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21 California opinions name it 3 courts 1996–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ehrlich v. City of Culver Citygreen2 sentences2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 276 [explaining that the Nollan/Dolan test “applies regardless of whether the [permit] condition requires the landowner to relinquish property or requires her to pay a ‘monetary exactio[n]’ instead of relinquishing the property”], citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612-615; see California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 459, fn. 11 [declining to decide the issue but recognizing that Koontz “suggests that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to monetary permit conditions even when the payment is not imposed in lieu of a requirement that the property owner dedica 2025(See Ehrlich, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 859-860, 865-868 (plur. opn. of Arabian, J.) [equating California’s reasonable relationship test with Nollan/Dolan scrutiny].) Thus, under the reasonable relationship test employed in California, the question at the second step of the analysis (i.e., the Dolan standard) is whether the amount of the challenged impact fee is reasonably related (or in Dolan’s terms--roughly proportional) to the cost of the public facility or portion of the public facility attributable to the development on which the impact fee is imposed. | 8 | 9 |
San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2025(Id. at pp. 252, 254– 255, 263.) The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it concluded “the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan/Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges.” (Id. at p. 267, italics omitted.) It relied in part on Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 470 , which in turn followed San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 670 , to hold that the Nollan/Dolan test governed only individual adjudicative permit approval decisions and fees, not 2025(Id. at pp. 252, 254– 255, 263.) The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it concluded “the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan/Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges.” (Id. at p. 267, italics omitted.) It relied in part on Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 470 , which in turn followed San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 670 , to hold that the Nollan/Dolan test governed only individual adjudicative permit approval decisions and fees, not | 6 | 7 |
Dolan v. City of Tigardgreen2 sentences2025Rough Proportionality Standard The “rough proportionality” component of the Nollan/Dolan test comes from Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 . 2025Rough Proportionality Standard The “rough proportionality” component of the Nollan/Dolan test comes from Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374 . | 4 | 8 |
California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 276 [explaining that the Nollan/Dolan test “applies regardless of whether the [permit] condition requires the landowner to relinquish property or requires her to pay a ‘monetary exactio[n]’ instead of relinquishing the property”], citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612-615; see California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 459, fn. 11 [declining to decide the issue but recognizing that Koontz “suggests that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to monetary permit conditions even when the payment is not imposed in lieu of a requirement that the property owner dedica 2022As our Supreme Court has explained, “legislatively prescribed monetary fees”--as distinguished from a monetary condition imposed on an individual permit application on an ad hoc basis--“that are imposed as a condition of development are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test.” (California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 459, fn. 11 (CBIA), citing San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 663-671 [“The ‘sine qua non’ for application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is . . . the ‘discretionary deployment of the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in in | 3 | 7 |
Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monicagreen2 sentences2025(Id. at pp. 252, 254– 255, 263.) The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it concluded “the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan/Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges.” (Id. at p. 267, italics omitted.) It relied in part on Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 470 , which in turn followed San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 670 , to hold that the Nollan/Dolan test governed only individual adjudicative permit approval decisions and fees, not 2018However, another limitation on the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to takings claims is that the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan / Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges. ( Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456 , 470, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ( Action Apartment ) [" Nollan / Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable legislative general zoning decisions."].) The Action Apartment court affi | 3 | 4 |
Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022As our Supreme Court has explained, “legislatively prescribed monetary fees”--as distinguished from a monetary condition imposed on an individual permit application on an ad hoc basis--“that are imposed as a condition of development are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test.” (California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 459, fn. 11 (CBIA), citing San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 663-671 [“The ‘sine qua non’ for application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny is . . . the ‘discretionary deployment of the police power’ in ‘the imposition of land-use conditions in in 2022The Nollan/Dolan test does not apply to the legislatively prescribed generally applicable development impact fee at issue here (see CBIA, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 459, fn. 11 , citing San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 663-671; Santa Monica, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967), and California law does not require an individualized or site-specific determination of reasonableness for each particular project subject to the fee (see AMCAL Chico LLC v. Chico Unified School District, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 127; Cresta Bella, L.P. v. Poway Unified School Dist., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 4 | 2 | 4 |
