right of peremptory challenge in Illinois

1982If, as Payne holds, the State under the circumstances there posited has to show a basis for its peremptory challenges, then the peremptory challenge has been so effectively emasculated as to destroy its function which Swain and Illinois has recognized (People v. Harris (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451 , 161 N.E.2d 809 ): “The fact that, the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges resulted in excluding them [blacks] from the petit jury did not deprive defendant of any constitutional right. [Citation.] The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied.

1982If, as Payne holds, the State under the circumstances there posited has to show a basis for its peremptory challenges, then the peremptory challenge has been so effectively emasculated as to destroy its function which Swain and Illinois has recognized (People v. Harris (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451 , 161 N.E.2d 809 ): “The fact that, the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges resulted in excluding them [blacks] from the petit jury did not deprive defendant of any constitutional right. [Citation.] The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied.

1941It is the right of an attorney to ascertain whether a juror has any interest in or relation to claims or suits of the same character as the one being tried, for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory challenge, (Iroquois Furnace Co. v. McCrea, 191 Ill. 340 ), but that can be readily done by an examination which would not lead the jury to understand that the defendant is insured against liability and is without substantial interest in the question of damages.” This rule was quoted and reaffirmed in Smithers v. Henriquez, supra. The responsibility is upon the trial court to see that t

1938It is the right of an attorney to ascertain whether a juror has any interest in or relation to claims or suits of the same character as the one being tried, for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory challenge, (Iroquois Furnace Co. v. McCrea, 191 Ill. 340 ,) but that can be readily done by an examination which would not lead the jury to understand that the defendant is insured against liability and is without substantial interest in the question of damages.

1973Kavanaugh v. Parret, 379 Ill. 273 , 40 N.E.2d 501 .

1961Kavanaugh v. Parret, 379 Ill. 273 , 40 N.E.2d 501 .

1938The trial court sustained an objection to the examination, and doubtless was of the opinion, from the character of the examination and the persons who were being interrogated, that the questions were not asked for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory challenge of said jurors, but that the examination, under the authority of McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co. 232 Ill. 473 , was improper.

1938The trial court sustained an objection to the examination, and doubtless was of the opinion, from the character of the examination and the persons who were being interrogated, that the questions were not asked for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory challenge of said jurors, but that the examination, under the authority of McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co. 232 Ill. 473 , was improper.

1936In the case of Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530 , 200 N. E. 762 , it was said: “Any rule of law which denies a litigant reasonable latitude in the examination of prospective jurors as to their qualifications, in order to enable him to exercise such peremptory chailenges judiciously and intelligently, deprives him of a substantial right.” In the case of Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412 , the Supreme Court said in refusing defendant’s counsel the right to examine the jurors for cause: ‘ ‘. . . the law-making power of the State has deemed it wise to give the right of peremptory challenge,

1924In this State the rule is laid down in Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412 , and cited with approval in People v. Robinson, 299 id. 617, and People v. Redola, 300 id. 392, that the defendant, through his counsel, has a right to ask pertinent and proper questions of the persons called as jurors testing their capacity and competency, and that for the purpose of advising him of the propriety of exercising the right of peremptory challenge it is often indispensable to the selection of a fair and impartial jury that the occupation, habits, associations and predisposition of the jurors should be known s

1994(People v. Moss (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 270 .) Supreme Court Rule 434(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 434(d)) establishes the number of peremptory challenges that the parties may normally use in criminal cases.

1982It may, by its very nature, be exercised or not exercised, according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party entitled thereto, and he is not required to assign any reason therefor.” ( 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451 .) This principle was followed in People v. Dukes (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 532, 540 , 169 N.E.2d 84 .

1982It may, by its very nature, be exercised or not exercised, according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party entitled thereto, and he is not required to assign any reason therefor.” ( 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451 .) This principle was followed in People v. Dukes (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 532, 540 , 169 N.E.2d 84 .

1980It may, by its very nature, be exercised or not exercised, according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party entitled thereto, and he is not required to assign any reason therefor. [Citation.]” Identical contentions were made by the defendants in both People v. Thornhill (1975), 31 Ill.

1975It may, by its very nature, be exercised or not exercised, according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party' entitled thereto, and he is not required to assign any reason therefor. [Citation.]” Reasoning in a similar fashion, the United States Supreme Court concluded in Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 221 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 773 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 836 , that the equal protection clause does not entitle a black American to a jury containing members of his own race, and that the Constitution of the United States does not require an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercis

1975It may, by its very nature, be exercised or not exercised, according to the judgment, will or caprice of the party' entitled thereto, and he is not required to assign any reason therefor. [Citation.]” Reasoning in a similar fashion, the United States Supreme Court concluded in Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 221 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 773 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 836 , that the equal protection clause does not entitle a black American to a jury containing members of his own race, and that the Constitution of the United States does not require an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercis

1959(People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575 , 12 N.W.2d 466 , cert. den. 323 U.S. 749 , 89 L. ed. 600.) The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied.

1959(People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575 , 12 N.W.2d 466 , cert. den. 323 U.S. 749 , 89 L. ed. 600.) The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied.

1959(People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575 , 12 N.W.2d 466 , cert. den. 323 U.S. 749 , 89 L. ed. 600.) The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied.

1941It is the right of an attorney to ascertain whether a juror has any interest in or relation to claims or suits of the same character as the one being tried, for the purpose of exercising the right of peremptory challenge, (Iroquois Furnace Co. v. McCrea, 191 Ill. 340 ), but that can be readily done by an examination which would not lead the jury to understand that the defendant is insured against liability and is without substantial interest in the question of damages.” This rule was quoted and reaffirmed in Smithers v. Henriquez, supra. The responsibility is upon the trial court to see that t

1936In the case of Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530 , 200 N. E. 762 , it was said: “Any rule of law which denies a litigant reasonable latitude in the examination of prospective jurors as to their qualifications, in order to enable him to exercise such peremptory chailenges judiciously and intelligently, deprives him of a substantial right.” In the case of Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412 , the Supreme Court said in refusing defendant’s counsel the right to examine the jurors for cause: ‘ ‘. . . the law-making power of the State has deemed it wise to give the right of peremptory challenge,

1936In the case of Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530 , 200 N. E. 762 , it was said: “Any rule of law which denies a litigant reasonable latitude in the examination of prospective jurors as to their qualifications, in order to enable him to exercise such peremptory chailenges judiciously and intelligently, deprives him of a substantial right.” In the case of Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412 , the Supreme Court said in refusing defendant’s counsel the right to examine the jurors for cause: ‘ ‘. . . the law-making power of the State has deemed it wise to give the right of peremptory challenge,

1935The Supreme Court said that under our statute the right of peremptory challenge was cut off with respect to any one of a panel of four jurors which had been passed upon and accepted by both parties, citing Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 Ill. 251 ; and Belt v. People, 97 Ill. 461 .

1935The Supreme Court said that under our statute the right of peremptory challenge was cut off with respect to any one of a panel of four jurors which had been passed upon and accepted by both parties, citing Sterling Bridge Co. v. Pearl, 80 Ill. 251 ; and Belt v. People, 97 Ill. 461 .