similarly situated inquiry in California

2018Equal protection and the Act "Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question." ( People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101 , 103, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 .) The equal protection clause applies to civil commitment statutes "to ensure that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens." ( People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 , 1199, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 ( McKee I ).) The similarly situa

2018Equal protection and the Act "Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question." ( People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101 , 103, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 .) The equal protection clause applies to civil commitment statutes "to ensure that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens." ( People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 , 1199, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 ( McKee I ).) The similarly situa

2022“Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.” (People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101, 103 .) The similarly situated inquiry examines whether two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged, not whether they are similarly situated for all purposes.

2022“Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.” (People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101, 103 .) The similarly situated inquiry examines whether two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged, not whether they are similarly situated for all purposes.

2024(See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong (1996) 517 U.S. 456 , 465–467; Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562, 564 .) Nor, in dispensing with the threshold “similarly situated” test in equal protection challenges like this one, do we call into question any of this court’s precedent that purported to dispose of an equal protection challenge upon deciding that the challenged disparate treatment did not involve groups that were similarly situated for purposes of the law in question.

2022Kruger, J., concurring scrutiny (strict) and moving directly to a consideration of the adequacy of the proffered justification]; United States v. Virginia (1996) 518 U.S. 515 , 531–534 [same, applying intermediate scrutiny]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 , 439–450 [same, applying rational basis scrutiny].) The high court’s cases do make clear that a similarly situated inquiry has a useful role to play in other kinds of cases — particularly cases involving so-called “ ‘class of one’ ” equal protection claims, “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentio

2021This court addressed the use of the similarly-situated standard in Heard, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 1735 , where a Black employee alleged race discrimination in the application of the terms and conditions of his employment.

2021This court addressed the use of the similarly-situated standard in Heard, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 1735 , where a Black employee alleged race discrimination in the application of the terms and conditions of his employment.

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2018NO EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION A. General Legal Principles " ' "The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution are substantially equivalent and we analyze[ ] them in a similar fashion." ' " ( People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657 , 666, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) " 'Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.' [Citation.] The equal protection *332 clause applies to

2016(People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155 .) Even if appellant could satisfy the similarly-situated requirement, the law is clear that “neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the existence of a prosecutor’s discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other violates equal protection principles.” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 .) In other words, the state has considerable leeway in terms of choosing which punishment is suitable for a particular offender when his conduct violates more th

2016(People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1155 .) Even if appellant could satisfy the similarly-situated requirement, the law is clear that “neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the existence of a prosecutor’s discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other violates equal protection principles.” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838 .) In other words, the state has considerable leeway in terms of choosing which punishment is suitable for a particular offender when his conduct violates more th

2014Nevertheless, LSAC asserts this case is more akin to Walgreen, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 424 , with respect to the similarly situated requirement than it is to the professional regulation cases cited above.

2014Nevertheless, LSAC asserts this case is more akin to Walgreen, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 424 , with respect to the similarly situated requirement than it is to the professional regulation cases cited above.

2026(Guevara, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 872 .) 13 intentional transmission may deter both testing and disclosure.

2024(See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong (1996) 517 U.S. 456 , 465–467; Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562, 564 .) Nor, in dispensing with the threshold “similarly situated” test in equal protection challenges like this one, do we call into question any of this court’s precedent that purported to dispose of an equal protection challenge upon deciding that the challenged disparate treatment did not involve groups that were similarly situated for purposes of the law in question.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022Kruger, J., concurring scrutiny (strict) and moving directly to a consideration of the adequacy of the proffered justification]; United States v. Virginia (1996) 518 U.S. 515 , 531–534 [same, applying intermediate scrutiny]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 , 439–450 [same, applying rational basis scrutiny].) The high court’s cases do make clear that a similarly situated inquiry has a useful role to play in other kinds of cases — particularly cases involving so-called “ ‘class of one’ ” equal protection claims, “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentio

2022(See also Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture (2008) 553 U.S. 591 , 601–602 [discussing “class-of-one” claims under Olech].) But in a case like the one before us, as in many others, the law clearly treats Eric B. differently from others because of the group — that is, potential conservatees — to which he belongs.

