11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hasty v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 5.401(B) (5th ed. 2024). 23 the “plain language” of the jury instruction to determine what the jury would have read the instruction to mean); Townsend v. Donaldson, 933 A.2d 282, 289 (D.C. 2007) (same); cf. Hasty, 669 A.2d at 133 (rejecting as “not persuasive” the government’s argument that the court’s instruction adequately conveyed the law to the jury where the government itself turned to the dictionary to define a term in the instructions that was undefined). 7 The clarity that is missing from the model instruction comes into relie | 1 | 1 |
Townsend v. Donaldsongreen1 sentence2025Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 5.401(B) (5th ed. 2024). 23 the “plain language” of the jury instruction to determine what the jury would have read the instruction to mean); Townsend v. Donaldson, 933 A.2d 282, 289 (D.C. 2007) (same); cf. Hasty, 669 A.2d at 133 (rejecting as “not persuasive” the government’s argument that the court’s instruction adequately conveyed the law to the jury where the government itself turned to the dictionary to define a term in the instructions that was undefined). 7 The clarity that is missing from the model instruction comes into relie | 1 | 1 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016See Mobley v. United States, 101 A.3d 406, 421 (D.C.2014) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). 2016See Mobley v. United States, 101 A.3d 406, 421 (D.C.2014) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Charles E. Mobley, Dante Carpenter, Gerald A. Thompkins v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See Mobley v. United States, 101 A.3d 406, 421 (D.C.2014) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Williamsgreen1 sentence1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alberto Torres Velasquezgreen1 sentence1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Joe Taylor, United States of America v. Chardale Arnaz Bowe, United States of America v. Eric Lamont Hutchinsongreen2 sentences1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United 1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986Winters, 317 A.2d at 533-34 ; see Wilson v. United States, 419 A.2d 353, 356 (D.C.1980). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Melvin Telfairegreen1 sentence1975D.C. 146, 152, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972) (explaining the one witness rule; setting out a model instruction; and ruling that the instruction, absent strong reason, should be given in the future); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 , 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 , 92 S.Ct. 327 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971) (setting out a model instruction to be used prospectively); United States v. Bodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (identification instruction must be given if requested by counsel). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blaine v. United States
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 770-71 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Marshall v. United States
green
1 sentence2022Cf. Marshall v. United States, 623 A.2d 551 , 565 n.6 (D.C. 1992) (Ferren, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result only). 14 Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request at trial for a claim of right jury instruction. 4 The model claim of right jury instruction in the District of Columbia reads: An element of the offense of robbery is that the defendant had the specific intent to steal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Crowder v. United States
green
1 sentence2022The second and third paragraphs, which appear in brackets in the model instruction, “have been recommended [by this court in Crowder, 383 A.2d at 342 n.11] for use in cases where there is a particularly high likelihood of juror coercion.” Comment to Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.603 (5th ed. 2018). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Cohen
green
1 sentence2017We said that, ―as the Board recognized, in going beyond the model rule, Rule 5.1 (c)(2) reflects what this jurisdiction has determined to be a fair and necessary balance. [Rule 5.1 (c)(2)] is not a rule of imputed liability for the underlying conduct.‖ Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Fawaz Yunis, A/K/A Nazeeh
green
1 sentence1998The differences between the two disciplines reinforce my view that we should follow Chief Judge Mikva's counsel in Yunis, supra . [2] *84 My colleagues do not share my reservations, however, and I acknowledge that the model instruction that they have collectively composed is constitutionally unassailable. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Deavers v. Kansas
green
1 sentence1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Seybold v. United States
green
1 sentence1994See Victor, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (“This model instruction surpasses others I have seen in stating the reasonable doubt standard succinctly and comprehensibly.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994) (“the ‘firmly convinced’ language, read in the context of the charge as a whole, adequately apprises the jury of the requisite level of proof’); Taylor, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354 , 997 F.2d at 1556 (reasonable doubt instruction requiring that jurors be “firmly convinced” of defendant’s guilt did not lower government’s burden of proof); United | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Winters v. United States
green
1 sentence1986Winters, 317 A.2d at 533-34 ; see Wilson v. United States, 419 A.2d 353, 356 (D.C.1980). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Barber
green
1 sentence1975D.C. 146, 152, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972) (explaining the one witness rule; setting out a model instruction; and ruling that the instruction, absent strong reason, should be given in the future); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 , 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 , 92 S.Ct. 327 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971) (setting out a model instruction to be used prospectively); United States v. Bodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (identification instruction must be given if requested by counsel). 5 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
United States v. Charles Hodges
green
1 sentence1975D.C. 146, 152, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972) (explaining the one witness rule; setting out a model instruction; and ruling that the instruction, absent strong reason, should be given in the future); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 , 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 , 92 S.Ct. 327 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971) (setting out a model instruction to be used prospectively); United States v. Bodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (identification instruction must be given if requested by counsel). 5 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
LePera v. United States
green
1 sentence1975D.C. 146, 152, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972) (explaining the one witness rule; setting out a model instruction; and ruling that the instruction, absent strong reason, should be given in the future); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 , 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 , 92 S.Ct. 327 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971) (setting out a model instruction to be used prospectively); United States v. Bodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (identification instruction must be given if requested by counsel). 5 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Badger v. LaVallee
green
1 sentence1975D.C. 146, 152, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (1972) (explaining the one witness rule; setting out a model instruction; and ruling that the instruction, absent strong reason, should be given in the future); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 , 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 , 92 S.Ct. 327 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971) (setting out a model instruction to be used prospectively); United States v. Bodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975) (identification instruction must be given if requested by counsel). 5 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Willie E. Pendergrast v. United States
green
1 sentence1973The carefully worded instructions of the trial judge in the instant case concerning the permissible inferences to be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property were based closely on the model instruction formulated in Pendergrast v. United States, supra, 135 U.S. App.D.C. at 34-35, 416 F.2d at 790-791 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.