consideration of the appropriate factors in California

2024(Mooney v. Superior Court (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 523, 536 .) “However, the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032.’ ” (In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 .) In this case, the court expressly stated on the record that it found an award of attorney fees and costs appropriate and that there was a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) Although the court used the $16,005 figure for Father’s income that we found problematic ante in fin

2022Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.” (§ 2032, subds. (a), (b).) “ ‘[T]he family court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying an attorney fees award . . . .’ [Citation.] However, the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Sharples, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 165 .) Express findin

2020(In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (Sharples).) Still, “the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032,’ ” as well as section 4320 (as incorporated by § 2032, subd. (b)). ( Sharples, supra, at p. 165 ; see also In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 111-112 ; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [it must be reflected in the record that the trial court exercised its discretion and considered the statutory factors].) When rulin

2014(In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 44 ]; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1313-1314 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 375 ].) “[T]he family court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying an attorney fees award . .. .” (In re Marriage of Tharp, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 .) However, the court’s “decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032.” (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 [the record mu

2025Its findings of fact are reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard. [Citation.] Its resolution of a 6 question of law is subject to de novo review. [Citation.] Where the Legislature has committed a particular issue to the family court’s discretion and the court must weigh various factors and choose from a range of options, that discretionary determination will not be disturbed if it falls within the range established by the applicable legal criteria.” (In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15 , 25 (Knox).) “While the [trial] court has considerable latitude in fashioni

2014(In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [ 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 44 ]; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1313-1314 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 375 ].) “[T]he family court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying an attorney fees award . .. .” (In re Marriage of Tharp, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313 .) However, the court’s “decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032.” (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 [the record mu

2025Its findings of fact are reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard. [Citation.] Its resolution of a 6 question of law is subject to de novo review. [Citation.] Where the Legislature has committed a particular issue to the family court’s discretion and the court must weigh various factors and choose from a range of options, that discretionary determination will not be disturbed if it falls within the range established by the applicable legal criteria.” (In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15 , 25 (Knox).) “While the [trial] court has considerable latitude in fashioni

2020Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 242 (award based only on disparity of income is an abuse of discretion.)” The court’s evaluation of the statutory factors is reflected in the following paragraph: “Here the Court has determined there is not a disparity in income that would justify the award of attorney’s fees.

2020(In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (Sharples).) Still, “the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032,’ ” as well as section 4320 (as incorporated by § 2032, subd. (b)). ( Sharples, supra, at p. 165 ; see also In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 111-112 ; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [it must be reflected in the record that the trial court exercised its discretion and considered the statutory factors].) When rulin

2020(In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (Sharples).) Still, “the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032,’ ” as well as section 4320 (as incorporated by § 2032, subd. (b)). ( Sharples, supra, at p. 165 ; see also In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 111-112 ; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [it must be reflected in the record that the trial court exercised its discretion and considered the statutory factors].) When rulin

2015(Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 .) Put another way, “‘the trial court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’” (Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 .) “However, the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code 14 sections 2030 and 2032.’ [Citations.]” (Sharples, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 165 .) Additionally, “[t]he trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of d

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

2015(Rosen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 .) Put another way, “‘the trial court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’” (Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 .) “However, the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code 14 sections 2030 and 2032.’ [Citations.]” (Sharples, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 165 .) Additionally, “[t]he trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of d

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

2014(In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 296 .) At the same time, while the family law court has wide discretion in granting or denying a pendente lite fee award, “its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors.” (Marriage of Hatch, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at 1219 .) Stated in other words, the family law court’s discretion is “limited by the statutes which enable the exercise of that discretion.” (In re Marriage of Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 866 .) II.

1985(See In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 297-304 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 918 ]; In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-427 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 885 ]; In re Marriage of Popenhager, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525, Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law I (1985) ch. 14; Attorneys Fees and Costs, § 14:23, p. 14-6.2.) In exercising its discretion to award attorney fees under Civil Code section 4370 the trial court must consider the respective incomes and needs of the parties.

