fair adversary hearing in California

2026To warrant relief in an independent action, the affected party must show that he was “denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 471; accord 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2021) Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 222.) If there was fraud or mistake, it must be “extrinsic or 5 collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action” that prevented the party “from having a trial.” (Kachig, sup

2026To warrant relief in an independent action, the affected party must show that he was “denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 471; accord 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2021) Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 222.) If there was fraud or mistake, it must be “extrinsic or 5 collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action” that prevented the party “from having a trial.” (Kachig, sup

2024Rather, [it] must show facts indicating a sufficiently meritorious claim to entitle [it] to a fair adversary hearing.’ ” (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246 (Mechling), quoting In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 346 (Park).) In making this determination, a court does not judge the truth or credibility of the facts presented. “[A] hearing on a motion to relieve a defendant from default is not the place or time to ascertain whether defendant really has a defense.” (First Small Business Inv.

2023(Rice v. Rice (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 646, 651 .) While “extrinsic fraud” or “extrinsic mistake” are often cited as the grounds for this equitable power, “those terms are given a broad meaning and tend to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342 (Park).) As a result, “[i]t does not seem to matter if the particular circumstances qualify as fraudulent or mistaken in the strict sense.” (Ibid.) Rather, “[w]hat constitutes extrinsic fraud depends in large part on the circumstance of the ind

2024If such neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, the basis for equitable relief is present, and is often called “extrinsic mistake.” ’ [Citations.] However, a motion to vacate a judgment should not be granted where the party requesting equitable relief was guilty of inexcusable neglect.” ( Aheroni, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 292–293.) Appellate courts have set forth “a stringent test to qualify for equitable relief from default on the basis of extrinsic mistake.” (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 982 .) “ ‘To set aside a judgment based upon extrinsic mistake

2024(Id.; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 .) Frost filed her motion roughly five years after entry of judgment in this case. 6 (In re Marriage of Wipson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 136, 141 ; Shields v. Siegel (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 334, 337-338 .) “[U]nder well established law[,] the court may grant relief under its inherent equitable power only if, due to the fraud of the opponent or by [the aggrieved party’s] own mistake, the aggrieved party was deprived of a fair adversary hearing and was prevented from presenting his claim or defense, or as the authorities put it, if the fraud or mis

2003“Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’ [Citation.] ‘Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudule

2003“Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’ [Citation.] ‘Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudule

2021Cadenasso (1929) 206 Cal. 436, 438 [“Courts of equity offer plain, speedy and adequate relief against the evil effects that may flow from void judgments”]; see also Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [“Typical of the situations in which equity has interfered with final judgments are the cases where the lack of a fair adversary hearing in the original action is attributable to matters outside the issues adjudicated therein which prevented one party from presenting his case to the court, as for example, where there is extrinsic fraud”].) Urias v. Harris Farms Upon learning that the judge

2016(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 669 , 884 P.2d 126 ] (Rappleyea); Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575 [ 122 P.2d 564 ].) “Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’ ” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 471 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 462 P.2d 17 ] (Kulchar); see 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 225, p. 832.) In co

2021(DKN Holdings LLC v. 26 America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581, 591 (Lazzarone).) However, the probate court has inherent equitable authority to set aside an order or decree when extrinsic factors have deprived a party of a fair adversary hearing. ( Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 ; Estate of Charters (1956) 46 Cal.2d 227 , 234–235; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 (Jorgensen).) Courts require a showing of extrinsic fraud or mistake in order to balance the public policy in favor of the finality of judgments with the policy in favor of providing litigants a fair opportunity to prese

1983(Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 489 , *905 462 P.2d 17 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1368 ]; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 17-21 [ 193 P.2d 728 ].) Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 792 , 612 P.2d 882 ]; see also 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 183, p. 3752.) It “usually arises when a party . . . has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance

2024Rather, [it] must show facts indicating a sufficiently meritorious claim to entitle [it] to a fair adversary hearing.’ ” (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246 (Mechling), quoting In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 346 (Park).) In making this determination, a court does not judge the truth or credibility of the facts presented. “[A] hearing on a motion to relieve a defendant from default is not the place or time to ascertain whether defendant really has a defense.” (First Small Business Inv.

