gunshot residue test in Georgia

2026However, Hills later “admitted that it was his firearm”; that he found the firearm about three months before the shooting; that “he had the firearm the day before, when they were at the hotel”; and that “he brought the firearm to the Lewis residence.” At the conclusion of the interview, Hills agreed to submit to a gunshot residue test, 6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 7 Hills’s custodial interview was audio- and video-recorded and played for the jury at trial. 4 which tested positive for the presence of gunshot residue. 1.

2026In Hills’s sole enumeration of error, he contends— relying largely on Allen v. State, 319 Ga. 415 , 419–21 (2024)—that the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because, given the “sexual nature” of Hills’s relationship with Destiney and her warning that Lewis threatened to beat up Hills if they ever met, the evidence supported a finding that Hills acted with provocation and passion in shooting Lewis six times when Lewis rushed into Destiney’s bedroom on the morning of November 11.

2020Specifically, Clay asserts: that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 ( 83 SCt 1194 , 10 LE2d 215) (1963), when it failed to produce a gunshot residue test;2 that his indictment was void because it was not returned in open court, because it contained numerous substantive and non-amendable defects, and because he is “actually innocent” of the charges;3 that there were issues concerning the composition of his jury pool and the qualification of a member of the petit jury; that granted Clay’s motion and allowed appellate counsel to withdraw from the case.

2020Specifically, Clay asserts: that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 ( 83 SCt 1194 , 10 LE2d 215) (1963), when it failed to produce a gunshot residue test;2 that his indictment was void because it was not returned in open court, because it contained numerous substantive and non-amendable defects, and because he is “actually innocent” of the charges;3 that there were issues concerning the composition of his jury pool and the qualification of a member of the petit jury; that granted Clay’s motion and allowed appellate counsel to withdraw from the case.

2013The reviewing court need not “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697 . (a) Appellant claims first that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the gunshot residue test performed on his hands, and then failing to object at trial to the admission of that evidence, because the test was performed without valid consent or a search warrant.

2002Temple contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to request a bifurcated trial on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and failed to introduce evidence that Temple passed a gunshot residue test. *609 (a) With respect to trial counsel’s failure to request a bifurcated trial, Temple correctly points out that Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ) (1984), states that a trial judge “shall bifurcate” the proceedings if the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is unrelated to any other count of the indic

2002Temple contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to request a bifurcated trial on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and failed to introduce evidence that Temple passed a gunshot residue test. *609 (a) With respect to trial counsel’s failure to request a bifurcated trial, Temple correctly points out that Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ) (1984), states that a trial judge “shall bifurcate” the proceedings if the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is unrelated to any other count of the indic