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21 California opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Uttecht v. Browngreen2 sentences2016(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts‖]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [―The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‗critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‘ ‖].) We reject Sandoval‘s argument that the trial court erroneously ―applied a double standard‖ because it denied his motion to remove for cause three prospective jurors who favored the death pen 2015(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ] [“the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts”]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [“The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‘critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.’ ”].) We reject Sandoval’s argument that the trial court erroneously “applied a double standard” because it denied his motion to remove for cause three prospe | 2 | 2 |
People v. DePriestgreen2 sentences2016(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts‖]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [―The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‗critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‘ ‖].) We reject Sandoval‘s argument that the trial court erroneously ―applied a double standard‖ because it denied his motion to remove for cause three prospective jurors who favored the death pen 2015(See Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [―the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts‖]; People v. DePriest, supra, at p. 21 [―The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthand—factors of ‗critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‘ ‖].) We reject Sandoval‘s argument that the trial court erroneously ―applied a double standard‖ because it denied his motion to remove for cause three prospective jurors who favored the death pen | 2 | 2 |
State Personnel Board v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences2004(State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 435, 444 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 16 , 703 P.2d 354 ] [FEHA applies to civil service employees, who may pursue remedies under both FEHA and CSCA].) SPB has filed a brief in this court defending its decision to apply the new statute. 2004(State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 435, 444 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 16 , 703 P.2d 354 ] [FEHA applies to civil service employees, who may pursue remedies under both FEHA and CSCA].) SPB has filed a brief in this court defending its decision to apply the new statute. | 1 | 1 |
Del Rio v. Jettongreen2 sentences2001(Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 .) In contrast, however, prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 15 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 179 ]; see also Del Rio v. Jetton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ].) Why the double standard? 2001(Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 .) In contrast, however, prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 15 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 179 ]; see also Del Rio v. Jetton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ].) Why the double standard? | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Rowegreen2 sentences2001(Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 .) In contrast, however, prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 15 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 179 ]; see also Del Rio v. Jetton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ].) Why the double standard? 2001(Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 .) In contrast, however, prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 15 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 179 ]; see also Del Rio v. Jetton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ].) Why the double standard? | 1 | 1 |
DeVita v. County of Napagreen2 sentences2000When matters of substance rather than procedure are concerned, courts will not employ a double standard for initiative amendments and general plan amendments enacted by the legislative body." ( Id. at p. 796, fn. 12, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 , 889 P.2d 1019 .) Here, the violation of CEQA was not a mere matter of procedure, but a matter of substance because the CEQA violation invalidated City's adoption of the resolution placing Measure 1-97-1 on the ballot, and thus infected the subsequent election itself. 2000When matters of substance rather than procedure are concerned, courts will not employ a double standard for initiative amendments and general plan amendments enacted by the legislative body." ( Id. at p. 796, fn. 12, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 , 889 P.2d 1019 .) Here, the violation of CEQA was not a mere matter of procedure, but a matter of substance because the CEQA violation invalidated City's adoption of the resolution placing Measure 1-97-1 on the ballot, and thus infected the subsequent election itself. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences1998(People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 210, fn. 16 .) Defendant also asserts in effect that the trial court applied a double standard to the foregoing offers of proof by permitting the prosecution to admit similar testimony in proceedings against Troné. 1998He presents this contention perfunctorily, however, without argument or authority in support, and we reject it in kind. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 210, fn. 16 .) Defendant also asserts in effect that the trial court applied a double standard to the foregoing offers of proof by permitting the prosecution to admit similar testimony in proceedings against Trone. | 1 | 1 |
Sierra Club v. County of Sonomagreen2 sentences1994(See, e.g., Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 473 ]; A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1802-1803, 1806.) We also reject appellant’s contention that the SEIR’s discussion of alternative sites is defective in that it “operates under a double standard,” treating problems with alternative sites as insurmountable, yet at the same time ignoring or promising to mitigate identical problems with the preferred site. 1994(See, e.g., Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 473 ]; A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1802-1803, 1806.) We also reject appellant’s contention that the SEIR’s discussion of alternative sites is defective in that it “operates under a double standard,” treating problems with alternative sites as insurmountable, yet at the same time ignoring or promising to mitigate identical problems with the preferred site. | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1990Economics should teach us that legal services respond to the same laws of *986 supply and demand as do other products and services in our free economy-”]; Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 336, 354-355 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 854 ] [the county and state public defender “were created in response to this concern over the shoddy quality of legal services donated to indigent criminal defendants”].) In this case, the threat of coerced, uncompensated representation could be alleviated very simply by allowing defendant to discharge the Hernandezes and to seek appointment of counsel by the co 1990Economics should teach us that legal services respond to the same laws of *986 supply and demand as do other products and services in our free economy-”]; Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 336, 354-355 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 854 ] [the county and state public defender “were created in response to this concern over the shoddy quality of legal services donated to indigent criminal defendants”].) In this case, the threat of coerced, uncompensated representation could be alleviated very simply by allowing defendant to discharge the Hernandezes and to seek appointment of counsel by the co | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Bristol v. Younggreen2 sentences1979(See Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 234-237 [ 143 P.2d 689 ] (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.); In the Matter of the Estate of Hartman (1977) 172 Mont. 225 [ 563 P.2d 569, 571-573 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 259, p. 221.) It is in reality a double presumption. 