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.green2 sentences2025In Koontz, the Supreme Court extended the Nollan/Dolan test to “so-called ‘monetary exactions’ ” demanded by the government as a substitute for the dedication of real property to mitigate the impact of a proposed development project. ( Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612, see also p. 619.) Because these “ ‘in lieu of’ fees are utterly commonplace” and “functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions,” the Supreme Court has concluded that they too must satisfy the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements of Nollan and Dolan. 2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 276 [explaining that the Nollan/Dolan test “applies regardless of whether the [permit] condition requires the landowner to relinquish property or requires her to pay a ‘monetary exactio[n]’ instead of relinquishing the property”], citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at pp. 612-615; see California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 459, fn. 11 [declining to decide the issue but recognizing that Koontz “suggests that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to monetary permit conditions even when the payment is not imposed in lieu of a requirement that the property owner dedica | 1 | 6 |
Nollan v. California Coastal Commissiongreen2 sentences2025Essential Nexus Standard The “essential nexus” component of the Nollan/Dolan test comes from Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825 . 2022(Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 837 .) The Dolan part of the test is the “rough proportionality” standard with regard to the “degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.” (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 386 .) The Dolan court concluded, “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the [government] must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” (Id. at p. 391.) In Koontz, the United States Supreme Court extended the Nollan/ | 1 | 5 |
Sheetz v. El Dorado Countygreen2 sentences2025Relying on precedent from the California Supreme Court, [we held] that the Nollan/Dolan test applies only to permit conditions imposed ‘ “on an individual and discretionary basis.” ’ [Citations.] Fees imposed on ‘a broad class of property owners through legislative action,’ [we] said, need not satisfy that test. [Citation.] The California Supreme Court denied review.” (Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 273 .) Because the state courts had “reached different conclusions on the question of whether the Takings Clause recognizes a distinction between legislative and 7 administrative conditions on land- 2025(Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 273 & fn. 3 [collecting cases].) In 2024, the Supreme Court reversed our prior opinion, holding that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to legislative and administrative conditions on building permits. | 1 | 3 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green2 sentences2015Three years later, in Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 , the federal high court held that the ―substantially advance‖ standard set out in Agins is not an appropriate standard for determining when a taking of property has occurred, and instead that the categorical and regulatory taking categories described in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 , constitute the appropriate taking standards. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 540- 545.) After Lingle, the California Court of Appeal, in Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 467-471 , upheld the validity of an inclusiona 2015Three years later, in Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 , the federal high court held that the “substantially advance” standard set out in Agins is not an appropriate standard for determining when a taking of property has occurred, and instead that the categorical and regulatory taking categories described in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 , constitute the appropriate taking standards. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 540-545.) After Lingle , the California Court of Appeal, in Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 467-471 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ], upheld the val | 1 | 3 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Citygreen2 sentences2015Three years later, in Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 , the federal high court held that the ―substantially advance‖ standard set out in Agins is not an appropriate standard for determining when a taking of property has occurred, and instead that the categorical and regulatory taking categories described in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 , constitute the appropriate taking standards. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 540- 545.) After Lingle, the California Court of Appeal, in Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 467-471 , upheld the validity of an inclusiona 2015Three years later, in Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 , the federal high court held that the “substantially advance” standard set out in Agins is not an appropriate standard for determining when a taking of property has occurred, and instead that the categorical and regulatory taking categories described in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 , constitute the appropriate taking standards. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 540-545.) After Lingle , the California Court of Appeal, in Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 467-471 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ], upheld the val | 1 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2025(Ehrlich, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 899 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [“Nollan and Dolan in most cases impose no additional constitutional burden on the government to justify development fees beyond the burden it already bears under the state constitution and statute”]; id., at p. 898, fn. 2 [“I agree with the plurality that ‘the term “reasonable relationship” embraces both constitutional and statutory meanings which, for all practical purposes, have merged to the extent that the Dolan decision applies to development fees’ ”]; see also Sheetz III, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 151 [“the Nollan/Dolan t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aultgreen2 sentences2022“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 .) Thus, contrary to Sheetz’s contention, Cedar Point does not abrogate the rule--by which we are bound-- that generally applicable development fees are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test. 2022“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 .) Thus, contrary to Sheetz’s contention, Cedar Point does not abrogate the rule--by which we are bound-- that generally applicable development fees are not subject to the Nollan/Dolan test. | 1 | 1 |
