gunshot residue test in Illinois

2017As a result, we are not 50 No. 1-15-0575 persuaded by the State's argument there were other valid, intervening circumstances. ¶ 116 The State also argues in its brief, in one line, that the gunshot residue test was not a form of interrogation. " 'Interrogation' refers to express questioning, as well as to "any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally accompanying arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' " Jackson, 374 Ill.

2017As a result, we are not 50 No. 1-15-0575 persuaded by the State's argument there were other valid, intervening circumstances. ¶ 116 The State also argues in its brief, in one line, that the gunshot residue test was not a form of interrogation. " 'Interrogation' refers to express questioning, as well as to "any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally accompanying arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' " Jackson, 374 Ill.

2017Temporal Proximity ¶ 99 As to the first attenuation factor, our supreme court has observed that "the temporal proximity between the arrest and the statement is often an ambiguous factor, the significance of which will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the conditions under which the time passes." Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d at 93 -94 (citing People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137, 160 (2004); 19 In other words, even if we assume arguendo that the trial court's factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we cannot find, applying a de novo standard of review, that

2017Temporal Proximity ¶ 99 As to the first attenuation factor, our supreme court has observed that "the temporal proximity between the arrest and the statement is often an ambiguous factor, the significance of which will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the conditions under which the time passes." Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d at 93 -94 (citing People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137, 160 (2004); 19 In other words, even if we assume arguendo that the trial court's factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we cannot find, applying a de novo standard of review, that

2007We recognize that the supreme court in Young held that courts should “rely solely upon the good-faith evaluation by the prosecutor of the impact of the suppression order on his case.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247 .

2007We recognize that the supreme court in Young held that courts should “rely solely upon the good-faith evaluation by the prosecutor of the impact of the suppression order on his case.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247 .

2007Ed. 2d 69 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); and (3) admitting a forensic scientist’s opinion on the results of a gunshot residue test when the scientist was not present at the trial.

2007Ed. 2d 69 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); and (3) admitting a forensic scientist’s opinion on the results of a gunshot residue test when the scientist 1-05-0668 was not present at the trial.

2025The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison. ¶ 25 On appeal to the appellate court, defendant argued that (1) his right to a public trial was violated when his mother was excluded from the courtroom, (2) evidence of the lineup identifications should have been suppressed because the lineups were unduly suggestive, (3) the State elicited improper testimony on gunshot residue testing, (4) the photograph provided to the jurors during deliberations deprived him of a fair trial, and (5) closing statements were prejudicial. 2023 IL App (1st) 181070, ¶ 1 .

2023The court elicited Rochowicz’s clarification that he did not test the samples, but in accord with standard peer review, he read Burke’s notes regarding Burke’s testing.” Id. ¶ 9. ¶4 On remand, we further note that Rochowicz testified at trial that the Illinois State Police (ISP) peer review process requires that “once the case has actually been analyzed and a file along with report and notes has been generated, that report and notes will be given to another qualified examiner to review,” and that examiner then reviews those materials “to ensure that the procedure manual has been followed as we

2023Defendant analogized his case to People v. Dennis, 28 Ill.App.3d 74 (1st Dist. 1975).

2022At the first sentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years for felony murder, plus the mandatory 25-year enhancement for killing with a firearm, for a total of 60 years. 3 ¶9 On appeal, defendant claimed (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to proceed solely on a felony murder charge, thereby precluding defendant from seeking jury instructions on self-defense and second degree murder, (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present evidence that a co-offender was not charged, (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to

2021Id. ¶ 16 We first address the defendant’s assertion that he set forth an arguable claim that his counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate, obtain, and truthfully inform him of the results of both a gunshot residue test and fingerprint test.

2021We, therefore, must accept the contents of his -7- 1-19-0248 affidavit as true and, given the substance of his affidavit as well as the results of both the gunshot residue test and fingerprint test, we find that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965 . ¶ 19 We next address the defendant’s argument that he set forth an arguable claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his coerced confession.

