Cooper analysis in California

2019In *653 any event, any error by the trial court in denying Cooper's motion to suppress her estimate of 23 *520 seconds on the Romberg test was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) Cooper's performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test showed impairment, she refused to do two other FSTs, she was swaying and unsteady on her feet on the roadway, and she smelled of alcohol.

2019In *653 any event, any error by the trial court in denying Cooper's motion to suppress her estimate of 23 *520 seconds on the Romberg test was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) Cooper's performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test showed impairment, she refused to do two other FSTs, she was swaying and unsteady on her feet on the roadway, and she smelled of alcohol.

2025Prock and Watts were making the well-established point that “ ‘acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the defendant is innocent’ ” but “ ‘merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.’ ” ( Watts, supra, 519 U.S. at p. 155; Prock, 22 The People see People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 (Santamaria) as demonstrating “why Cooper’s analysis is incorrect” and the conspiracy acquittal did not preclude the trial court’s findings.

2024(People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958 .) The second element of prejudice “is a contextual inquiry that examines the actual effect of a defense attorney’s error on the trial outcome.” (People v. Zaheer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 326 , 339.) Focusing on that second element, we find that Cooper’s claim fails because he cannot establish prejudice even if his attorney’s performance was deficient.

2022Because there is no evidence contradicting the County’s assertion that it expressly planned the area without any warning signs, the absence of such signs cannot be the basis of a cause of action here.7 As we explained in Compton, “[i]t would be illogical to hold that a public entity immune from liability because the design was deemed reasonably adoptable, could then be held liable for failing to warn that the design was dangerous. [Citation.]” (Compton, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 600 .) Thus, Cooper’s claim for liability based on these causes of injury are barred by design immunity. 7 We note

2022We need not resolve this question here, however, because Cooper’s claim is supported by established case law in the analogous context of petitions for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 22 (Proposition 36 or the Act).14 (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924 , 941; People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 , 725– 727.) Proposition 36 reduced “the punishment for some third strike offenses that are neither serious nor violent.” (Arevalo, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 .) Similar to Senate Bill 1437, Proposition 36 also added section 1170.126, which “crea

2022(Arevalo, at p. 841.) Arevalo and a later case, People v. Piper (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1007 (Piper), both held that a trial court could not conclude that a defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126 by relying on factual determinations about the defendant’s gun use that “turn[ed] acquittals and not-true enhancement findings [at trial] into their opposites.” (Arevalo, at p. 853; accord Piper, at p. 1015.) In Arevalo, the defendant was convicted at trial of a third strike but acquitted of a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, and an allegation that he was armed wit

2022We need not resolve this question here, however, because Cooper’s claim is supported by established case law in the analogous context of petitions for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 22 (Proposition 36 or the Act).14 (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924 , 941; People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719 , 725– 727.) Proposition 36 reduced “the punishment for some third strike offenses that are neither serious nor violent.” (Arevalo, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 .) Similar to Senate Bill 1437, Proposition 36 also added section 1170.126, which “crea

2021(People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1057 .) The trial “court was permitted to conclude that the monetary burden the restitution fine imposed on [Cooper] was outweighed by [these] considerations.” (Ibid.) We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Cooper to pay a $5,000 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), but we order the correction of several clerical errors in the sentencing minute order and indeterminate abstract of judgment as set forth below. 4 DISPOSITION We order the trial court to amend the March 13, 2020 sentencing minute order and the

2021(People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139 .) Cooper’s claim that he could not pay the restitution fine did not compel the trial court to impose the statutory minimum, particularly in light of the seriousness and gravity of the offenses he committed, “ ‘and the harm he caused to the victim’ ” and the victim’s family.

2021(See, e.g., People v. Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272 , 279-282.) The Supreme Court will likely resolve the conflict in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 65 , review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, in which the parties have been asked to address the following two issues: “Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments?

2021Cooper’s motion relied on Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , but acknowledged other courts of appeal had disagreed with Dueñas’s due process analysis and expressly stated, “This court is free to ‘make a choice between conflicting decisions,’” citing Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 .

