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21 California opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966, 972 .) In the second place, defendant does not provide anything more than a perfunctory analysis of how the failure to object in each instance did not meet objective professional standards; “[t]his will not suffice” (People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 466-467 [rejecting claim of ineffective assistance on this basis]). 2015(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966, 972 .) In the second place, defendant does not provide anything more than a perfunctory analysis of how the failure to object in each instance did not meet objective professional standards; “[t]his will not suffice” (People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 466-467 [rejecting claim of ineffective assistance on this basis]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966, 972 .) In the second place, defendant does not provide anything more than a perfunctory analysis of how the failure to object in each instance did not meet objective professional standards; “[t]his will not suffice” (People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 466-467 [rejecting claim of ineffective assistance on this basis]). 2015(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966, 972 .) In the second place, defendant does not provide anything more than a perfunctory analysis of how the failure to object did not meet objective professional standards or resulted in the necessary prejudice, without any consideration of the remainder of closing argument or the instructions. | 4 | 4 |
Jones v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 [declining to address issue not expanded upon with argument or citation to relevant authority]; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived”]; Independent Roofing Contractors of California Unilateral Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1336 [appellant has a duty to demonstrate error in the reasoning of the trial court’s ruling].) 2020(See Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived”].)9 9 In his reply brief, Horn appears to raise an additional contention that Wal-Mart filed “fabricated evidence” showing Horn was allowed to return to work after recovering from his work-related injury. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Oatesgreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 [declining to address issue not expanded upon with argument or citation to relevant authority]; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived”]; Independent Roofing Contractors of California Unilateral Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1336 [appellant has a duty to demonstrate error in the reasoning of the trial court’s ruling].) | 1 | 1 |
Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship Councilgreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1068, fn. 10 [declining to address issue not expanded upon with argument or citation to relevant authority]; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived”]; Independent Roofing Contractors of California Unilateral Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1336 [appellant has a duty to demonstrate error in the reasoning of the trial court’s ruling].) | 1 | 1 |
Saltonstall v. City of Sacramentogreen1 sentence2021(See Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 549, 587-588 [“conclusory assertions regarding documents that should have been included in the administrative record fail to properly tender the issue for appellate review.”].) We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that the record complies with section 21167.6, subdivision (e). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tullygreen2 sentences2012(See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 , 282 P.3d 173 ].) Because our Supreme Court did not provide detailed reasons for rejecting the perfunctory claim in Rich , we think it fair to construe the decision narrowly. 2012(See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 , 282 P.3d 173 ].) Because our Supreme Court did not provide detailed reasons for rejecting the perfunctory claim in Rich , we think it fair to construe the decision narrowly. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schmeckgreen2 sentences2011Assuming this perfunctory claim is properly raised under People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 , 118 P.3d 451 ], we have consistently held that the admission of unadjudicated criminal activity as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase is constitutional. 2011Assuming this perfunctory claim is properly raised under People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 , 118 P.3d 451 ], we have consistently held that the admission of unadjudicated criminal activity as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase is constitutional. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avenagreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ] (Valencia); People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 428-429 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ].) Defendant next challenges the admission of several other crime incidents as improper under the state and federal Constitutions and state statutes because the evidence allegedly was “misleading, unreliable and inflammatory,” and was insufficient as a matter of law. 18 He did not object during the trial to the evidence as being misleading, unreliable and inflammatory, and therefore has forfeited that as 2011(See, e.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ] (Valencia); People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 428-429 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ].) Defendant next challenges the admission of several other crime incidents as improper under the state and federal Constitutions and state statutes because the evidence allegedly was “misleading, unreliable and inflammatory,” and was insufficient as a matter of law. 18 He did not object during the trial to the evidence as being misleading, unreliable and inflammatory, and therefore has forfeited that as | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valenciagreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ] (Valencia); People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 428-429 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ].) Defendant next challenges the admission of several other crime incidents as improper under the state and federal Constitutions and state statutes because the evidence allegedly was “misleading, unreliable and inflammatory,” and was insufficient as a matter of law. 18 He did not object during the trial to the evidence as being misleading, unreliable and inflammatory, and therefore has forfeited that as 2011(See, e.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 311 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 180 P.3d 351 ] (Valencia); People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 428-429 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ].) Defendant next challenges the admission of several other crime incidents as improper under the state and federal Constitutions and state statutes because the evidence allegedly was “misleading, unreliable and inflammatory,” and was insufficient as a matter of law. 18 He did not object during the trial to the evidence as being misleading, unreliable and inflammatory, and therefore has forfeited that as | 1 | 1 |
Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1998The court denied the requested relief after *317 concluding that Toigo “failed to establish an abuse of discretion because the Town’s denial of their subdivision and other applications was supported by findings and, considering the entire record, the findings were supported by substantial evidence . . . .” Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (§ 1094.5, subd. (c); Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 334 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 ]; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v 1998The court denied the requested relief after *317 concluding that Toigo “failed to establish an abuse of discretion because the Town’s denial of their subdivision and other applications was supported by findings and, considering the entire record, the findings were supported by substantial evidence . . . .” Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (§ 1094.5, subd. (c); Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 334 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 ]; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v | 1 | 1 |