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2021Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

2020Accordingly, any assertion by defendant that his plea was entered involuntarily would have been patently without merit. ¶ 25 We now turn to defendant’s contention that he “entered into a plea agreement with the understanding of a reduced charge against Dana Manley *** and that she [was] eligible to receive earned good conduct credits” to determine whether he was arguably denied the benefit of the bargain he made with the State. “ ‘[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such

1992The court observed that defendant did not in brief or oral argument specifically show how the contents would provide an alibi and that such was essential to secure reversal. [2] The dissent to the opinion originally filed cites 31 such cases, but neglects to indicate that none, except Hammock , was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence. [3] People v. Stallings (1991) 211 Ill.App.3d 1032 , 156 Ill.Dec. 344 , 570 N.E.2d 820 ; People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 570 , 140 Ill.Dec. 642 , 550 N.E.2d 278 ; People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Il

1992App. 3d 1065 , 536 N.E.2d 816 , where defendant’s conviction was affirmed although a gunshot residue test performed on another suspect was destroyed by police notwithstanding defendant’s claim that the test results were “potentially exculpatory,” and People v. Davis (1981), 103 Ill.

1992NOTES [1] The dissenting justice in the instant case has declined to reverse on other occasions by reason of lost evidence: People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Ill.Dec. 766 , 536 N.E.2d 816 , where defendant's conviction was affirmed although a gunshot residue test performed on another suspect was destroyed by police notwithstanding defendant's claim that the test results were "potentially exculpatory," and People v. Davis (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 792 , 59 Ill.Dec. 453 , 431 N.E.2d 1210 , where defendant claimed that the contents of a briefcase, lost by the police, would provide him

1992App. 3d 1065 , 536 N.E.2d 816 , where defendant’s conviction was affirmed although a gunshot residue test performed on another suspect was destroyed by police notwithstanding defendant’s claim that the test results were “potentially exculpatory,” and People v. Davis (1981), 103 Ill.

1992NOTES [1] The dissenting justice in the instant case has declined to reverse on other occasions by reason of lost evidence: People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Ill.Dec. 766 , 536 N.E.2d 816 , where defendant's conviction was affirmed although a gunshot residue test performed on another suspect was destroyed by police notwithstanding defendant's claim that the test results were "potentially exculpatory," and People v. Davis (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 792 , 59 Ill.Dec. 453 , 431 N.E.2d 1210 , where defendant claimed that the contents of a briefcase, lost by the police, would provide him

1992The court observed that defendant did not in brief or oral argument specifically show how the contents would provide an alibi and that such was essential to secure reversal. [2] The dissent to the opinion originally filed cites 31 such cases, but neglects to indicate that none, except Hammock , was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence. [3] People v. Stallings (1991) 211 Ill.App.3d 1032 , 156 Ill.Dec. 344 , 570 N.E.2d 820 ; People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 570 , 140 Ill.Dec. 642 , 550 N.E.2d 278 ; People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Il

1992The court observed that defendant did not in brief or oral argument specifically show how the contents would provide an alibi and that such was essential to secure reversal. [2] The dissent to the opinion originally filed cites 31 such cases, but neglects to indicate that none, except Hammock , was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence. [3] People v. Stallings (1991) 211 Ill.App.3d 1032 , 156 Ill.Dec. 344 , 570 N.E.2d 820 ; People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 570 , 140 Ill.Dec. 642 , 550 N.E.2d 278 ; People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Il

1992The court observed that defendant did not in brief or oral argument specifically show how the contents would provide an alibi and that such was essential to secure reversal. [2] The dissent to the opinion originally filed cites 31 such cases, but neglects to indicate that none, except Hammock , was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence. [3] People v. Stallings (1991) 211 Ill.App.3d 1032 , 156 Ill.Dec. 344 , 570 N.E.2d 820 ; People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 570 , 140 Ill.Dec. 642 , 550 N.E.2d 278 ; People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Il

1992The court observed that defendant did not in brief or oral argument specifically show how the contents would provide an alibi and that such was essential to secure reversal. [2] The dissent to the opinion originally filed cites 31 such cases, but neglects to indicate that none, except Hammock , was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence. [3] People v. Stallings (1991) 211 Ill.App.3d 1032 , 156 Ill.Dec. 344 , 570 N.E.2d 820 ; People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill.App.3d 570 , 140 Ill.Dec. 642 , 550 N.E.2d 278 ; People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 1065 , 129 Il