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21 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nealy v. City of West Palm Beachgreen2 sentences2016Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.”); see also Superior Concrete Constr. v. Olsen, 616 So.2d 183, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 1990In Nealy v. City of West Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), this court stated: “Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.” Employer/carrier correctly note that the cited cases did not involve, as this one does, the absence of a prior determination or stipulation that a compensable accident had occurred. | 7 | 9 |
Sanchez v. Security Sales Co.green2 sentences1989Furthermore, when "the purpose of a diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable." Sumner v. Gardinier, Inc., 526 So.2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Sanchez v. Security Sales Co., 522 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), quoting Nealy v. City of West Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). 1988"Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable." Sanchez v. Security Sales Co., 522 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (quoting Nealy v. City of West Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). | 2 | 3 |
Moore v. Texasgreen2 sentences2018Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000 ; see Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048-49 . 2018Hall , 134 S.Ct. at 2000 ; see Moore , 137 S.Ct. at 1048 -49 . | 2 | 2 |
Perry v. Ridgecrest Internationalgreen2 sentences2016Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.”); see also Superior Concrete Constr. v. Olsen, 616 So.2d 183, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 1994Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Hamilton v. Early Bird Stud Farms, 540 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 2 |
Prince v. PRINCE INS. SERVICESgreen2 sentences2004Servs., 556 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 2002Servs., 556 So.2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“Since the diagnostic test recommended by [the authorized physician] was designed to reveal the precise causal etiology of claimant’s symptoms so that an appropriate treatment decision could be made, the claimant should have been awarded payment of the bills incurred for the diagnostic testing.”). | 1 | 2 |
Sullivan v. Stategreen2 sentences2004This argument is based primarily on our decision in Sumner v. Gardinier, Inc., 526 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), which stands for the principle that the employer should be ordered to pay for a diagnostic test, when the purpose of the test "is to determine the cause of a claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident." Sumner, 526 So.2d at 1070 ; see also Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 2004This argument is based primarily on our decision in Sumner v. Gardinier, Inc., 526 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), which stands for the principle that the employer should be ordered to pay for a diagnostic test, when the purpose of the test "is to determine the cause of a claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident." Sumner, 526 So.2d at 1070 ; see also Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 2 |
Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustorgreen2 sentences2004This argument is based primarily on our decision in Sumner v. Gardinier, Inc., 526 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), which stands for the principle that the employer should be ordered to pay for a diagnostic test, when the purpose of the test "is to determine the cause of a claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident." Sumner, 526 So.2d at 1070 ; see also Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 1994Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Hamilton v. Early Bird Stud Farms, 540 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 2 |
Youngblood v. Combined Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2022We reverse and remand consistent with our recent decision in United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Millennium Radiology, LLC, 337 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 12, 2022) (“Millennium's ‘identity’ is not the same in each of these cases against United Auto; Millennium draws its identity from its assignor from case to case. | 1 | 1 |
Superior Concrete Construction v. Olsengreen1 sentence2016Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (“Whenever the purpose of the diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable.”); see also Superior Concrete Constr. v. Olsen, 616 So.2d 183, 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Southeast Diagnostics, Inc.green1 sentence2009Id. at 230-31 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Rogers, 783 So.2d at 999 . | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Bisanti Services, Inc.green1 sentence2004This court has previously held that "[w]henever the purpose of a diagnostic test is to determine the cause of a claimant's symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable, even if it should later be determined that the claimant suffered from both compensable and noncompensable conditions." Scott v. Bisanti Servs., Inc., 634 So.2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Prince v. Prince Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence1992See generally Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA1984) (“Probable cause exists under section 316.1933(1) to order a blood test if the officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the time of the accident and caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being.”). | 1 | 1 |
Abbott v. Price Plumbing, Inc.green1 sentence1988See also Abbott v. Price Plumbing Inc., and F.C.C.I., 500 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and cases cited within. | 1 | 1 |
Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utahgreen1 sentence1984See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. 458 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Florida
green
2 sentences2018Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000 ; see Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048-49 . 2018Hall , 134 S.Ct. at 2000 ; see Moore , 137 S.Ct. at 1048 -49 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Boykin v. American Marine Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Sanchez v. Security Sales Company, 522 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Nealy v. City of West Palm Beach, 491 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Boykin v. American Marine Products, Inc., 395 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). 1986Boykin v. American Marine Products, Inc., 395 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). | 2 | 1986–1989 |
McKinney v. McKinney Farms
green
1 sentence2002The judge of compensation claims found that, “as indicated by Dr. Chait [the independent medical examiner], Dr. Licht-blau’s action[ ] in sending claimant to the emergency room was appropriate, reasonable, and medically necessary based on the exigent circumstances.” While it is true that, as the judge of compensation claims also found, “no evidence was presented that a connection existed between the claimant’s symptoms on August 26, 1999 and the work injury sustained on June 13, 1988,” the evaluation was “in the normal progression of authorized treatment.” McKinney, 380 So.2d at 470 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hamilton v. Early Bird Stud Farms
neutral
1 sentence1994Perry v. Ridgecrest Int'l, 548 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Green v. Chromalloy-Turbocumbustor, 540 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Hamilton v. Early Bird Stud Farms, 540 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Copeland Steel Erectors v. Miles
neutral
1 sentence1988In the case of Copeland Steel Erectors v. Miles, 483 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), this court held that a claimant who injured his lower back in a compensable accident and subsequently developed a thyroid nodule was entitled to diagnostic evaluation by an endocrinologist to determine whether a causal relationship existed between the thyroid nodule and the compensable injury. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1984A particular diagnostic test may be used by more than one health-related profession. [8] In Brown , Chief Judge Ervin describes what he believes to be the differing standards and then proposes a standard that essentially focuses on the relevancy of the proposed evidence. 426 So.2d at 85-90 . [9] We note that the trial court's decision to admit the thermograms of Fay taken by Dr. Rosenthal was also proper. [10] Archer and Zinn note without citation that Florida, New York, and Wisconsin trial courts have also admitted thermograms into evidence. 19 Trial at 71. [11] This particular article notes | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.