Desmond v. County of Contra Costagreen2 sentences1998The court denied the requested relief after *317 concluding that Toigo “failed to establish an abuse of discretion because the Town’s denial of their subdivision and other applications was supported by findings and, considering the entire record, the findings were supported by substantial evidence . . . .” Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (§ 1094.5, subd. (c); Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 334 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 ]; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v 1998The court denied the requested relief after *317 concluding that Toigo “failed to establish an abuse of discretion because the Town’s denial of their subdivision and other applications was supported by findings and, considering the entire record, the findings were supported by substantial evidence . . . .” Where, as here, a land use decision is challenged by administrative mandamus, courts are to apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (§ 1094.5, subd. (c); Desmond v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, 334 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 ]; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jenningsgreen1 sentence1995No reasonable juror would have interpreted these instructions to permit a criminal conviction where the evidence shows defendant was ‘apparently’ guilty, yet not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 386.) 19 Defendant also includes a perfunctory claim that the instructions violated his “right to trial by jury.” He merely restates the due process claim under a different label; the same result adheres. 20 Specifically, the jury was referred to an instruction that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, it must then determine whether one or m | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Weaver
green
1 sentence2025(See Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 987 .) 19 BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hodges
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Hodges (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110 .) Here, although defendant’s trial counsel signed the written statement under penalty of perjury, he conveyed only a perfunctory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without providing specifics and without attesting to its arguable merit. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Carter
green
1 sentence2024Defendant also raises a perfunctory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. “ ‘In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189 .) We presume “ ‘counsel’s 9 performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions a | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Merriman
green
1 sentence2022“Even when we conclude, as we do here, that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying severance or consolidating charges, we must further inquire whether events after the court’s ruling demonstrate that joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness’ amounting to a denial of defendant’s constitutional right to fair trial or due process of law.” (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 46 .) “[A] judgment will be reversed on this ground only if it is 15 ‘reasonably probable that the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its verdict of guilt.’ ” (Id. at p. 49.) However, in this cas | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Kenneth H.
green
1 sentence2010Also, the failed plea bargain could not be used in any way against defendant in any parole revocation proceedings as counsel for defendant argued at the hearing on the motions in making a perfunctory claim of detrimental reliance. (§§ 1192.4, 1192.5.) Partial performance may demonstrate detrimental reliance (In re Kenneth K, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 149 ), but here there was no partial performance. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Patel
green
1 sentence2010(Patel, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 242 .) For the same reason, we reject the City’s perfunctory claim that, if there is no contempt order, there may be no need for appeal because the noncompliant party has not been harmed—finality does not hinge on whether a party is held in contempt. 8 Even if this subpoena were akin to a discovery request, the appropriate analogy would be to discovery orders ancillary to cases pending in other jurisdictions, which have been held to be final judgments for purposes of appealability. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Adams v. Woods
green
1 sentence2010(Adams v. Woods (1861) 18 Cal. 30 ; H.B. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2003Alleged Miranda violation Defendant makes a perfunctory claim that admission of the July 30th statements violated his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . 2003Alleged Miranda violation Defendant makes a perfunctory claim that admission of the July 30th statements violated his rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1991Because a trial judge’s findings related to the sufficiency of an attorney’s showing “ ‘largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference’ ” and not “second-guess his factual determination.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 .) “The trial court, however, must make ‘a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the [attorney’s] explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the [attorney] has examined members of the 1991Because a trial judge’s findings related to the sufficiency of an attorney’s showing “ ‘largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference’ ” and not “second-guess his factual determination.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 .) “The trial court, however, must make ‘a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the [attorney’s] explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the [attorney] has examined members of the | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. De Waele
green
1 sentence1966It cannot be said that the proceeding . . . was other than a step in the criminal prosecution.” {People v. De Waele, supra, 224 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 .) Although petitioner was represented by counsel when he appeared before the court, it is clear that this representation was ineffective on the issue of probation; that neither his counsel nor the trial court recognized that the law requires more than a perfunctory hearing at the time of arraignment and the pronouncement of sentence. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Clippinger v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view 1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view | 1 | 1948–1948 |
In re Estate of Rogers
green
2 sentences1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view 1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view | 1 | 1948–1948 |
In Re Estate of Blake
green
2 sentences1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view 1948The cases relied on by the respondent (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448 [ 108 P. 287 ], Estate of Rogers, 94 Cal. 526 [ 29 P. 962 ], and Estate of Kruce, 10 Cal.App.2d 426 [ 51 P.2d 1174 ], are distinguishable upon their facts, and they are not controlling under the circumstances which here appear. [7] With respect to the appeals from the orders approving the second and third accounts it appears that only a perfunctory hearing was had in this connection, probably for the reason that the trial court, as well as the respondent's attorney, felt that the matter was of little importance under the view | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.