plaintiff relies rule in Connecticut

1981The plaintiff relies on this rule: “[T]he right to injunctive relief and damages would apply ... to business done with customers solicited before the end of the employment.” Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 321 , 189 A.2d 390 (1963).

1981The plaintiff relies on this rule: “[T]he right to injunctive relief and damages would apply ... to business done with customers solicited before the end of the employment.” Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 321 , 189 A.2d 390 (1963).

1976Pepe v. Santoro, 101 Conn. 694 , 697 ; Quinnipiac Brewing Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 71 Conn. 80 , 85 .

1976Pepe v. Santoro, 101 Conn. 694, 697 ; Quinnipiac Brewing Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 71 Conn. 80, 85 .

1976Pepe v. Santoro, 101 Conn. 694 , 697 ; Quinnipiac Brewing Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 71 Conn. 80 , 85 .

1976Pepe v. Santoro, 101 Conn. 694, 697 ; Quinnipiac Brewing Co. v. Fitzgibbons, 71 Conn. 80, 85 .

2020To be sure, it is often stated that ‘‘[a] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings . . . including on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry, supra, 196 Conn. App. 88 ; Kelly v. Kurtz, 193 Conn. App. 507 , 539, 219 A.3d 948 (2019); see also Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn. App. 43, 48 , 194 A.3d 343 (2018) (issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even at appellate level); Arroyo v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493 , 500 n.10, 167 A.3d 1112

2020To be sure, it is often stated that ‘‘[a] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings . . . including on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry, supra, 196 Conn. App. 88 ; Kelly v. Kurtz, 193 Conn. App. 507 , 539, 219 A.3d 948 (2019); see also Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn. App. 43, 48 , 194 A.3d 343 (2018) (issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even at appellate level); Arroyo v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493 , 500 n.10, 167 A.3d 1112

2020To be sure, it is often stated that ‘‘[a] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings . . . including on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry, supra, 196 Conn. App. 88 ; Kelly v. Kurtz, 193 Conn. App. 507 , 539, 219 A.3d 948 (2019); see also Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn. App. 43, 48 , 194 A.3d 343 (2018) (issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even at appellate level); Arroyo v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493 , 500 n.10, 167 A.3d 1112

2020To be sure, it is often stated that ‘‘[a] claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings . . . including on appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Starboard Resources, Inc. v. Henry, supra, 196 Conn. App. 88 ; Kelly v. Kurtz, 193 Conn. App. 507 , 539, 219 A.3d 948 (2019); see also Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn. App. 43, 48 , 194 A.3d 343 (2018) (issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even at appellate level); Arroyo v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 175 Conn. App. 493 , 500 n.10, 167 A.3d 1112

2010The Amendment clearly applies to the present action, which was commenced in 2006. 10 Noscitur a sociis is a canon of statutory construction providing that “statutory terms . . . [that are] ambiguous when considered alone . . . should be given related meaning when grouped together.” Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., supra, 540 F.3d 1247 . 11 In claiming that the savings clause preserves the state statute because 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b) (2), unlike 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b) (1), is not expressly limited in its application to state laws relating to the registration and operation of a motor vehic

2010The Amendment clearly applies to the present action, which was commenced in 2006. 10 Noscitur a sociis is a canon of statutory construction providing that “statutory terms . . . [that are] ambiguous when considered alone . . . should be given related meaning when grouped together.” Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., supra, 540 F.3d 1247 . 11 In claiming that the savings clause preserves the state statute because 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b) (2), unlike 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b) (1), is not expressly limited in its application to state laws relating to the registration and operation of a motor vehic

2002The plaintiff relies on an exception that applies if the agent "did not act legitimately within the scope of duty but used the corporate power improperly for personal gain." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2002Although it is well settled that a court’s judgment may be affirmed on a dispositive alternate ground that has support in the trial court record; Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 259 Conn. 592, 599 , 790 A.2d 1178 (2002); we need not reach the plaintiffs alternate claim here because our ruling on the defendant’s claim is dispositive.