2023Rather, [it] must show facts indicating a sufficiently meritorious claim to entitle [it] to a fair adversary hearing.’ ” (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246 ; see also Gruber v. Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529 , 532 [court analyzes the merit of a claim by accepting the claimant’s evidence as true and evaluating whether the claim is legally and factually tenable].) Here, Antich asserts claims under the FDCPA and CCRAA, alleging she paid her debt to the original creditor before it was referred to Capital for collection, and Capital should not have reported a past d

2000(See, e.g., Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 432 , 710 P.2d 232 ]; State of California v. Broderson, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 797 ; Harkins v. Fielder, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 528 ; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 223, 226, at pp. 727-728, 730-731.) “‘[E]xtrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” ’ ” (Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614 , quoting In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897,

2000(See, e.g., Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 432 , 710 P.2d 232 ]; State of California v. Broderson, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 797 ; Harkins v. Fielder, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 528 ; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 223, 226, at pp. 727-728, 730-731.) “‘[E]xtrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” ’ ” (Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614 , quoting In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897,

2024If that neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, the basis for equitable relief on the ground of extrinsic mistake is present.” (Manson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 , citing Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471 (Kulchar).) Examples of extrinsic mistake include “ ‘[r]eliance on an attorney who becomes incapacitated, or incompetence of the party without appointment of a guardian ad litem.’ ” (Heyman v. Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 921, 926 (Heyman).) “Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary he

2024If that neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, the basis for equitable relief on the ground of extrinsic mistake is present.” (Manson, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 47 , citing Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471 (Kulchar).) Examples of extrinsic mistake include “ ‘[r]eliance on an attorney who becomes incapacitated, or incompetence of the party without appointment of a guardian ad litem.’ ” (Heyman v. Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 921, 926 (Heyman).) “Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary he

2024(Id.; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 .) Frost filed her motion roughly five years after entry of judgment in this case. 6 (In re Marriage of Wipson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 136, 141 ; Shields v. Siegel (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 334, 337-338 .) “[U]nder well established law[,] the court may grant relief under its inherent equitable power only if, due to the fraud of the opponent or by [the aggrieved party’s] own mistake, the aggrieved party was deprived of a fair adversary hearing and was prevented from presenting his claim or defense, or as the authorities put it, if the fraud or mis

2021(Estate of Carter (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 (Carter).) “ ‘Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” ’ [Citations.] The clearest examples of extrinsic fraud are cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in ignorance of the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear. [Citation.] In both situations the party is ‘fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’ ” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607 , 614–615; see id. at p. 619 [reversing denial o

2025(See Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 470–471 (Kulchar); Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 737 (Aldrich).) “In this context the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘mistake’ have been given a broad meaning by the courts, and tend to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (Aldrich, at p. 738.) An attorney’s negligence may constitute an extrinsic mistake under some circumstances.

2023The defendant must . . . demonstrate a satisfactory excuse for not responding to the original action in a timely manner.” ’ [Citation.] A defendant has a satisfactory excuse if it shows that an extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake occurred.” (Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.) “In this context the terms ‘fraud’ and ‘mistake’ have been given a broad meaning by the courts, and tend to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing. [Citation.] The term ‘extrinsic’ refers to matters outside of the issues framed by the pleadings, or the

2024“Extrinsic fraud usually arises when a party is denied a fair adversary hearing because he [or she] has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his [or her] claim or defense.’” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471 .) “Examples of extrinsic fraud are: concealment of the existence of a community property asset, failure to give notice of the action to the other party, and convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the matter will not proceed (and then it does proceed).” (City and County of

2021(Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 .) The terms extrinsic fraud and extrinsic mistake have been interpreted broadly, encompassing “almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342 .) Fraud is extrinsic when a party is prevented from fully participating in the proceeding or deprived of the opportunity to present a claim to the court by the fraudulent conduct of another party, as opposed to the moving party’s own negligence. ( Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p.1068; City and County

2000(See, e.g., Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 432 , 710 P.2d 232 ; State of California v. Broderson, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 797 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 58 ; Harkins v. Fielder, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 528 , 310 P.2d 423 ; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 223, 226, at pp. 727-728, 730-731.) "`Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that "tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing."'" ( Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614 , 221 Cal.Rptr. 432 , 710 P.