1979(See Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 234-237 [ 143 P.2d 689 ] (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.); In the Matter of the Estate of Hartman (1977) 172 Mont. 225 [ 563 P.2d 569, 571-573 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 259, p. 221.) It is in reality a double presumption. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Fergusongreen2 sentences1977To this extent the Attorney General’s complaint about a double standard is correct, for “[t]he duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate.” (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 487 P.2d 1234 ].) Yet in numerous respects the situation of the prosecutor is overwhelmingly advantageous when compared to that of defense counsel. 1977To this extent the Attorney General’s complaint about a double standard is correct, for “[t]he duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate.” (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 487 P.2d 1234 ].) Yet in numerous respects the situation of the prosecutor is overwhelmingly advantageous when compared to that of defense counsel. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baingreen2 sentences1977(People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-850 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ].) On appeal the Attorney General in effect complains of a double standard governing prosecution and defense in that “only the prosecutor, as the ‘glorified’ representative of the People, can commit misconduct.” He seems to conclude that the prosecutor should not be held to a higher standard of behavior than defense counsel and therefore misbehavior of one counsel cancels out misbehavior of the other. 1977(People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-850 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ].) On appeal the Attorney General in effect complains of a double standard governing prosecution and defense in that “only the prosecutor, as the ‘glorified’ representative of the People, can commit misconduct.” He seems to conclude that the prosecutor should not be held to a higher standard of behavior than defense counsel and therefore misbehavior of one counsel cancels out misbehavior of the other. | 1 | 1 |
Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossiergreen2 sentences1944However costly some of the attributes of free enterprise may be, it is established in this state that "Competitive freedom ... is of sufficient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third party to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship exists between the latter two." (Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941), 18 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 112 P.2d 631 ], and cases there cited.) No claim is made by plaintiffs that defendants here induced any customers of the plaintiffs to breach any contract with them or induced any of the milk brokers to breach a contract between plaintiffs and 1944However costly some of the attributes of free enterprise may be, it is established in this state that "Competitive freedom ... is of sufficient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third party to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship exists between the latter two." (Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941), 18 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 112 P.2d 631 ], and cases there cited.) No claim is made by plaintiffs that defendants here induced any customers of the plaintiffs to breach any contract with them or induced any of the milk brokers to breach a contract between plaintiffs and | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Summer H.
green
2 sentences2009According to the court, section 361.4 eliminated this double standard. ( Summer H., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 .) The court then noted that section 360, subdivision (a) was "not a foster care placement statute." ( Summer H., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331 .) "Rather, section 360[, subdivision (a)] is triggered by the custodial parent's express approval of both a guardianship for the child and the prospective guardian." ( Ibid. ) Finally, the court distinguished between a guardianship ordered at a section 366.26 hearing and a section 360, subdivision (a) guardianship. 2009According to the court, section 361.4 eliminated this double standard. ( Summer H., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 .) The court then noted that section 360, subdivision (a) was "not a foster care placement statute." ( Summer H., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331 .) "Rather, section 360[, subdivision (a)] is triggered by the custodial parent's express approval of both a guardianship for the child and the prospective guardian." ( Ibid. ) Finally, the court distinguished between a guardianship ordered at a section 366.26 hearing and a section 360, subdivision (a) guardianship. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Mills
green
1 sentence2014(Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 175 , italics omitted.) We disagree. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Baxstrom v. Herold
green
2 sentences2008The United States Supreme Court concluded that this double standard violated the equal protection clause. “[W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [Indiana’s general civil commitment statutes], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” ( 4 2008The United States Supreme Court concluded that this double standard violated the equal protection clause. “[W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [Indiana’s general civil commitment statutes], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” ( 4 | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Conservatorship of Hofferber
green
