right of peremptory challenge in Arizona

1987In such a case, the court went on to say, “the right of peremptory challenge has not been affected,” (Emphasis in original) 102 Ariz. at 471 , 433 P.2d at 21 .

1987In such a case, the court went on to say, “the right of peremptory challenge has not been affected,” (Emphasis in original) 102 Ariz. at 471 , 433 P.2d at 21 .

1977Under these circumstances we believe that an analogy can be drawn to the case of State v. Garcia, supra. There the court quoted with approval the Kentucky case of Crutcher v. Hicks, 257 S.W.2d 539 , 39 A.L.R.2d 620 (1953): “ ‘ . . .If the false information is of such character as to indicate probable bias on the part of the juror, it may be presumed that a free exercise of the right of peremptory challenge has been so restricted as to result in prejudice to the party affected.

1967However, if information inno-. cently withheld or given, although false, is so insignificant or trifling as to. indi *471 cate only a remote or speculative influence on the furor, the right of peremptory challenge has not been affected.” (Emphasis added.) 257 S.W.2d at 540 . 1 The defendant before us asserts that he has been prejudiced by the relationship of the silent juror but he fails to support this assertion with any positive facts.

1967Our only concern is the effect of the juror’s-failure to respond to the voir dire inquiry,, thereby depriving plaintiff of an opportunity to exercise his valuable right of challenge. 4 The importance of the right of peremptory challenge is explained in Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758 , 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933), in a quotation from Shulinsky v. Boston & Maine R.

1967Our only concern is the effect of the juror’s-failure to respond to the voir dire inquiry,, thereby depriving plaintiff of an opportunity to exercise his valuable right of challenge. 4 The importance of the right of peremptory challenge is explained in Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758 , 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933), in a quotation from Shulinsky v. Boston & Maine R.

1967R., 83 N.H. 86 , 139 A. 189 : “ * * * the right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing causéis one of the most important rights to a litigant; any system for the empaneling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise of the right, of challenge must be condemned; a'litigant cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge until he has been brought face to face in the presence of the court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity given for such inspection and examination of him as is required for the due administration of justice; the right to rej

1967R., 83 N.H. 86 , 139 A. 189 : “ * * * the right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing causéis one of the most important rights to a litigant; any system for the empaneling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise of the right, of challenge must be condemned; a'litigant cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge until he has been brought face to face in the presence of the court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity given for such inspection and examination of him as is required for the due administration of justice; the right to rej

1966An early decision referring to this type of waiver is the Stephens case itself, which indicates that this right of peremptory challenge may be lost "* * * by conduct implying a waiver * * *." 17 Ariz. at 310 , 152 P. at 166 . *260 In Allan v. Allan, 21 Ariz. 70 , 185 P. 539 (1919), it was held to be "* * * too late * * *" to disqualify a judge after "* * * the trial of the cause had commenced * * *." 21 Ariz. at 73 , 185 P. at 540 .

1966An early decision referring to this type of waiver is the Stephens case itself, which indicates that this right of peremptory challenge may be lost "* * * by conduct implying a waiver * * *." 17 Ariz. at 310 , 152 P. at 166 . *260 In Allan v. Allan, 21 Ariz. 70 , 185 P. 539 (1919), it was held to be "* * * too late * * *" to disqualify a judge after "* * * the trial of the cause had commenced * * *." 21 Ariz. at 73 , 185 P. at 540 .

1966An early decision referring to this type of waiver is the Stephens case itself, which indicates that this right of peremptory challenge may be lost "* * * by conduct implying a waiver * * *." 17 Ariz. at 310 , 152 P. at 166 . *260 In Allan v. Allan, 21 Ariz. 70 , 185 P. 539 (1919), it was held to be "* * * too late * * *" to disqualify a judge after "* * * the trial of the cause had commenced * * *." 21 Ariz. at 73 , 185 P. at 540 .

1966An early decision referring to this type of waiver is the Stephens case itself, which indicates that this right of peremptory challenge may be lost “* * * by conduct' implying a waiver * * 17 Ariz. at 310 , 152 P. at 166 .

1949Besides, experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge.” See Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 , 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578 .

1949Besides, experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge.” See Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 , 7 S.Ct. 350 , 30 L.Ed. 578 .