2000(See, e.g., Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 432 , 710 P.2d 232 ]; State of California v. Broderson, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 797 ; Harkins v. Fielder, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 528 ; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 223, 226, at pp. 727-728, 730-731.) “‘[E]xtrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” ’ ” (Estate of Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614 , quoting In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897,

2024“The terms extrinsic fraud and extrinsic mistake have been interpreted broadly, encompassing ‘almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.’ ” (Hudson, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 664.) Nevertheless, “[t]o the extent that the court’s equity power to grant relief differs from its power under section 473, the equity power must be considered narrower, not wider.” (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 857 .) “Thus, a party who seeks to have a default set aside under a court’s equity power must make a stronger showing than is necessary to obtain rel

1969If such neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, the basis for equitable relief is present, and is often called ‘extrinsic mistake.’ ” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 2128.) Extrinsic mistake is found when a party becomes incompetent but no guardian ad litem is appointed (Olivera v. Grace, supra, at p. 577 ; Dei Tos v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 84-85 [ 232 P.2d 873 ]; Winslow v. McCarthy (1918) 39 Cal.App. 337, 340 [ 178 P. 720 ]); when one party relies on another to defend (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 855-856 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 409 P.2d 700

1986Extrinsic fraud or mistake is that which “deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present his case to the court.” (Westphal v. Westphal (1942) 20 Cal.2d 393, 397 [ 126 P.2d 105 ].) Extrinsic mistake *935 entails a party’s excusable neglect in failing to present his claim or defense, thereby resulting in an unjust judgment without a fair adversary hearing.

1986Extrinsic fraud or mistake is that which “deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present his case to the court.” (Westphal v. Westphal (1942) 20 Cal.2d 393, 397 [ 126 P.2d 105 ].) Extrinsic mistake *935 entails a party’s excusable neglect in failing to present his claim or defense, thereby resulting in an unjust judgment without a fair adversary hearing.

1969Proc., §1916; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575-576 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] ; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, pp. 2121-2122.) What constitutes extrinsic fraud depends in large part on the circumstance of the individual case. ‘‘ The outstanding characteristic of extrinsic fraud is that it prevents a fair adversary hearing, the party aggrieved being kept in ignorance of the proceedings.” (State of California v. Broderson, 247 Cal.App.2d 797, 804 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 58 ]; see also Craney v. Low, 46 Cal.2d 757, 759 [ 298 P.2d 860 ]; Neblett v. Pacific Mut.

1969Proc., §1916; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575-576 [ 122 P.2d 564 , 140 A.L.R. 1328 ] ; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, pp. 2121-2122.) What constitutes extrinsic fraud depends in large part on the circumstance of the individual case. ‘‘ The outstanding characteristic of extrinsic fraud is that it prevents a fair adversary hearing, the party aggrieved being kept in ignorance of the proceedings.” (State of California v. Broderson, 247 Cal.App.2d 797, 804 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 58 ]; see also Craney v. Low, 46 Cal.2d 757, 759 [ 298 P.2d 860 ]; Neblett v. Pacific Mut.

1980(Saunders v. Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73 [ 320 P.2d 131 ]; see also Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 577-578; Dei Tos v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 83 [ 232 P.2d 873 ].) The inadequacy of the new attorney’s representation is a further basis for holding that Mrs. Park was deprived of a fair adversary hearing.

1980(Saunders v. Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73 [ 320 P.2d 131 ]; see also Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 577-578; Dei Tos v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 83 [ 232 P.2d 873 ].) The inadequacy of the new attorney’s representation is a further basis for holding that Mrs. Park was deprived of a fair adversary hearing.

1980(Saunders v. Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73 [ 320 P.2d 131 ]; see also Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 577-578; Dei Tos v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 83 [ 232 P.2d 873 ].) The inadequacy of the new attorney’s representation is a further basis for holding that Mrs. Park was deprived of a fair adversary hearing.

