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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Talal B. Jammal v. John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General of the State of California Superior Court of the County of Contra Costagreen1 sentence2022(See Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 70 ; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 ; cf. People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 230–232.) Accordingly, we reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of Lam’s statement as a dying declaration was error and requires reversal of his murder conviction. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mayogreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 553 [abuse of discretion standard of review applies].) “‘To be admissible in evidence as dying declarations, the statements of the decedent must have been made at a time when he had abandoned all hope of life so that he believed that death inevitably must follow. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Angletongreen1 sentence2011The likelihood of death, the awareness of eventual death, or the intention to eventually inflict death on one’s self is not enough to place the declarant in the elevated sense of solemnity envisioned by the jurisprudence or the relevant codal provision.” (Ibid., citation omitted; see also U.S. v. Angleton (S.D.Tex. 2003) 269 F.Supp.2d 878, 885 [“The aspect of control involved in an intended death clearly diminishes the spontaneity that is a critical part of the dying declaration exception.”]; but see State v. Satterfield (1995) 193 W.Va. 503 [ 457 S.E.2d 440 ] [suicide note admissible as dying | 1 | 1 |
People v. Geiergreen2 sentences2010(See People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 609-611 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ] [the defendant’s failure to object forfeited constitutional claims; constitutional claims were not of such magnitude that an exception to the forfeiture rule was warranted].) In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit. 2010(See People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 609-611 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ] [the defendant’s failure to object forfeited constitutional claims; constitutional claims were not of such magnitude that an exception to the forfeiture rule was warranted].) In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit. | 1 | 1 |
Mattox v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990(See 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1974) §§ 1438-1444, pp. 289-303; 1 Jefferson, Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 7.1, p. 280.) “The sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood.” (Mattox v. U.S. (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 244 [ 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 ].) Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the declarations were trustworthy because Hughes believed death was imminent when he made the statements. 1990(See 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1974) §§ 1438-1444, pp. 289-303; 1 Jefferson, Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 7.1, p. 280.) “The sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood.” (Mattox v. U.S. (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 244 [ 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 ].) Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the declarations were trustworthy because Hughes believed death was imminent when he made the statements. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Satterfieldgreen2 sentences2011The likelihood of death, the awareness of eventual death, or the intention to eventually inflict death on one’s self is not enough to place the declarant in the elevated sense of solemnity envisioned by the jurisprudence or the relevant codal provision.” (Ibid., citation omitted; see also U.S. v. Angleton (S.D.Tex. 2003) 269 F.Supp.2d 878, 885 [“The aspect of control involved in an intended death clearly diminishes the spontaneity that is a critical part of the dying declaration exception.”]; but see State v. Satterfield (1995) 193 W.Va. 503 [ 457 S.E.2d 440 ] [suicide note admissible as dying 2011The likelihood of death, the awareness of eventual death, or the intention to eventually inflict death on one’s self is not enough to place the declarant in the elevated sense of solemnity envisioned by the jurisprudence or the relevant codal provision.” (Ibid., citation omitted; see also U.S. v. Angleton (S.D.Tex. 2003) 269 F.Supp.2d 878, 885 [“The aspect of control involved in an intended death clearly diminishes the spontaneity that is a critical part of the dying declaration exception.”]; but see State v. Satterfield (1995) 193 W.Va. 503 [ 457 S.E.2d 440 ] [suicide note admissible as dying | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Monterroso
green
2 sentences2024The People respond that the holding in People v. Monterroso (2004) 4 34 Cal.4th 743 (Monterroso) requires us to reject defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim and it was up to the jury to determine C.L. and G.C.’s credibility. 2015But our decision in Monterroso did not purport to rely on any asserted historical uniqueness concerning the dying declaration exception to the right of confrontation; rather, we simply recognized that the admissibility of dying declarations was one of “ ‘those exceptions established at the time of the founding.’ ” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 765 , quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 54 .) Accordingly, even assuming that the dying declaration exception was not a unique hearsay exception at the time the founders drafted the Sixth Amendment, that circumstance does not affect our hold | 2 | 2015–2024 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015But our decision in Monterroso did not purport to rely on any asserted historical uniqueness concerning the dying declaration exception to the right of confrontation; rather, we simply recognized that the admissibility of dying declarations was one of “ ‘those exceptions established at the time of the founding.’ ” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 765 , quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 54 .) Accordingly, even assuming that the dying declaration exception was not a unique hearsay exception at the time the founders drafted the Sixth Amendment, that circumstance does not affect our hold 2015But our decision in Monterroso did not purport to rely on any asserted historical uniqueness concerning the dying declaration exception to the right of confrontation; rather, we simply recognized that the admissibility of dying declarations was one of “ ‘those exceptions established at the time of the founding.’ ” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 765 , quoting Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 54 .) Accordingly, even assuming that the dying declaration exception was not a unique hearsay exception at the time the founders drafted the Sixth Amendment, that circumstance does not affect our hold | 2 | 2006–2015 |
People v. Albarran
green
1 sentence2022(See Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 70 ; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 ; cf. People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 230–232.) Accordingly, we reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of Lam’s statement as a dying declaration was error and requires reversal of his murder conviction. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Merriman
green
1 sentence2022(See Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 70 ; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 ; cf. People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214 , 230–232.) Accordingly, we reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of Lam’s statement as a dying declaration was error and requires reversal of his murder conviction. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Giles v. California
green
2 sentences2008In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant had caused a person to be absent, but had not done so to prevent the person from testifying—as in the typical murder case involving accusatorial statements by the victim—the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying-declaration exception.” (Giles, supra, 554 U.S. at p._[ 128 S.Ct. at p. 2684 ].) The court added that the rule propounded by this court was not recognized at common law and not established in American jurisprudence. 2008(Id. at p.__ [ 128 S.Ct. at p. 2687 ].) By contrast, as noted in the text, the doctrine that a defendant impliedly waives the right of presence by voluntarily absenting himself from trial has been well established in the jurisprudence of the high court for almost a century. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Rowland
green
2 sentences2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. 2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Cromer
green
2 sentences2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. 2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Karis
green
2 sentences2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. 2006We review the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for abuse of discretion ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264 , 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 659 , 758 P.2d 1189 ) and the legal question whether admission of the evidence was constitutional de novo ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 , 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 , 15 P.3d 243 ). a. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Cipolla
green
1 sentence1998(People v. Cipolla, supra, 155 Cal. at p. 228 ; Evid. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.