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21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MacKey v. Montrymgreen2 sentences1994Ed. 2d 321 , 99 S. Ct. 2612 .) However, where a defendant has the option of participating in a presuspension hearing, there is no due process violation even where the sworn report is itself inadequate. 1993(Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 .) Due process, however, does not invariably require a predeprivation hearing whenever the State seeks to restrict a person's driving privileges ( Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 ; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 ), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here ( People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill.2d 85, 91 , 121 Ill.Dec. 262 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ). | 2 | 11 |
People v. Gerkegreen2 sentences2009Moreover, as the supreme court pointed out in Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d at 91-92 , a presuspension hearing is not constitutionally required, and, in most cases, a delay does not implicate due process concerns because the hearing will be had on or about the first appearance date and before the suspension is effective. 1994While the 45-day delay between notice and the beginning of the suspension is intended to allow a motorist an opportunity to secure a hearing prior to the suspension, our supreme court has held that a presuspension hearing is not required under the statute (People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ) and that the timing of the hearing depends largely upon when a motorist files his petition to rescind (People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491 , 521 N.E.2d 884 ). | 2 | 5 |
Dixon v. Lovegreen2 sentences1993(Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 .) Due process, however, does not invariably require a predeprivation hearing whenever the State seeks to restrict a person's driving privileges ( Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 ; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 ), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here ( People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill.2d 85, 91 , 121 Ill.Dec. 262 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ). 1993Ed. 2d 172 , 97 S. Ct. 1723 ), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here (People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85, 91 ). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Badoudgreen2 sentences1994See People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50 , 521 N.E.2d 884 ; People v. Zilio (1989), 191 Ill. 1994While the 45-day delay between notice and the beginning of the suspension is intended to allow a motorist an opportunity to secure a hearing prior to the suspension, our supreme court has held that a presuspension hearing is not required under the statute (People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ) and that the timing of the hearing depends largely upon when a motorist files his petition to rescind (People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491 , 521 N.E.2d 884 ). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Esposito
green
2 sentences1998Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d at 504-11 ; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L. 1994While the 45-day delay between notice and the beginning of the suspension is intended to allow a motorist an opportunity to secure a hearing prior to the suspension, our supreme court has held that a presuspension hearing is not required under the statute (People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ) and that the timing of the hearing depends largely upon when a motorist files his petition to rescind (People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491 , 521 N.E.2d 884 ). | 4 | 1993–1998 |
Stillo v. State Retirement Systems
green
2 sentences2006On appeal, plaintiff again did not raise the issue of the amount of refund to which he was entitled, contending only that he was “entitled to a presuspension hearing before [his] pension benefits were suspended and *** that [his] pension benefits should not have been terminated prior to exhaustion of [his] appeal of his criminal conviction.” Stillo, 305 Ill. 2006On appeal, defendant again did not raise the issue of the amount of refund to which he was entitled, contending only that he was Aentitled to a presuspension hearing before [his] pension benefits were suspended and *** that [his] pension benefits should not have been terminated prior to exhaustion of [his] appeal of his criminal conviction.@ Stillo, 305 Ill. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1998To determine whether a presuspension hearing was constitutionally mandated, the Esposito court applied the balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 47 L. 1998To determine whether a presuspension hearing was constitutionally mandated, the Esposito court applied the balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 47 L. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Trigg v. Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence2019Ending the first presuspension hearing before it was -9- complete and setting a new date was equivalent to the lawful act of “reserving for future decision a matter which has not been determined.” Id. ¶ 39 We also note that plaintiffs themselves requested that the presuspension hearing start over under a different procedure. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Luyten
green
1 sentence2009Luyten, 285 Ill. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Sarver
green
1 sentence1994(See People v. Sarver (1994), 262 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Zilio
green
1 sentence1994See People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50 , 521 N.E.2d 884 ; People v. Zilio (1989), 191 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bell v. Burson
green
2 sentences1993(Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 .) Due process, however, does not invariably require a predeprivation hearing whenever the State seeks to restrict a person's driving privileges ( Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 ; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 ), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here ( People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill.2d 85, 91 , 121 Ill.Dec. 262 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ). 1993(Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535 , 91 S.Ct. 1586 , 29 L.Ed.2d 90 .) Due process, however, does not invariably require a predeprivation hearing whenever the State seeks to restrict a person's driving privileges ( Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 ; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 ), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here ( People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill.2d 85, 91 , 121 Ill.Dec. 262 , 525 N.E.2d 68 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Spaulding v. Howlett
green
1 sentence1985App. 3d 249, 253-54 , 375 N.E.2d 437 .) Plaintiff particularly relies on Spaulding for the proposition that she was deprived of due process because hearsay is not competent evidence in a presuspension hearing and without the hearsay evidence, there is insufficient evidence to show a reasonable possibility of liability on plaintiff’s part. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Kropel v. Conlisk
green
2 sentences1976Defendants look to Kropel v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 17 , 322 N.E.2d 793 , in contending that the Act’s post-suspension review provisions are adequate to meet constitutional due process requirements. 1976Defendants look to Kropel v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 17 , 322 N.E.2d 793 , in contending that the Act’s post-suspension review provisions are adequate to meet constitutional due process requirements. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.