1980(Saunders v. Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73 [ 320 P.2d 131 ]; see also Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19 Cal.2d at pp. 577-578; Dei Tos v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 83 [ 232 P.2d 873 ].) The inadequacy of the new attorney’s representation is a further basis for holding that Mrs. Park was deprived of a fair adversary hearing.

2026To warrant relief in an independent action, the affected party must show that he was “denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 471; accord 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2021) Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 222.) If there was fraud or mistake, it must be “extrinsic or 5 collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action” that prevented the party “from having a trial.” (Kachig, sup

2026To warrant relief in an independent action, the affected party must show that he was “denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been ‘deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 , 471; accord 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2021) Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 222.) If there was fraud or mistake, it must be “extrinsic or 5 collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action” that prevented the party “from having a trial.” (Kachig, sup

2002And is distinguishable from cases that you cite, where the reversal was by Appellate Court after the initial decision." There are, as Judge Garcia suggested, many cases that hold that a judgment or verdict after trial in favor of the plaintiff establishes the proceedings were prosecuted with probable cause, even if the case is later reversed on appeal. ( Cowles v. Carter (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 356 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ( Cowles ).) According to Cowles , the inquiry is: "Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior p

2002And is distinguishable from cases that you cite, where the reversal was by Appellate Court after the initial decision." There are, as Judge Garcia suggested, many cases that hold that a judgment or verdict after trial in favor of the plaintiff establishes the proceedings were prosecuted with probable cause, even if the case is later reversed on appeal. ( Cowles v. Carter (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 350, 356 , 171 Cal.Rptr. 269 ( Cowles ).) According to Cowles , the inquiry is: "Did a trier of fact after a fair adversary hearing reach a determination on the merits against the defendant in the prior p

1999Like extrinsic fraud, extrinsic mistake must result in the entry of an unjust judgment without a fair adversary hearing. ( Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 471-473, 82 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 462 P.2d 17 ; Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1113-1114 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ; In re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 83 , 260 Cal.Rptr. 403 ; Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 284, 292-293 ;, 252 Cal.Rptr. 369 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 231, pp. 741-742.) Equitable relief from an order or judgment otherwise final may De

1999Like extrinsic fraud, extrinsic mistake must result in the entry of an unjust judgment without a fair adversary hearing. ( Kulchar v. Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 471-473, 82 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 462 P.2d 17 ; Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1113-1114 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ; In re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 83 , 260 Cal.Rptr. 403 ; Aheroni v. Maxwell (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 284, 292-293 ;, 252 Cal.Rptr. 369 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 231, pp. 741-742.) Equitable relief from an order or judgment otherwise final may De

1960Actual fraud is not required. ( Antonsen v. Pacific Container *Page 794 Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 P.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud." ( Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899 , 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) [12] It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpreta

1960Actual fraud is not required. ( Antonsen v. Pacific Container *Page 794 Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 P.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud." ( Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899 , 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) [12] It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpreta

1960(Antonsen v. Pacific Container Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 F.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud.” (Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899, 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpretation to relieve him from a judgment taken withou

1960(Antonsen v. Pacific Container Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 F.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud.” (Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899, 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpretation to relieve him from a judgment taken withou

1960Actual fraud is not required. ( Antonsen v. Pacific Container *Page 794 Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 P.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud." ( Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899 , 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) [12] It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpreta

1960Actual fraud is not required. ( Antonsen v. Pacific Container *Page 794 Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 120 P.2d 148 ]; Rogers v. Mulkey, 63 Cal.App.2d 567 [ 147 P.2d 62 ]; Chung Gee v. Quan Wing, 103 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 229 P.2d 50 ]; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137 [ 256 P. 484 ].) Thus, this divorce, when secured, was subject to being set aside because of this fraud." ( Wendell v. Wendell, 111 Cal.App.2d 899 , 900 [ 245 P.2d 342 ].) [12] It is well established that in cases where the aggrieved party is unable to make out a case of intentional fraud, the courts on motion will extend a liberal interpreta