party raising defense in New York

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012Rather, in the context of a paternity proceeding, “it is the child’s justifiable reliance on a representation of paternity that is considered” (Matter of Savel v Shields, 58 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]; accord Matter of Stephen W. v Christina X., 80 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011] [2001]) and, therefore, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied only where its use furthers the best interests of the [subject] child” (Matter of Derrick H. v Martha J., 82 AD3d 1236, 1238 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Felix O. v Janette M., 89 AD3d

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2012The party raising this defense — here, respondent — bears the initial burden of proof (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181, 1182 [2010]), and application of the doctrine “ ‘does not involve the equities between the . . . adult[ ]’ ” participants (Matter of Dustin G. v Melissa I., 69 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 708 [2010], quoting Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320, 330 [2006]).

2015(Werking v Amity Estates, 2 NY2d 43, 52 [1956].) “This intent must be clearly established and cannot be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts or language.” (Matter of East 56th Plaza v Abrams, 91 AD2d 1129, 1130 [3d Dept 1983].) The party raising the defense of waiver has the burden of proving it.

2015(Werking v Amity Estates, 2 NY2d 43, 52 [1956].) “This intent must be clearly established and cannot be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts or language.” (Matter of East 56th Plaza v Abrams, 91 AD2d 1129, 1130 [3d Dept 1983].) The party raising the defense of waiver has the burden of proving it.

2015(City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976].) A motion to disqualify should be denied where a delay in making the motion is “inordinate and inadequately explained.” (Lewis v Unigard Mut.

2011To establish laches, a party must show: “(1) conduct by an offending party giving rise to the situation complained of, (2) delay by the complainant in asserting his or her claim for relief despite the opportunity to do so, (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the offending party that the complainant would assert his or her claim for relief, and (4) injury or prejudice to the offending party in the event that relief is accorded the complainant.” (Cohen v Krantz, 227 AD2d 581, 582 [2d Dept 1996].) Mere delay in asserting one’s rights will not establish laches, without actual prejudice

2010The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, petitioner, to put forth evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to order the DNA test (see Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d at 815 ; see also Matter of Smythe v Worley, 72 AD3d 977, 979 [2010]; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 8 [1987]).

2010The party raising the doctrine of equitable estoppel — here, the mother — has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case sufficient to support that claim (see Debra H. v Janice R., 14 NY3d 576, 588 [2010]; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, 815 [1997], Iv denied 90 NY2d 809 [1997]; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 468 [1983], affd for reasons stated below 63 NY2d 859 [1984]).

2010The party raising the doctrine of equitable estoppel — here, the mother — has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case sufficient to support that claim (see Debra H. v Janice R., 14 NY3d 576, 588 [2010]; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, 815 [1997], Iv denied 90 NY2d 809 [1997]; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 468 [1983], affd for reasons stated below 63 NY2d 859 [1984]).

2010The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, petitioner, to put forth evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to order the DNA test (see Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d at 815 ; see also Matter of Smythe v Worley, 72 AD3d 977, 979 [2010]; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 8 [1987]).

2010The party raising the doctrine of equitable estoppel — here, the mother — has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case sufficient to support that claim (see Debra H. v Janice R., 14 NY3d 576, 588 [2010]; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, 815 [1997], Iv denied 90 NY2d 809 [1997]; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 468 [1983], affd for reasons stated below 63 NY2d 859 [1984]).

2010The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, petitioner, to put forth evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to order the DNA test (see Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d at 815 ; see also Matter of Smythe v Worley, 72 AD3d 977, 979 [2010]; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6, 8 [1987]).

2005Sheet Metal, 89 AD2d 229 [4th Dept 1982]; Club Chain of Manhattan v Christopher & Seventh Gourmet, 74 AD2d 277, 282 [1st Dept 1980].) Accordingly, the court holds that petitioner may raise the statute of frauds as a defense to the lease.

2005Indeed, in one of the cases cited by respondents, the court took the same position and entertained a defense based on the statute of frauds to a contract signed by the predecessor of the party raising the defense. 1 (Brockport Devs. v 47 Ely Corp., 82 Misc 2d 310, 315 [Sup Ct, Monroe County 1975]; see also, Holm v C.M.P.

2004An "as-applied" challenge, by contrast, requires a court only to consider whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the particular facts of the case. ( Chapman v United States , 500 US 453, 467-468 [1991]; People v Parker , 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976].) Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. ( Brady v State of New York , 80 NY2d 596, 602 [1992].) Accordingly, with the exception {** 3 Misc 3d at 702 }(not relevant here) of a First Amendment context, when a statute is challenged as being vague both facially and as applied, a court must first consider whether t

2004Co. , 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; International Harvester Co. v Kentucky , 234 US 216, 221 [1914]; People v Grogan , 260 NY 138, 145-146 [1932].) A statute must also be written in a manner which precludes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. ( Grayned v City of [*2]Rockford , 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972]; People v Nelson , 69 NY2d 302, 306 [1987].) Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if a potential offender or a police officer cannot determine the conduct proscribed by the statute. ( People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412 [2003].) Where a question is raised as to the consti

2004Co. , 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; International Harvester Co. v Kentucky , 234 US 216, 221 [1914]; People v Grogan , 260 NY 138, 145-146 [1932].) A statute must also be written in a manner which precludes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. ( Grayned v City of [*2]Rockford , 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972]; People v Nelson , 69 NY2d 302, 306 [1987].) Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if a potential offender or a police officer cannot determine the conduct proscribed by the statute. ( People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412 [2003].) Where a question is raised as to the consti

2004An "as-applied" challenge, by contrast, requires a court only to consider whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the particular facts of the case. ( Chapman v United States , 500 US 453, 467-468 [1991]; People v Parker , 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976].) Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. ( Brady v State of New York , 80 NY2d 596, 602 [1992].) Accordingly, with the exception {** 3 Misc 3d at 702 }(not relevant here) of a First Amendment context, when a statute is challenged as being vague both facially and as applied, a court must first consider whether t

2004Co. , 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; International Harvester Co. v Kentucky , 234 US 216, 221 [1914]; People v Grogan , 260 NY 138, 145-146 [1932].) A statute must also be written in a manner which precludes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. ( Grayned v City of [*2]Rockford , 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972]; People v Nelson , 69 NY2d 302, 306 [1987].) Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if a potential offender or a police officer cannot determine the conduct proscribed by the statute. ( People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412 [2003].) Where a question is raised as to the consti

2004Co. , 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; International Harvester Co. v Kentucky , 234 US 216, 221 [1914]; People v Grogan , 260 NY 138, 145-146 [1932].) A statute must also be written in a manner which precludes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. ( Grayned v City of [*2]Rockford , 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972]; People v Nelson , 69 NY2d 302, 306 [1987].) Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if a potential offender or a police officer cannot determine the conduct proscribed by the statute. ( People v Stuart , 100 NY2d 412 [2003].) Where a question is raised as to the consti

2004An "as-applied" challenge, by contrast, requires a court only to consider whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the particular facts of the case. ( Chapman v United States , 500 US 453, 467-468 [1991]; People v Parker , 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976].) Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. ( Brady v State of New York , 80 NY2d 596, 602 [1992].) Accordingly, with the exception {** 3 Misc 3d at 702 }(not relevant here) of a First Amendment context, when a statute is challenged as being vague both facially and as applied, a court must first consider whether t