2020(In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165 (Sharples).) Still, “the court’s ‘decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors as set forth in code sections 2030 and 2032,’ ” as well as section 4320 (as incorporated by § 2032, subd. (b)). ( Sharples, supra, at p. 165 ; see also In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 111-112 ; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975 [it must be reflected in the record that the trial court exercised its discretion and considered the statutory factors].) When rulin

2014(In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ]; Richards, Watson & Gershon v. King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) Wife argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion with respect to the OSC and denying her request solely because of the erroneous conclusion that form FL-319 was mandatory.

2014(In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ]; Richards, Watson & Gershon v. King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) Wife argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion with respect to the OSC and denying her request solely because of the erroneous conclusion that form FL-319 was mandatory.

2014(In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ]; Richards, Watson & Gershon v. King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) Wife argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion with respect to the OSC and denying her request solely because of the erroneous conclusion that form FL-319 was mandatory.

2014(In re Marriage of Gray (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 504, 515 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ]; Richards, Watson & Gershon v. King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 ].) Wife argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion with respect to the OSC and denying her request solely because of the erroneous conclusion that form FL-319 was mandatory.

2014(See In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 27 [“testimony of a single witness, ‘even a party in a divorce case,’ may constitute substantial evidence”].) attorneys’ fees “‘must reflect an exercise of discretion and a consideration of the appropriate factors’”]; cf. In re Marriage of Sharples (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 168 [trial court erred by denying application for pendente lite attorneys’ fees on the sole ground that applicant had not filed optional Judicial Council form and by failing to exercise “its discretion in considering the merits of the OSC”].) 13 In addition, Lopez’s

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987Co. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 570 ].) Equally beyond dispute is the principle that the standard of care for professionals, including title companies, is that of other professionals within their area of expertise. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed 1974) Torts, § 518, pp. 2783-2784.) It is now clear that a defendant can be liable for economic harm inflicted upon a third party with whom he has no direct dealing, provided that the consideration of the appropriate factors warrants the imposition of a duty to the third party.

1987Co. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 570 ].) Equally beyond dispute is the principle that the standard of care for professionals, including title companies, is that of other professionals within their area of expertise. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed 1974) Torts, § 518, pp. 2783-2784.) It is now clear that a defendant can be liable for economic harm inflicted upon a third party with whom he has no direct dealing, provided that the consideration of the appropriate factors warrants the imposition of a duty to the third party.

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1987(J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803-804 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Connor v. Great Western Sav.& *861 Loan Ass’n (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 447 P.2d 609 , 39 A.L.R.3d 224 ]; Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 364 P.2d 685 ]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 [ 320 P.2d 16 , 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 ].) Those factors are: “(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the clo

1986(Ibid.; Holt v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 427, 437 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 1 ].) We agree with the trial court that under the circumstances dismissal cannot be considered an abuse of discretion.

1986(Ibid.; Holt v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 427, 437 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 1 ].) We agree with the trial court that under the circumstances dismissal cannot be considered an abuse of discretion.

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

1985(See In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 297-304 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 918 ]; In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-427 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 885 ]; In re Marriage of Popenhager, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525, Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law I (1985) ch. 14; Attorneys Fees and Costs, § 14:23, p. 14-6.2.) In exercising its discretion to award attorney fees under Civil Code section 4370 the trial court must consider the respective incomes and needs of the parties.

1985(See In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 297-304 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 918 ]; In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-427 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 885 ]; In re Marriage of Popenhager, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525, Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law I (1985) ch. 14; Attorneys Fees and Costs, § 14:23, p. 14-6.2.) In exercising its discretion to award attorney fees under Civil Code section 4370 the trial court must consider the respective incomes and needs of the parties.

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con

1985(In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 525 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 379 ]; In re Marriage of Janssen (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 425, 428 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; In re Marriage of Gonzales (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 340, 344 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 278 ]; In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 ] [disapproved on other grounds by In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 453 ( 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 573 P.2d 41 )].) But, while the court has considerable latitude in fashioning or denying a pendente lite fee award its decision must reflect an exercise of discretion and a con