchallenged by any counterclaim of the supposed grantor.” In Warner v. Henby, 48 Pa. 187 , Mr. Justice Thompson, in discussing presumptive grants, said: “ These presumptions, when ripened by time, and the silence of the warrantee, supply the place of a conveyance whe

1911It was said in Baskin v. Seechrist, 6 Pa. 154 , that: “It is true that a defective claim of title may be amended by presuming a conveyance from one shown to have title, where the presumptive grantee has exercised, for a long course of years, such acts of dominion over the lands as can only indicate a claim of beneficial ownership unchallenged by any counterclaim of the supposed grantor.” In Warner v. Henby, 48 Pa. 187 , Mr. Justice Thompson, in discussing presumptive grants, said: “ These presumptions, when ripened by time, and the silence of the warrantee, supply the place of a conveyance whe

1911That period is not less than twenty-one years.” Mr. Justice Clark in Wallace v. Presbyterian Church, supra, in discussing the necessity of the rule as a security of title, said: “Witnesses will die, papers will be lost or destroyed, and the exact proof of an ancient transaction thereby often becomes exceedingly difficult, sometimes impossible.

1847Such was the case of Taylor v. Dougherty, 1 Watts & Serg. 324 , where the plaintiff, and those under-whom he claimed, had paid taxes'for wild land for upwards of'thirty years, which was held sufficient to found- a presumption of grant from the original warrantee, as against a naked intruder without colour of title. ' The same principle is asserted in Hastings v. Wagner, 7 Watts & Serg. ' 215, where it is said, after the deed itself, or the legal registration of it, the next best evidence against a third party is long-continued claim of title with acts of ownership, uncontested by adverse posse