2002Although it is well settled that a court’s judgment may be affirmed on a dispositive alternate ground that has support in the trial court record; Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. Bridgeport, 259 Conn. 592, 599 , 790 A.2d 1178 (2002); we need not reach the plaintiffs alternate claim here because our ruling on the defendant’s claim is dispositive.

2002Generally, “contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980).

2002Generally, “contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.” Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980).

2001In support of her argument, the plaintiff relies on the test for the finding of a legal duty articulated in Mendillo v. Board of Education , 246 Conn. 456 , 717 A.2d 1177 (1998).

2001In support of her argument, the plaintiff relies on the test for the finding of a legal duty articulated in Mendillo v. Board of Education , 246 Conn. 456 , 717 A.2d 1177 (1998).

2001The sole case on which the plaintiff relies for his claim of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of fraud on the Probate Court is Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn. App. 174, 177 , 579 A.2d 576 (1990).

2001The sole case on which the plaintiff relies for his claim of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of fraud on the Probate Court is Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn. App. 174, 177 , 579 A.2d 576 (1990).

1998The plaintiff, however, claims that she "falls squarely within the exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule . . ." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, 12/11/97, p. 4.) Citing Scoville v. CT Page 5907 Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67 , 70 , 74 , 291 A.2d 222 (1973), and Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987), the plaintiff relies on the exception which states that "[a]ny person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation [without exhausting administ

1998The plaintiff, however, claims that she "falls squarely within the exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule . . ." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, 12/11/97, p. 4.) Citing Scoville v. CT Page 5907 Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67 , 70 , 74 , 291 A.2d 222 (1973), and Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987), the plaintiff relies on the exception which states that "[a]ny person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation [without exhausting administ

1998In support of that claim, the plaintiff relies on the rule governing intentional interference with contractual relations or unlawful interference with business relations set forth in Harry A. Finman & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Truck & Trailer Service Co., 169 Conn. 407, 415 , 363 A.2d 86 (1975).

1998In support of that claim, the plaintiff relies on the rule governing intentional interference with contractual relations or unlawful interference with business relations set forth in Harry A. Finman & Son, Inc. v. Connecticut Truck & Trailer Service Co., 169 Conn. 407, 415 , 363 A.2d 86 (1975).

1998The plaintiff, however, claims that she "falls squarely within the exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule . . ." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, 12/11/97, p. 4.) Citing Scoville v. CT Page 5907 Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67 , 70 , 74 , 291 A.2d 222 (1973), and Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987), the plaintiff relies on the exception which states that "[a]ny person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation [without exhausting administ

1998The plaintiff, however, claims that she "falls squarely within the exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule . . ." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, 12/11/97, p. 4.) Citing Scoville v. CT Page 5907 Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67 , 70 , 74 , 291 A.2d 222 (1973), and Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67 , 75 , 527 A.2d 230 (1987), the plaintiff relies on the exception which states that "[a]ny person specifically and materially damaged by a violation of the zoning ordinances which has occurred or is likely to occur on another's land may seek injunctive relief restraining such violation [without exhausting administ

1995The plaintiff relies on the doctrine that “[w]hether there is a defect in such proximity to the highway so as to be considered ‘in, upon, or near the traveled path’ of the highway must be determined on a case-by-case basis after a proper analysis of its own particular circumstances, and is generally a question of fact for the jury . . . .” Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 300 , 294 A.2d 290 (1972), quoting Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 136, 142 (1867).

1995The plaintiff relies on the doctrine that “[w]hether there is a defect in such proximity to the highway so as to be considered ‘in, upon, or near the traveled path’ of the highway must be determined on a case-by-case basis after a proper analysis of its own particular circumstances, and is generally a question of fact for the jury . . . .” Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295, 300 , 294 A.2d 290 (1972), quoting Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 136, 142 (1867).

