franchise violation in California

2021(Saathoff v. City of San Diego, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 703-704.) A private utility’s franchise in a public street is a property interest created by contract, i.e., the franchise agreement.

2020Code, § 39732, subd. (b) [city may “[g]rant franchises for the construction of public utilities it deems proper,” including “the laying of gas and water pipes in public streets.”].) “[F]ranchises have been created when a governmental agency authorizes private companies to set up their infrastructures on public property in order to provide public utilities to the public; i.e., when railroad, gas, water, telephone, or electric companies set up tracks, pipes, poles, etc. across the streets and other public ways of a city. [Citations.]” (Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697 , 70

2020Code, § 39732, subd. (b) [city may “[g]rant franchises for the construction of public utilities it deems proper,” including “the laying of gas and water pipes in public streets.”].) “[F]ranchises have been created when a governmental agency authorizes private companies to set up their infrastructures on public property in order to provide public utilities to the public; i.e., when railroad, gas, water, telephone, or electric companies set up tracks, pipes, poles, etc. across the streets and other public ways of a city. [Citations.]” (Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697 , 70

2020Code, § 39732, subd. (b) [city may “[g]rant franchises for the construction of public utilities it deems proper,” including “the laying of gas and water pipes in public streets.”].) “[F]ranchises have been created when a governmental agency authorizes private companies to set up their infrastructures on public property in order to provide public utilities to the public; i.e., when railroad, gas, water, telephone, or electric companies set up tracks, pipes, poles, etc. across the streets and other public ways of a city. [Citations.]” (Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697 , 70

2021Franchises “A franchise to use public streets or rights-of-way is a form of property” interest; the “franchise fee is the purchase price of the franchise. [Citation.]” (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 262 .) “‘A franchise is a privilege conferred upon an individual or a corporation for use of a sovereign body’s property. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Riverside County Transportation Com. v. Southern California Gas Co. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 823 , 856 (Riverside Transportation).) “[S]ection 6202 authorizes a municipality to ‘grant a franchise to any person, firm, or corporation

2017A utility franchise is a privilege to use public streets or rights-of-way in connection with the utility's provision of services to residents within the governmental entity's jurisdiction. ( Spring Valley W.W. v. Schottler (1882) 62 Cal. 69 , 106-108 ; Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 940 , 949, 257 Cal.Rptr. 615 ( Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. ); 12 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 2006) § 34.2, p. 15.) 2 "For its own government, a county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the questi

2017A utility franchise is a privilege to use public streets or rights-of-way in connection with the utility's provision of services to residents within the governmental entity's jurisdiction. ( Spring Valley W.W. v. Schottler (1882) 62 Cal. 69 , 106-108 ; Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 940 , 949, 257 Cal.Rptr. 615 ( Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. ); 12 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 2006) § 34.2, p. 15.) 2 "For its own government, a county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the questi

2017A utility franchise is a privilege to use public streets or rights-of-way in connection with the utility's provision of services to residents within the governmental entity's jurisdiction. ( Spring Valley W.W. v. Schottler (1882) 62 Cal. 69 , 106-108 ; Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 940 , 949, 257 Cal.Rptr. 615 ( Santa Barbara County Taxpayer Assn. ); 12 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 2006) § 34.2, p. 15.) 2 "For its own government, a county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the questi

2017(Powerhouse, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 .) Section 11713.3, subdivision (/), provides that it is unlawful for a manufacturer or distributor “[t]o modify, replace, enter into, relocate, terminate, or refuse to renew a franchise in violation of Article 4 (commencing with Section 3060) II.

2003(Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 370 ; Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 728 ; Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Or, in language Hoffman seizes upon, does the voting classification “reflect the narrow primary purposes for which the [State Bar was] created.” (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 369 .) Asserting that the State Bar’s purpose is to regulate California lawyers, appellant reasons that under the limited-purpose entity test, “the franchise in a state bar may be limited to lawyers” licensed to practice law in a given state.

2003(Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 370 ; Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 728 ; Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Or, in language Hoffman seizes upon, does the voting classification “reflect the narrow primary purposes for which the [State Bar was] created.” (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 369 .) Asserting that the State Bar’s purpose is to regulate California lawyers, appellant reasons that under the limited-purpose entity test, “the franchise in a state bar may be limited to lawyers” licensed to practice law in a given state.

