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21 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Georgakapoulosgreen2 sentences2008People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill. 2008People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1008 , 237 Ill.Dec. 156 , 708 N.E.2d 1196 (1999). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2020See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2020See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 3 |
Harkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2020See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 3 |
Leon Davis, Jr. v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2020See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 3 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2020See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 3 |
People v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2021The State sought to introduce decedent’s statement under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to People v. Graham, 392 Ill. 2009Deference is given to a trial court’s determination to admit a statement as a dying declaration exception to hearsay, and a reviewing court will not overturn the decision unless it is “ ‘palpably against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” People v. Graham, 392 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2021See Jenkins, 2013 IL App (4th) 120628, ¶ 28 (although “the surgical incision in [the victim’s] abdomen look[ed] gruesome” and “it would seem reasonable to infer that he regarded his survival as far from assured,” the court held such a belief was not the “same as believing his death was inevitable and imminent,” and where the court was “unable to say it is clear and indisputable that [the victim] believed his death was imminent when he spoke with [the police],” those statements were not admissible under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule). 2018See Jenkins, - 24 - 1-13-3981 2013 IL App (4th) 120628, ¶ 28 (although “the surgical incision in [the victim’s] abdomen look[ed] gruesome” and “it would seem reasonable to infer that he regarded his survival as far from assured,” the court held such a belief was not the “same as believing his death was inevitable and imminent,” and where the court was “unable to say it is clear and indisputable that [the victim] believed his death was imminent when he spoke with [the police],” those statements were not admissible under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hatchettgreen2 sentences2014People v. Hatchett, 397 Ill. 2013People v. Hatchett, 397 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Monterrosogreen2 sentences2005People v. Monterroso , 34 Cal. 4th 743, 763-65, 101 P.3d 956, 971-72 , 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 19-20 (2004). 2005People v. Monterroso , 34 Cal. 4th 743, 763-65, 101 P.3d 956, 971-72 , 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 19-20 (2004). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Webbgreen1 sentence2009“The trial court’s determination of whether a particular statement constitutes a dying declaration will not be reversed on appeal unless its findings are palpably contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” People v. Webb, 125 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gilmore
green
2 sentences2021Jan. 1, 2011) provides that in a prosecution for a homicide, a dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule where the statement is “made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.” A dying declaration qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule because it “poses a guarantee of trustworthiness based on the assumption that the belief of impending death excludes the possibility of fabrication by the declarant.” Gilmore, 356 Ill. 2020Jan. 1, 2011) provides that in a prosecution for a homicide, a dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule where the statement is “made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.” A dying declaration qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule because it “poses a guarantee of trustworthiness based on the assumption that the belief of impending death excludes the possibility of fabrication by the declarant.” Gilmore, 356 Ill. | 7 | 2008–2021 |
State v. Beauchamp
green
2 sentences2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . 2021See Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142, 162 (Fla. 2016) (“The unique nature and purpose of the dying declaration exception, observed in Crawford and Giles, justifies its continuing utility and validity as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); People v. Johnson, 353 P.3d 266, 288-89 (Cal. 2015); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 283-84 (Minn. 2006); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); People v. Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 , 608-09 (App. Div. 2011); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 146-50 (Tenn. 2007); and State v. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, ¶ 31 , 796 N.W.2d 780 . | 3 | 2020–2021 |
People v. House
green
2 sentences2021Instead, the record shows that Teresa was coherent at the time she made her statements and she did not die until nine days after the shooting and, therefore, nine days after the statements were made. - 14 - ¶ 61 The language in our supreme court’s decision in People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323 (1990), is also instructive. 2018Instead, the record shows that Teresa was coherent at the time she made her statements and she did not die until nine days after the shooting and, therefore, nine days after the statements were made. ¶ 61 The language in our supreme court’s decision in People v. House, 141 Ill. 2d 323 (1990), is also instructive. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
People v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2021Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 96 . 2018Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 96 . | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2008I’ve been shot in the heart.” When Cameron asked, “Who shot you?” Hicks responded, “Pattyman shot me.” In the motion in limine, defense counsel argued the statement did not qualify under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule and that the dying declaration exception was inconsistent with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 158 L. 2008I’ve been shot in the heart.” When Cameron asked, “Who shot you?” Hicks responded, “Pattyman shot me.” In the motion in limine, defense counsel argued the statement did not qualify under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule and that the dying declaration exception was inconsistent with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 158 L. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
The PEOPLE v. Odum
green
2 sentences2004Dying declarations are admissible into evidence only if it appears that such declarations are “made by the victim under the fixed belief and moral conviction that death is impending and certain to follow almost immediately, without opportunity for repentance and in the absence of all hope of avoidance,” when the victim “has despaired of life and looks to death as inevitable and at hand.” People v. Odum, 27 Ill. 2d 237, 242-43 , 188 N.E.2d 720 (1963); See also People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill. 2004Dying declarations are admissible into evidence only if it appears that such declarations are “made by the victim under the fixed belief and moral conviction that death is impending and certain to follow almost immediately, without opportunity for repentance and in the absence of all hope of avoidance,” when the victim “has despaired of life and looks to death as inevitable and at hand.” People v. Odum, 27 Ill. 2d 237, 242-43 , 188 N.E.2d 720 (1963); See also People v. Georgakapoulos, 303 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Giles v. California
green
2 sentences2009The Giles Court reviewed relevant common law and said: “In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from testifying — as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim — the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying declaration exception.” (Emphasis added.) Giles, 554 U.S. at 361-62 , 171 L. 2009The Giles Court reviewed relevant common law and said: “In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from testifying — as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim — the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying declaration exception.” (Emphasis added.) Giles, 554 U.S. at 361-62 , 171 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Tilley
green
1 sentence1982An additional requirement of the dying declaration exception — a requirement which follows from the general rule that witnesses must be competent — is that “The declarant must be in possession of his mental faculties sufficiently to understand what he is doing and to be able to give a true and correct account of the facts to which the statement relates.” People v. Tilley (1950), 406 Ill. 398, 403 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.