2022Kruger, J., concurring scrutiny (strict) and moving directly to a consideration of the adequacy of the proffered justification]; United States v. Virginia (1996) 518 U.S. 515 , 531–534 [same, applying intermediate scrutiny]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 , 439–450 [same, applying rational basis scrutiny].) The high court’s cases do make clear that a similarly situated inquiry has a useful role to play in other kinds of cases — particularly cases involving so-called “ ‘class of one’ ” equal protection claims, “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentio

2022Kruger, J., concurring (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1199–1200 [detailed analysis of the similarly situated requirement as a threshold matter independent of subsequent inquiry into justification]; People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [treating the similarly situated inquiry as a necessary “threshold” question]; id. at pp. 1202–1209 [deciding only that question and remanding for further proceedings on the separate question of justification].) Indeed, the court stopped citing Eric J. itself, simply asserting as a settled matter that the “initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is wh

2022Kruger, J., concurring (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1199–1200 [detailed analysis of the similarly situated requirement as a threshold matter independent of subsequent inquiry into justification]; People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [treating the similarly situated inquiry as a necessary “threshold” question]; id. at pp. 1202–1209 [deciding only that question and remanding for further proceedings on the separate question of justification].) Indeed, the court stopped citing Eric J. itself, simply asserting as a settled matter that the “initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is wh

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022Kruger, J., concurring (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1199–1200 [detailed analysis of the similarly situated requirement as a threshold matter independent of subsequent inquiry into justification]; People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [treating the similarly situated inquiry as a necessary “threshold” question]; id. at pp. 1202–1209 [deciding only that question and remanding for further proceedings on the separate question of justification].) Indeed, the court stopped citing Eric J. itself, simply asserting as a settled matter that the “initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is wh

2022Kruger, J., concurring (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1199–1200 [detailed analysis of the similarly situated requirement as a threshold matter independent of subsequent inquiry into justification]; People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [treating the similarly situated inquiry as a necessary “threshold” question]; id. at pp. 1202–1209 [deciding only that question and remanding for further proceedings on the separate question of justification].) Indeed, the court stopped citing Eric J. itself, simply asserting as a settled matter that the “initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is wh

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231 ; Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543 ; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 227 ; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376 .) B.

2018Equal protection and the Act "Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question." ( People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101 , 103, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 .) The equal protection clause applies to civil commitment statutes "to ensure that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens." ( People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 , 1199, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 ( McKee I ).) The similarly situa

2018Equal protection and the Act "Equal protection requires the state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question." ( People v. Jacobs (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 101 , 103, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 .) The equal protection clause applies to civil commitment statutes "to ensure that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens." ( People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 , 1199, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 , 223 P.3d 566 ( McKee I ).) The similarly situa

2015But most legislation is tested only to 5 I likewise express no opinion as to whether denying any other class of prisoners credits against post-release community supervision violates equal protection. 9 determine if the challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.’ [Citation.]” (In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1262-1263 .) The California Supreme Court has stated that, once it has been determined that two groups are not similarly situated, “an equal protection inquiry into the justification for any legislative distinction [is not] necessary. [Citatio

2015But most legislation is tested only to 5 I likewise express no opinion as to whether denying any other class of prisoners credits against post-release community supervision violates equal protection. 9 determine if the challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.’ [Citation.]” (In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1262-1263 .) The California Supreme Court has stated that, once it has been determined that two groups are not similarly situated, “an equal protection inquiry into the justification for any legislative distinction [is not] necessary. [Citatio

1996In this respect, the jury instructions and special verdict questions were also inconsistent. 9 Although the jurors were instructed that the similarly situated requirement was a part of Heard’s prima facie case, the special verdict questions isolated the similarly situated issue, setting it apart from the special verdict question regarding plaintiff’s prima facie case, and thereby suggested it was not part of that prima facie case. 10 Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 882 P.2d 298 ] sets forth the standard for assessing the prejudicial impact of erroneous

1996In this respect, the jury instructions and special verdict questions were also inconsistent. 9 Although the jurors were instructed that the similarly situated requirement was a part of Heard’s prima facie case, the special verdict questions isolated the similarly situated issue, setting it apart from the special verdict question regarding plaintiff’s prima facie case, and thereby suggested it was not part of that prima facie case. 10 Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 882 P.2d 298 ] sets forth the standard for assessing the prejudicial impact of erroneous