Alto Eldorado Partnership v. County of Santa Fegreen1 sentence2014(Lingle, at p. 546; see Alto Eldorado Partnership v. County of Santa Fe (10th Cir. 2011) 634 F.3d 1170, 1178 [Tenth Circuit treats Nollan/Dolan land use exaction claims as a subcategory of physical per se takings]; Conklin Development v. City of Spokane Valley (9th Cir., Aug. 19, 2011, No. 10-35322) 2011 WL 3648100 , p. *2 [Nollan/Dolan framework is limited to per se physical takings].) Lingle reasoned that both cases are rooted in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. | 1 | 1 |
IOWA ASSUR. CORP. v. City of Indianola, Iowagreen1 sentence2014Hawaii 2008) 573 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1365 (“the first inquiry under the Nollan/Dolan standard is whether the government’s exaction effects a taking”); Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City of lndianola, Iowa (8th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1094, 1098-1099 (Nollan test does not apply to ordinance that did not restrict owners’ right to exclude others from their property). 9 Overflight cases have been analyzed in similar fashion in the federal courts: “[S]ubject to certain narrow exceptions not applicable here, flights by government-owned aircraft at elevations exceeding the minimum safe altitudes of flight establis | 1 | 1 |
| Kamaole Pointe Development LP v. County of Mauigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drennen v. County of Venturagreen | 1 | 1 |
Alva A. Aaron v. The United States. Peter Andersen v. The United Statesgreen1 sentence2014Hawaii 2008) 573 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1365 (“the first inquiry under the Nollan/Dolan standard is whether the government’s exaction effects a taking”); Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City of lndianola, Iowa (8th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1094, 1098-1099 (Nollan test does not apply to ordinance that did not restrict owners’ right to exclude others from their property). 9 Overflight cases have been analyzed in similar fashion in the federal courts: “[S]ubject to certain narrow exceptions not applicable here, flights by government-owned aircraft at elevations exceeding the minimum safe altitudes of flight establis | 1 | 1 |
| Poe v. Ullmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pennell v. City of San Josegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2025(Id. at pp. 394-395.) Over the ensuing three decades since Dolan was decided in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has not provided further guidance as to the contours of the Dolan standard aside from noting that the rough proportionality requirement has not been extended “beyond the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public.” (City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., supra, 526 U.S. at p. 702 .) As a result, the law in 34 this area, as it did prior to Nollan and Dolan, has largely developed in the 2024(City of Monterey, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 703 .) Because the Nollan/Dolan test arose from the “realities of the permitting process” (Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 604 ), its two considerations are centered on this context. | 3 | 2008–2025 |
Cresta Bella v. Poway Unified School District
green
2 sentences2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an 2022The Nollan/Dolan test does not apply to the legislatively prescribed generally applicable development impact fee at issue here (see CBIA, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 459, fn. 11 , citing San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 663-671; Santa Monica, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967), and California law does not require an individualized or site-specific determination of reasonableness for each particular project subject to the fee (see AMCAL Chico LLC v. Chico Unified School District, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 127; Cresta Bella, L.P. v. Poway Unified School Dist., supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 4 | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Levin v. City & County of San Francisco
green
2 sentences2018The court stated: "Both the United States and California Supreme Courts have explained the two-part Nollan / Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable legislative general zoning decisions. [Citations.] ... 'The "sine qua non" for application of Nollan / Dolan scrutiny is thus the "discretionary deployment of the police power" in "the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases." [Citation.] Only "individualized development fees warrant a type of review aki 2018In Levin , the plaintiffs facially challenged a San Francisco ordinance that "require[d] property owners wishing to withdraw their rent-controlled property from the rental market to pay a lump sum to displaced tenants." ( Levin, supra , 71 F.Supp.3d at p. 1074 .) The federal district court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the Nollan / Dolan test, and concluded the ordinance did "not pass constitutional muster" because it was "a monetary exaction that 'lack[s] an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issu | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Nash v. City of Santa Monica
green
1 sentence2025Because strict scrutiny does not apply, we consider only whether the restrictive covenant condition is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the general welfare or a proper legislative goal. ( Nash, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 103, 108–109.) We find a reasonable relationship between the condition and the general welfare and a proper legislative goal for the reasons set forth ante regarding the Benedettis’ Nollan/Dolan challenge. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach
green