1 sentence2008As the Jackson court put it: “Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for [civil] commitment that are available to all others.” (Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 727 .) “Rejecting the State’s argument that Baxstrom’s conviction and sentence constituted adequate justification for the difference in procedures, the Court said that ‘there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.’ ” ([Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 724 .) The | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2008As the Jackson court put it: “Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for [civil] commitment that are available to all others.” (Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 727 .) “Rejecting the State’s argument that Baxstrom’s conviction and sentence constituted adequate justification for the difference in procedures, the Court said that ‘there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.’ ” ([Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 724 .) The 2008The United States Supreme Court concluded that this double standard violated the equal protection clause. “[W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [Indiana’s general civil commitment statutes], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.” ( 4 | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Farrar v. Hobby
green
1 sentence2001(Farrar v. Hobby, supra, 506 U.S. 103 .) In contrast, however, prevailing civil rights defendants can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively “ ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ ” (Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 15 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 179 ]; see also Del Rio v. Jetton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 ].) Why the double standard? | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board
green
2 sentences1995(See Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 90, 103-104 .) When matters of substance rather than procedure are concerned, courts will not employ a double standard for initiative amendments and general plan amendments enacted by the legislative body. [1] All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted. [2] Although the term "legislative body" is not expressly defined in the planning law, section 34000 in title 4, pertaining to "Government of Cities," states that it "means board of trustees, city council, or other 1995(See Concerned Citizens of Calaveras County v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 90, 103-104 .) When matters of substance rather than procedure are concerned, courts will not employ a double standard for initiative amendments and general plan amendments enacted by the legislative body. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1986The admissibility of those declarations was not questioned. ( Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) In accordance with the decision in Hasson, I would decline "to obfuscate the clear line drawn in Hutchinson between proof of objectively ascertainable facts and proof of the subjective mental processes of jurors." ( Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 414 .) Regarding the quantum of proof required to trigger the presumption of prejudice, the concurring opinion appears to advocate the adoption of a double standard. 1986The admissibility of those declarations was not questioned. ( Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) In accordance with the decision in Hasson, I would decline "to obfuscate the clear line drawn in Hutchinson between proof of objectively ascertainable facts and proof of the subjective mental processes of jurors." ( Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 414 .) Regarding the quantum of proof required to trigger the presumption of prejudice, the concurring opinion appears to advocate the adoption of a double standard. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gulyas v. Gulyas
green
2 sentences1986Other examples of the double standard include Gulyas v. Gulyas, supra, 254 N.W.2d 818 , which affirmed a trial court’s award to a father who worked a standard 40-hour week. 1986Other examples of the double standard include Gulyas v. Gulyas, supra, 254 N.W.2d 818 , which affirmed a trial court's award to a father who worked a standard 40-hour week. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Conservatorship of Baber
green
2 sentences1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther 1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Cramer v. Shay
green
2 sentences1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther 1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Conservatorship of Mitchell
green
2 sentences1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther 1985(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 262 ] (doctrine of double *148 jeopardy is not applicable in conservatorship proceedings; conservatee cannot refuse to testify at his or her own conservatorship trial); Conservator-ship of Mitchell (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 759 ] (no right to warning of privilege of self-incrimination prior to psychiatric examination); Cramer v. Shay (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 242 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 303 ] (exclusionary rule promulgated in Miranda is unnecessary in commitment proceedings for mentally retarded).) We are persuaded and ther | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Regents of University of California v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
green
1 sentence1980Co., supra, 21 Cal.3d 624, 633 , footnote 2, the court indicated that section 337.15 was for the benefit of the contractor, in stating: “A contractor is in the business of constructing improvements and must devote his capital to that end; the need to provide reserves against an uncertain liability extending indefinitely into the future could seriously impinge upon the conduct of his .enterprise....” The construction which appellants wish placed upon section 337.15 could result in extending a contractor’s liability for an indefinite period, long beyond the 10-year period anticipated by the sect | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Matter of Estate of Hartman
green
2 sentences1979(See Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 234-237 [ 143 P.2d 689 ] (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.); In the Matter of the Estate of Hartman (1977) 172 Mont. 225 [ 563 P.2d 569, 571-573 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 259, p. 221.) It is in reality a double presumption. 1979(See Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 234-237 [ 143 P.2d 689 ] (dis. opn. of Traynor, J.); In the Matter of the Estate of Hartman (1977) 172 Mont. 225 [ 563 P.2d 569, 571-573 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 259, p. 221.) It is in reality a double presumption. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher
green
2 sentences1943The authors remark: “If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government, ’ it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.” (P. 1299.) The authors find in the principles broadly laid down in the decisions “frequent manifestations of official irresponsibility.” (P. 1308.) The 1939 Supplement to Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, refers to “the courts’ double standard of moral attitude in looking the other way when government agents act inconsistentl 1943The authors remark: “If we say with Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government, ’ it is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.” (P. 1299.) The authors find in the principles broadly laid down in the decisions “frequent manifestations of official irresponsibility.” (P. 1308.) The 1939 Supplement to Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, refers to “the courts’ double standard of moral attitude in looking the other way when government agents act inconsistentl | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.