1994As to these special defenses the plaintiff relies on the doctrine set forth in the case of D'Oench Dume Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 , 625 S.Ct. 676 (1942), in which the Court held that a bank customer could not assert as a defense a secret or unrecorded agreement between such customer and the bank in an action maintained by the FDIC to collect on a note to the insolvent bank.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1993The plaintiff relies on the principle of law established in Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397 , 378 A.2d 522 (1977), and reaffirmed in Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462 , 556 A.2d 145 (1989), Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555 , 595 A.2d 905 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 919 , 597 A.2d 344 (1991), and Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn. App. 367 , 577 A.2d 1087 (1990), that alimony already “accrued” may not be modified.

1992Id., 539-40 .” Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 311 , 567 A.2d 383 (1989). 3 The plaintiff relies on the rule set out in Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429 , 429 A.2d 910 (1980), in which the court held that in matters of technical complexity, such as pollution control, a lay commission without expertise in the area may not substitute its own judgment for contrary expert testimony.

1992Id., 539-40 .” Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 311 , 567 A.2d 383 (1989). 3 The plaintiff relies on the rule set out in Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429 , 429 A.2d 910 (1980), in which the court held that in matters of technical complexity, such as pollution control, a lay commission without expertise in the area may not substitute its own judgment for contrary expert testimony.

1992Id., 539-40 .” Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 311 , 567 A.2d 383 (1989). 3 The plaintiff relies on the rule set out in Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429 , 429 A.2d 910 (1980), in which the court held that in matters of technical complexity, such as pollution control, a lay commission without expertise in the area may not substitute its own judgment for contrary expert testimony.

1992Id., 539-40 .” Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 311 , 567 A.2d 383 (1989). 3 The plaintiff relies on the rule set out in Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429 , 429 A.2d 910 (1980), in which the court held that in matters of technical complexity, such as pollution control, a lay commission without expertise in the area may not substitute its own judgment for contrary expert testimony.

1992Id., 539-40 .” Kaeser v. Conservation Commission, 20 Conn. App. 309, 311 , 567 A.2d 383 (1989). 3 The plaintiff relies on the rule set out in Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 429 , 429 A.2d 910 (1980), in which the court held that in matters of technical complexity, such as pollution control, a lay commission without expertise in the area may not substitute its own judgment for contrary expert testimony.

1989The plaintiff relies on the rule of law enunciated in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 389 , 128 A. 705 (1925), that “[a]n accumulation of ice or snow upon a common approach to a tenement house may impose upon the landlord a liability for injuries due to it, provided he knew, or in the exercise of a reasonable oversight ought to have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition and failed to exercise reasonable care to provide against injury by reason of it.” The circumstances giving rise to the rule in Reardon , however, differ considerably from the circumstances in the present case

1989The plaintiff relies on the rule of law enunciated in Reardon v. Shimelman, 102 Conn. 383, 389 , 128 A. 705 (1925), that “[a]n accumulation of ice or snow upon a common approach to a tenement house may impose upon the landlord a liability for injuries due to it, provided he knew, or in the exercise of a reasonable oversight ought to have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition and failed to exercise reasonable care to provide against injury by reason of it.” The circumstances giving rise to the rule in Reardon , however, differ considerably from the circumstances in the present case

1967The plaintiff relies on the rule of such cases as Suffield Heights Corporation v. Town Planning Commission, 144 Conn. 425, 429 , 133 A.2d 612 , and Del Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 673, 678 , 124 A.2d 915 , in which this court stated that “[a] classification permanently restricting the enjoyment of property to such an extent that it cannot be utilized for any reasonable purpose goes beyond valid regulation and constitutes a taking without due process.” See also Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 304, 308 , 197 A.2d 770 .

1967The plaintiff relies on the rule of such cases as Suffield Heights Corporation v. Town Planning Commission, 144 Conn. 425, 429 , 133 A.2d 612 , and Del Buono v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 673, 678 , 124 A.2d 915 , in which this court stated that “[a] classification permanently restricting the enjoyment of property to such an extent that it cannot be utilized for any reasonable purpose goes beyond valid regulation and constitutes a taking without due process.” See also Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 304, 308 , 197 A.2d 770 .