model inquiry in Iowa

2014See Guideline For District Judges, 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02–2 to –5 (3d ed. 1986); accord United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting the Bench Book guideline in appendix); Martin, 608 N.W.2d at 450 (stating “we [have previously] pointed the bench and bar to a model inquiry for determining a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

2007See State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 2000) (recommending the model inquiry found in Iowa Bench Book, 5-37 to 5-41 (1999)); State v. Spencer, 519 N.W.2d 357 , 360 n.1 (Iowa 1994) (recommending the model inquiry found in 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02-2 (3d ed. 1986)); see also Spencer, 941 F. Supp. at 843– 44 (discussing and quoting the Bench Book for United States District Judges). 13 In this case the trial court did not conduct the all important colloquy to make sure Hannan properly waived his right to counsel.

2014See Guideline For District Judges, 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02–2 to –5 (3d ed. 1986); accord United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting the Bench Book guideline in appendix); Martin, 608 N.W.2d at 450 (stating “we [have previously] pointed the bench and bar to a model inquiry for determining a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

2014The model inquiry is found in 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02–2 (3d ed. 1986), as well as United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987)”).

2022Instead of promptly paying Larew what he owed as required by 1See,e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 , 768–69 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d) to align with the ABA’s interpretation because “hold[ing] otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it proposed the model rule, which we adopted in rule 32:8.4(d) without change”); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Iowa 2015) (quoting an ABA formal opinion with approval); Iowa Sup.

2022Instead of promptly paying Larew what he owed as required by 1See,e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 , 768–69 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d) to align with the ABA’s interpretation because “hold[ing] otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it proposed the model rule, which we adopted in rule 32:8.4(d) without change”); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Iowa 2015) (quoting an ABA formal opinion with approval); Iowa Sup.

2022Ct. for Polk Cnty., 671 N.W.2d 482, 492 (Iowa 2003) (same); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Pro.

2022Ct. for Polk Cnty., 671 N.W.2d 482, 492 (Iowa 2003) (same); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Pro.

2022Instead of promptly paying Larew what he owed as required by 1See,e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 , 768–69 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d) to align with the ABA’s interpretation because “hold[ing] otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it proposed the model rule, which we adopted in rule 32:8.4(d) without change”); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Iowa 2015) (quoting an ABA formal opinion with approval); Iowa Sup.

2022Instead of promptly paying Larew what he owed as required by 1See,e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 , 768–69 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d) to align with the ABA’s interpretation because “hold[ing] otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it proposed the model rule, which we adopted in rule 32:8.4(d) without change”); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Iowa 2015) (quoting an ABA formal opinion with approval); Iowa Sup.

2007See State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 2000) (recommending the model inquiry found in Iowa Bench Book, 5-37 to 5-41 (1999)); State v. Spencer, 519 N.W.2d 357 , 360 n.1 (Iowa 1994) (recommending the model inquiry found in 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02-2 (3d ed. 1986)); see also Spencer, 941 F. Supp. at 843– 44 (discussing and quoting the Bench Book for United States District Judges). 13 In this case the trial court did not conduct the all important colloquy to make sure Hannan properly waived his right to counsel.

2000See also Spencer v. Ault, 941 F.Supp. 832, 843-44 (N.D.Iowa 1996).

2025See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).

2023See State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009) (explaining that when a defendant does not “object to the instructions given to the jury at trial . . . the jury 1 While no instruction was given in this case, for reference, the model instruction for “intoxication as a defense” states: The defendant claims he was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the alleged crime.

2022Cf. United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 973 (4th Cir. 1987) (indicating the “real possibility” portion impermissibly places the burden of persuasion back onto the defense); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 , 51–52 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); State v. Jackson, 925 A.2d 1060 , 1067 n.3 (Conn. 2007) (“[U]se of [‘real possibility’] actually may create confusion about the meaning of reasonable doubt and impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant.”).

2022Cf. United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 973 (4th Cir. 1987) (indicating the “real possibility” portion impermissibly places the burden of persuasion back onto the defense); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 , 51–52 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); State v. Jackson, 925 A.2d 1060 , 1067 n.3 (Conn. 2007) (“[U]se of [‘real possibility’] actually may create confusion about the meaning of reasonable doubt and impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant.”).

2022Cf. Williams, 929 N.W.2d at 633 (pointing out that just because the model instruction was appropriately given “does not mean, of course, that it would have been an abuse of discretion to use [the AIJ Project] instruction”). 2.

2020He maintains trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to 1) multiple portions of the trial being closed to the public, 2) a jury instruction—based on a model instruction—advising the jury it could consider Levy’s out-of-court statements “just as if they had been made at trial,” and 3) prosecutorial error during the State’s rebuttal argument. 10 “For his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to succeed, [Levy] ‘must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.’” State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2

2020“Under the first prong, we measure counsel’s performance against the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner.” State v. Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Iowa 2015) (altered for readability).

2019Prejudice is established by showing “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ).

2019If you find any of the statements were made, then you may consider them as part of the evidence, just as if they had been made at this trial. 3 Bishop notes that the instruction is a modified reproduction of the model instruction,1 which we are “slow to disapprove of.” State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 559 (Iowa 2015).

2017See id.

2014Butcher contends these instructions comply with Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2009), which held that a “pretext instruction” is necessary in an employment discrimination trial so as “to ensure the jury understands the plaintiff need not present an admission or other affirmative evidence of the defendant’s intent in order to prove discrimination.” However, the Deboom court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s model instruction, which states: “You may find that plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate if it has been proved by the preponderance

2014Butcher contends these instructions comply with Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2009), which held that a “pretext instruction” is necessary in an employment discrimination trial so as “to ensure the jury understands the plaintiff need not present an admission or other affirmative evidence of the defendant’s intent in order to prove discrimination.” However, the Deboom court relied on the Eighth Circuit’s model instruction, which states: “You may find that plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate if it has been proved by the preponderance