2003(Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 370 ; Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 728 ; Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Or, in language Hoffman seizes upon, does the voting classification “reflect the narrow primary purposes for which the [State Bar was] created.” (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 369 .) Asserting that the State Bar’s purpose is to regulate California lawyers, appellant reasons that under the limited-purpose entity test, “the franchise in a state bar may be limited to lawyers” licensed to practice law in a given state.

2003(Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 370 ; Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 728 ; Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Or, in language Hoffman seizes upon, does the voting classification “reflect the narrow primary purposes for which the [State Bar was] created.” (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 369 .) Asserting that the State Bar’s purpose is to regulate California lawyers, appellant reasons that under the limited-purpose entity test, “the franchise in a state bar may be limited to lawyers” licensed to practice law in a given state.

1992Citing Don Rose Oil Co., Inc. v. Lindsley, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 752, 759 , Dameshghi argues that he should not be denied access to the courts to enforce his claim that the alleged misrepresentations were made. 13 Since it is clear as a matter of law that Dameshghi never became a “franchisee” within the meaning of Corporations Code section 31006, and since the Legislature declined to define a franchisee as including a “prospective” franchisee, we believe Dameshghi’s argument is *1285 not well taken that he must be entitled to access to the courts to redress allegedly misleading “offerings” of

1982Cir. 1978) 580 F.2d 701 ; see also, note, Dare to be Great, Inc.!: A Case Study of Pyramid Sales Plan Regulation, supra, 33 Ohio State L.J. 676.) 11 In view of our finding of illegality of the merchandising scheme in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500 and Penal Code section 327, it is unnecessary to examine the contention that the scheme also violates the Corporations Code section 31300 prohibiting persons from offering or selling a franchise in violation of section 31110 of the Corporations Code because Figurettes was not registered under the franchise investment law.

1977County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 51 Cal.2d 331, 334 ; Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of L.A., supra, 50 Cal.2d 713, 716 .) In light of the nature of the utility’s franchise or privilege, sections 33391 and 33395 cannot be construed to mean that relocation may be required only through exercise of the power of eminent domain or that compensation must be paid as though compelled by the federal and state Constitutions.

1977County Flood Control Dist. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 51 Cal.2d 331, 334 ; Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of L.A., supra, 50 Cal.2d 713, 716 .) In light of the nature of the utility’s franchise or privilege, sections 33391 and 33395 cannot be construed to mean that relocation may be required only through exercise of the power of eminent domain or that compensation must be paid as though compelled by the federal and state Constitutions.

1912A. (N. S.) 174, 83 Pac. 54 ], the decision was that this franchise or privilege, when accepted and used, is an incorporeal hereditament, an easement in the particular street and partaking of the realty, local in situation and taxable in the county in which the street is situated, the same as other real property, and that it is not one of, or a part of, the general corporate franchises to do business upon which corporations are taxable only in the county in which the principal place of business is situated.

1907The power to grant a “franchise or privilege” implies the power to withhold it (State v. City of Spokane, 24 Wash. 53 , [ 63 Pac. 1116 ]), and an ordinance which empowers city trustees to refuse to grant, on any terms, the right to occupy the soil covered by a street in a manner not in conflict with the public use can have no application to the owner of the soil.

1907The power to grant a “franchise or privilege” implies the power to withhold it (State v. City of Spokane, 24 Wash. 53 , [ 63 Pac. 1116 ]), and an ordinance which empowers city trustees to refuse to grant, on any terms, the right to occupy the soil covered by a street in a manner not in conflict with the public use can have no application to the owner of the soil.

1897The court said: “It cannot be denied that the language of this act is broad enough to include the franchise and privilege which the petitioner seeks; but a statute will not always be held to include every case which falls within its literal terms.....The word ‘railroad’ is certainly broad enough to cover a steam railroad, and the privilege of laying and operating a steam railroad through a city is clearly included in ‘ any privilege whatever’; but at the same time, if it is perfectly evident from the whole tenor of this act, and other acts in pari materia, that the legislature could not have i

1897In considering this act, it was held in People v. Craycroft, 111 Cal. 544 , that its provisions requiring the sale of railroad franchises in the streets of cities to the highest bidder must be construed as applying only to cases of street railroads, and not to a steam railroad which seeks to extend its track through the streets of a city en route between its termini.