2021Cooper’s motion relied on Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , but acknowledged other courts of appeal had disagreed with Dueñas’s due process analysis and expressly stated, “This court is free to ‘make a choice between conflicting decisions,’” citing Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 .

2015(Ibid.) On appeal, the Cooper defendant argued that the trial court had erred by failing to instruct on second degree murder, but the California Supreme Court held that “any error 25 was invited” because the record showed that “[d]efense counsel had a deliberate tactical purpose for his objection.” (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 827 .) The record showed that the defendant’s trial counsel “believed it was in his client’s interest not to have the second degree murder instructions” and that counsel was aware that without an objection, the trial court would have given the lesser included offense

2015This relationship 'imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.' " (In re Marriage of Simmons (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 584, 590 .) Further, as relevant here, case law establishes that a spouse's fiduciary duty includes the duty of fair dealing in handling the separate property of the other spouse.

2014(See Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1345 .) In any case, because we affirm the judgment here, our denial of Cooper's motion is of no consequence to Cooper.

2014(See Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1345 .) In any case, because we affirm the judgment here, our denial of Cooper's motion is of no consequence to Cooper.

2008In People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 ] our Supreme Court added to the Cooper analysis.

2008In People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 ] our Supreme Court added to the Cooper analysis.

1994(See People v. Macedo (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d 554, 558 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 754 ]; People v. Forte (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 1317, 1321-1322 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 855 ]; People v. Brady, supra, 190 Cal. App.3d 124, 133-134, 137 ; People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 477, 481-482 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 151 ].) The People maintain that the reasoning of these decisions is inconsistent with the analysis contained in this court's decision in People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1158 , and suggest that, under the Cooper analysis, the commission of a burglary does not terminate, for the purpose of aiding and abetting,

1994(See People v. Macedo (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d 554, 558 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 754 ]; People v. Forte (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 1317, 1321-1322 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 855 ]; People v. Brady, supra, 190 Cal. App.3d 124, 133-134, 137 ; People v. Markus (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 477, 481-482 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 151 ].) The People maintain that the reasoning of these decisions is inconsistent with the analysis contained in this court's decision in People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1158 , and suggest that, under the Cooper analysis, the commission of a burglary does not terminate, for the purpose of aiding and abetting,

1989Thus, the issue is reduced to whether the trial court erred when it held that SMP-NY was responsible for all of Miller’s liabilities under the exception announced in Ray . *1646 In considering the liability of SMP-NY for the Phillipses injuries, the trial court imposed such liability on the “product line continuation theory” of Ray, supra, by first citing as the definition of “continuation” of a product line the following language from Rawlings v. D.

1988If we allow the state to dishonor at will the agreements it enters into, the result could only serve to weaken the plea negotiating system.” ( 437 So.2d at p. 1335 , fn. omitted.) In Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 437 , 104 S.Ct. 2543 ], however, the United States Supreme Court held the Cooper rule was not mandated by the federal Constitution.

1988If we allow the state to dishonor at will the agreements it enters into, the result could only serve to weaken the plea negotiating system.” ( 437 So.2d at p. 1335 , fn. omitted.) In Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 437 , 104 S.Ct. 2543 ], however, the United States Supreme Court held the Cooper rule was not mandated by the federal Constitution.

1988If we allow the state to dishonor at will the agreements it enters into, the result could only serve to weaken the plea negotiating system.” ( 437 So.2d at p. 1335 , fn. omitted.) In Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 437 , 104 S.Ct. 2543 ], however, the United States Supreme Court held the Cooper rule was not mandated by the federal Constitution.

1988If we allow the state to dishonor at will the agreements it enters into, the result could only serve to weaken the plea negotiating system.” ( 437 So.2d at p. 1335 , fn. omitted.) In Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 437 , 104 S.Ct. 2543 ], however, the United States Supreme Court held the Cooper rule was not mandated by the federal Constitution.