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8 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gardner v. Pawliwgreen2 sentences2025We also consider the clear and more expansive preexisting condition standard set forth by the Gardner Court, which calls for application of its holding "when the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnostic test should be performed and that it is a deviation not to perform it, but it is unknown whether A-2154-23 22 performing the test would have helped to diagnose or treat a preexistent condition . . . . " Gardner, 150 N.J. at 387 (emphasis added). 2013See also Gardner, supra, 150 N.J. at 387 , 696 A.2d 599 (holding when a plaintiff alleges failure to perform a diagnostic test, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the omission increased the risk of harm from the pre-existing condition). | 2 | 4 |
State v. One Marlin Riflegreen1 sentence2024"A nursing diagnosis identifies signs and symptoms only to the extent necessary to carry out the nursing regimen rather than making final conclusions about the identity and cause of the underlying disease." State v. One Marlin Rifle, 30/30, 30 AS, Serial No. 12027068, 319 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chewgreen2 sentences2004The “substantial factor” standard requires the jury to determine whether the deviation, in the context of the preexistent condition, was sufficiently significant in relation to the eventual harm to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause. [Id. at 108-09, 695 A.2d 1301 (citations omitted).] Thereafter, in Gardner, supra, where plaintiffs alleged that the failure to perform diagnostic tests that would have revealed an umbilical cord defect increased the risk that their fetus would not survive, we elucidated on the Scafidi standard: When the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnos 2004The substantial factor standard requires the jury to determine whether the deviation, in the context of the preexistent condition, was sufficiently significant in relation to the eventual harm to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause. [ Id. at 108-09, 695 A. 2d 1301 (citations omitted).] Thereafter, in Gardner, supra, where plaintiffs alleged that the failure to perform diagnostic tests that would have revealed an umbilical cord defect increased the risk that their fetus would not survive, we elucidated on the Scafidi standard: When the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnos | 1 | 1 |
Olah v. Slobodiangreen2 sentences1997In Olah, supra, this Court considered issues involving the alleged negligent failure to administer a diagnostic test that might have revealed a preexistent condition, which increased the risk to the patient, who ultimately died. 119 N.J. at 124, 574 A.2d 411 . 1997Finally, the “substantial factor” segment of the Evers standard ... is well designed to focus the jury’s attention on “whether the deviation, in the context of the preexistent condition, was sufficiently significant in relation to the eventual harm to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause.” [Id. at 133, 574 A.2d 411 (quoting Scafidi supra, 119 N.J. at 113-14, 574 A.2d 398 ).] Ill When the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnostic test should be performed and that it is a deviation not to perform it, but it is unknown whether performing the test would have helped to diagnose | 1 | 1 |
Snead v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995A more detailed illustration of the kind of evidence that will satisfy a plaintiff’s burden to show that a doctor's negligent failure to perform a diagnostic test was a substantial factor in causing harm to a patient may be found in Snead v. United States, 595 F.Supp. 658, 665-67 (D.C.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Thermographic Diagnostics, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.green2 sentences1991This latitude includes minority medical viewpoints within the scope of coverage as well as remedial treatment rendered by religious healers. [Id. at 227, 530 A2d 56 .] Relying on its determination that the expert testimony at trial established that “neuromuscular thermography is sufficiently supported by credible expert medical testimony to have medical value,” id. at 221 , 530 A.2d 56 , the Law Division instead adopted as the standard for reimbursement under the Act the requirement of a “physician’s sincere belief that the procedure will further the diagnosis and treatment of his patient,” id 1991This latitude includes minority medical viewpoints within the scope of coverage as well as remedial treatment rendered by religious healers. [Id. at 227, 530 A2d 56 .] Relying on its determination that the expert testimony at trial established that “neuromuscular thermography is sufficiently supported by credible expert medical testimony to have medical value,” id. at 221 , 530 A.2d 56 , the Law Division instead adopted as the standard for reimbursement under the Act the requirement of a “physician’s sincere belief that the procedure will further the diagnosis and treatment of his patient,” id | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Swanson v. Wiesenfeld
green
1 sentence2024N.J.S.A. 45:11-23(b) defines the practice of nursing as "diagnosing and treating human responses to actual or potential physical and emotional health problems . . . ." The statute recognizes that the diagnostic privilege in the context of nursing practice "is distinct from a medical diagnosis." Ibid. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Scafidi v. Seiler
green
2 sentences1997Finally, the “substantial factor” segment of the Evers standard ... is well designed to focus the jury’s attention on “whether the deviation, in the context of the preexistent condition, was sufficiently significant in relation to the eventual harm to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause.” [Id. at 133, 574 A.2d 411 (quoting Scafidi supra, 119 N.J. at 113-14, 574 A.2d 398 ).] Ill When the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnostic test should be performed and that it is a deviation not to perform it, but it is unknown whether performing the test would have helped to diagnose 1997Finally, the “substantial factor” segment of the Evers standard ... is well designed to focus the jury’s attention on “whether the deviation, in the context of the preexistent condition, was sufficiently significant in relation to the eventual harm to satisfy the requirement of proximate cause.” [Id. at 133, 574 A.2d 411 (quoting Scafidi supra, 119 N.J. at 113-14, 574 A.2d 398 ).] Ill When the prevailing standard of care indicates that a diagnostic test should be performed and that it is a deviation not to perform it, but it is unknown whether performing the test would have helped to diagnose | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hamil v. Bashline
green
2 sentences1997The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hamil, supra, considered the question of the degree of certainty required of expert medical testimony to establish the causal relation between the harm suffered by a patient and the alleged negligence of a health care provider who fails to properly diagnose and treat the plaintiff's preexistent condition in a manner that might have prevented the harm. 392 A. 2d at 1282-83 . 1997The question is whether proof that the failure to perform a diagnostic test was a deviation from standard medical practice and that the unperformed test might have yielded information resulting in the avoidance of harm from the preexistent condition is sufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, that the defendant’s deviation increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, thereby satisfying the first prong of Scafidi The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hamil, supra, considered the question of the degree of certainty required of expert medical testimony to establish | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.