21 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2026A party raising this claim must 23 overcome “the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998). ¶ 53 To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. 2025A party raising this claim must overcome “the strong presumption the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998). ¶ 97 To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Houstongreen2 sentences2026Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). 2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694 ; People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). | 3 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). 2025Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694 ; People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Colegreen1 sentence2025People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 138 (1992) (hereinafter Andrew Johnson) (citing People v. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 413 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 138 (1992) (hereinafter Andrew Johnson) (citing People v. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 413 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Guygreen1 sentence2023Illinois courts have also recognized that “[t]he purpose of the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine is to protect courts of equity from - 21 - assisting litigants in accomplishing their fraudulent or unlawful purposes, and not to protect the party raising the doctrine as a defense.” Cole v. Guy, 183 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
BRUSO BY BRUSO v. Alexian Bros. Hosp.
green
2 sentences2003Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill.2d 445, 460 , 227 Ill.Dec. 532 , 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997). 2003Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill.2d 445, 460 , 227 Ill.Dec. 532 , 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997). | 4 | 2002–2003 |
Wyeth v. Levine
green
2 sentences2019The party raising the defense of conflict preemption must "demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements." Wyeth , 555 U.S. at 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 . 2019The party raising the defense of conflict preemption must "demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements." Wyeth , 555 U.S. at 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Heinze v. Heinze
green
2 sentences1988To prevail on a claim of estoppel, the party raising the defense must show that, having no access to the true facts, it relied on statements or conduct of the plaintiff to its detriment. ( Heinze v. Heinze (1979), 79 Ill. 1988(Heinze v. Heinze (1979), 79 Ill. | 2 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Howard
green
1 sentence2024People v. Howard, 2017 IL 120443, ¶ 24 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re M.A.
green
1 sentence2019In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 25 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jackson v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2017Jackson v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 111044 , ¶ 20, 363 Ill.Dec. 351 , 975 N.E.2d 153 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Long v. Kemper Life Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1992Long v. Kemper Life Insurance Co. (1990), 196 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carlyle v. Jaskiewicz
green
2 sentences1989(Carlyle v. Jaskiewicz (1984), 124 Ill. 1989App. 3d at 498 , 464 N.E.2d at 759-60 .) Thus, a court requires that the “unclean hands” conduct must have been directed at the party raising the doctrine as a defense and must have involved the very transaction at issue before the court. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Pedigo v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1987App. 3d 392 , 474 N.E.2d 430 .) The party raising the defense of res judicata has the burden of establishing the identity of the parties, the precise issues, and the judgment of the former action. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Gonyo v. Gonyo
green
1 sentence1987Gonyo v. Gonyo (1973), 9 Ill. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
City of Quincy v. Sturhahn
green
2 sentences1984App. 3d 436, 439-40 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) “In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the courts will not decide the question by mere lapse of time but by all the circumstances of the case, and will hold the public estopped or not as right or justice may require. [Citations.] The doctrine is invoked only to prevent fraud and injustice. [Citation.]” (City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614 , 165 N.E.2d 271 .) To equitably estop a municipality acting in its governmental capacity, the party raising the claim must prove that there were affirmative acts by the municipal officers which induc 1984App. 3d 436, 439-40 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) “In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the courts will not decide the question by mere lapse of time but by all the circumstances of the case, and will hold the public estopped or not as right or justice may require. [Citations.] The doctrine is invoked only to prevent fraud and injustice. [Citation.]” (City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614 , 165 N.E.2d 271 .) To equitably estop a municipality acting in its governmental capacity, the party raising the claim must prove that there were affirmative acts by the municipal officers which induc | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines
green
2 sentences1984Cities Service Oil Co. v. Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157, 161 , 171 N.E.2d 605 . 1984Cities Service Oil Co. v. Des Plaines (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 157, 161 , 171 N.E.2d 605 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Wachta v. Pollution Control Board
green
1 sentence1984App. 3d 436, 439-40 , 289 N.E.2d 484 .) “In applying the doctrine of estoppel, the courts will not decide the question by mere lapse of time but by all the circumstances of the case, and will hold the public estopped or not as right or justice may require. [Citations.] The doctrine is invoked only to prevent fraud and injustice. [Citation.]” (City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614 , 165 N.E.2d 271 .) To equitably estop a municipality acting in its governmental capacity, the party raising the claim must prove that there were affirmative acts by the municipal officers which induc | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Kedzierski v. Kedzierski
neutral
2 sentences1973A discussion of both theories is contained in the case of Kedzierski v. Kedzierski, 86 Ill.App.2d 264 , 229 N.E.2d 919 , where the court states as follows, pp. 267-268: “The burden of establishing the defense under either of the aforementioned principles is upon the party invoking it * * *. [Citations omitted.] The party raising the defense must show with clarity and certainty the parties, the precise issues and the judgment of the former action * * Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act provides that a defendant may file a motion to dismiss an action that is barred by a prior judgment. 1973A discussion of both theories is contained in the case of Kedzierski v. Kedzierski, 86 Ill.App.2d 264 , 229 N.E.2d 919 , where the court states as follows, pp. 267-268: “The burden of establishing the defense under either of the aforementioned principles is upon the party invoking it * * *. [Citations omitted.] The party raising the defense must show with clarity and certainty the parties, the precise issues and the judgment of the former action * * Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act provides that a defendant may file a motion to dismiss an action that is barred by a prior judgment. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.