executive officer violation in California

2015(See Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Torres contends that even if Lucas did satisfy her burden of demonstrating falsity, the statements are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty." This privilege, known as the executive officer privilege (Morrow, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), applies "to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process." (Royer v. S

2013The Official Duty Privilege The trial court found the statements made by Reynolds were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” (Ibid.) Sometimes called the executive officer privilege (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), the privilege applies “to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process.” (Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 5

2007“Enacted in 1872, the statute states simply: ‘A privileged publication of broadcast is one made: (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.’ The annotation to the section made by the Code Commission in 1872 indicated that it was intended ‘as a codification of the general principles developed by the courts.’ (Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 710 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 557 , 371 P.2d 293 ] [(Saroyan)].) At the time of its enactment, the legal authorities cited by the Code Commission recognized an absolute privilege only in judicial and legislative proceedings.

2007“Enacted in 1872, the statute states simply: ‘A privileged publication of broadcast is one made: (a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.’ The annotation to the section made by the Code Commission in 1872 indicated that it was intended ‘as a codification of the general principles developed by the courts.’ (Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 710 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 557 , 371 P.2d 293 ] [(Saroyan)].) At the time of its enactment, the legal authorities cited by the Code Commission recognized an absolute privilege only in judicial and legislative proceedings.

2016First, we agree with defendants’ assertion the statements are privileged under the executive officer privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), as “publication[s]” made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” The “executive privilege broadly ‘encompass[es] all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function’ decision.” (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1442 [statements by a school district’s superintendent and local superintendent to the press regarding a high school principal’s impending replacement were pr

2015(See Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Torres contends that even if Lucas did satisfy her burden of demonstrating falsity, the statements are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty." This privilege, known as the executive officer privilege (Morrow, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), applies "to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process." (Royer v. S

2025(E.g., People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 153 [defendant who used unreasonable force in resisting officers’ improper or excessive use of force could be convicted of simple assault].) What matters here is whether Bass’s account would support a defense to resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code section 69.

2021Because the jury was not given the option of convicting appellant of a lesser offense, it may have been “‘tempted to convict [him] of an offense greater than that established by the evidence instead of rendering an acquittal.’ [Citation.]” (Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 155 .) Because it is reasonably probable that the error in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple assault affected the outcome of the case, appellant’s conviction under section 69 must be reversed. “‘When a greater offense must be reversed, but a lesser included offense could be affirmed, we give the

2020This is because the defendant may not actually succeed in touching the target of the offense. “[A] lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117 , italics added.) Because the offense of battery requires that the defendant be successful in touching the target of the force or violence (§ 242), a defen

2008We recently held in People v. Lacefield (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 249 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 508 ] ( Lacefield ), that in a proper case section 148, subdivision (a) is a lesser included offense of section 69, but we find no substantial evidence supported instructing on that lesser offense here. (3) "California law has long provided that even absent a request, and over any party's objection, a trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense `necessarily included' in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed." ( People v. Birks (1998) 1

2015(See Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Torres contends that even if Lucas did satisfy her burden of demonstrating falsity, the statements are absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made "[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty." This privilege, known as the executive officer privilege (Morrow, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), applies "to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process." (Royer v. S

2013The Official Duty Privilege The trial court found the statements made by Reynolds were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), which protects statements made “[i]n the proper discharge of an official duty.” (Ibid.) Sometimes called the executive officer privilege (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1440 ) or the official duty privilege (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1149, fn. 6 ), the privilege applies “to all state and local officials who engage in the policy-making process.” (Royer v. Steinberg (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 5

2023(In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 814 (Manuel G.).) It is an element of the offense that the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties at the time the resistance occurs.

2022As acknowledged by Meza in his opening brief, the California Supreme Court in People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 240 (Smith) held: “Section 148(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of section 69 based on the statutory elements of each crime.” Meza argues, however, his conviction on count 2 must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense of count 3 based on the accusatory pleading test.

2016(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375-376 [stating in dicta that failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to exercise its power to dismiss under section 1385 waives or forfeits right to raise issue on appeal].) More importantly, there was ample evidence Jimenez employed force to resist the officers: he kicked at the dog, and swung and kicked at officers when they tried to subdue him.

2011(People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P.2d 735 ] [“the aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended, or target, offense, but also of any other crime the direct perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense”].) Thus, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 on the principles of aiding and abetting, and with CALCRIM No. 402 as follows: “The defendant is charged in Count 6 with evading a peace officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 and in Count 7 with resisting an executive offic

2011(People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P.2d 735 ] [“the aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended, or target, offense, but also of any other crime the direct perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense”].) Thus, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 on the principles of aiding and abetting, and with CALCRIM No. 402 as follows: “The defendant is charged in Count 6 with evading a peace officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 and in Count 7 with resisting an executive offic

2009Anonymous Tip Supports the Detention and Cursory Search for Weapons A police officer may stop and detain a person if the officer knows of “specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) The officer must have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person to be detained has violated the law.

2009Anonymous Tip Supports the Detention and Cursory Search for Weapons A police officer may stop and detain a person if the officer knows of “specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) The officer must have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person to be detained has violated the law.