2 sentences2025It reached this conclusion largely based on Beach & Bluff, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th 244 . 2025(Id. at pp. 252, 254– 255, 263.) The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it concluded “the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan/Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges.” (Id. at p. 267, italics omitted.) It relied in part on Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456, 470 , which in turn followed San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 670 , to hold that the Nollan/Dolan test governed only individual adjudicative permit approval decisions and fees, not | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda
green
2 sentences2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an 2025All that is required of the [government] is that it demonstrate that development contributes to the need for the facilities, and that its choices as to what will adequately accommodate the [new population] are reasonably based.’ ” (Boatworks, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 298 .) In determining whether there was a valid method for imposing the fee in question, courts do not “concern themselves with the [government’s] methods of marshalling and evaluating scientific data. [Citations.] Yet the court must be able to assure itself that before imposing the fee the [government] engaged in a reasoned an | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Tyler v. Hennepin County
green
1 sentence2024Even ordinary property taxes—which the Supreme Court recently reiterated “are not themselves a taking” (Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023) 598 U.S. 631, 637 )—would also be subject to plaintiffs’ modified Nollan/Dolan test. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rezai v. City of Tustin
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 ; Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154-155 ; Rezai v. City of Tustin (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 ; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713 , 718- 719; Taylor v. Swanson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 416, 418 .)8 III Petition for Writ of Mandate Sheetz contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test and the “reasonable relationship” test embodied in the Mitigation Fee Act. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Taylor v. Swanson
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 ; Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154-155 ; Rezai v. City of Tustin (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 ; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713 , 718- 719; Taylor v. Swanson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 416, 418 .)8 III Petition for Writ of Mandate Sheetz contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test and the “reasonable relationship” test embodied in the Mitigation Fee Act. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hensler v. City of Glendale
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 ; Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154-155 ; Rezai v. City of Tustin (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 ; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713 , 718- 719; Taylor v. Swanson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 416, 418 .)8 III Petition for Writ of Mandate Sheetz contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test and the “reasonable relationship” test embodied in the Mitigation Fee Act. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
City of Santee v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 ; Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154-155 ; Rezai v. City of Tustin (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 ; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713 , 718- 719; Taylor v. Swanson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 416, 418 .)8 III Petition for Writ of Mandate Sheetz contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test and the “reasonable relationship” test embodied in the Mitigation Fee Act. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 ; Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 154-155 ; Rezai v. City of Tustin (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 ; City of Santee v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 713 , 718- 719; Taylor v. Swanson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 416, 418 .)8 III Petition for Writ of Mandate Sheetz contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test and the “reasonable relationship” test embodied in the Mitigation Fee Act. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Home Builders Assn. v. City of Napa
green
2 sentences2015Applying that standard, the City of 43 Napa court held that the challenged inclusionary housing ordinance was constitutionally valid. (90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 195-197.)17 CBIA contends, however, that this court‘s decision in San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th 643 , which was decided after City of Napa, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 188 , should be interpreted to limit inclusionary housing requirements only to those that are reasonably related to the adverse impacts that are caused by or attributable to the proposed developments that are subject to the ordinance — in effect, to requirements that satisfy s 2015(Id. at pp. 195-197.) 17 CBIA contends, however, that this court’s decision in San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th 643 , which was decided after City of Napa, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 188 , should be interpreted to limit inclusionary housing requirements only to those that are reasonably related to the adverse impacts that are caused by or attributable to the proposed developments that are subject to the ordinance — in effect, to requirements that satisfy something similar to the Nollan/Dolan test. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Goodman v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Aaron v. United States
green
1 sentence2014Hawaii 2008) 573 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1365 (“the first inquiry under the Nollan/Dolan standard is whether the government’s exaction effects a taking”); Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City of lndianola, Iowa (8th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1094, 1098-1099 (Nollan test does not apply to ordinance that did not restrict owners’ right to exclude others from their property). 9 Overflight cases have been analyzed in similar fashion in the federal courts: “[S]ubject to certain narrow exceptions not applicable here, flights by government-owned aircraft at elevations exceeding the minimum safe altitudes of flight establis | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.