Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
33 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1989–2026 31 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v. Katorgreen2 sentences2026The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) (L 2022, ch 821 [eff Dec. 30, 2022]) amended CPLR 213(4) "by adding, among other things, paragraph (a), which provides that '[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determi 2025As the 2000 action was not dismissed "based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4][a]), the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2000 action ( see US Bank Trust, N.A. v Reizes , 222 AD3d 907, 910 ; GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 917 ). | 4 | 11 |
US Bank Trust, N.A. v. Reizesgreen2 sentences2026Since the 2003 action was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the instrument was not validly accelerated, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2003 action ( see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Reizes , 222 AD3d at 910 ). 2025As the 2000 action was not dismissed "based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4][a]), the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2000 action ( see US Bank Trust, N.A. v Reizes , 222 AD3d 907, 910 ; GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 917 ). | 1 | 3 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ruttygreen2 sentences2025"When a mortgage is payable in installments, which is the typical practice, an acceleration of the entire amount due begins the running of the statute of limitations on the entire debt." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Rutty, 206 AD3d 862 , 863 (2d Dep't 2022) quoting Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Marous, 186 AD3d 669 , 670 (2d Dep't 2020). 2025"When a mortgage is payable in installments, which is the typical practice, an acceleration of the entire amount due begins the running of the statute of limitations on the entire debt." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Rutty, 206 AD3d 862, 863 (2d Dep't 2022) quoting Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Marous, 186 AD3d 669 , 670 (2d Dep't 2020). | 1 | 3 |
Freedom Mortgage Corporation v. Herschel Engel , Ditech Financial v. Santhana Kumar Nataraja Naidu, Juan Vargas v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v.Donna Ferratored2 sentences2023Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2007 action based on Saxon's lack of standing ( see id. ). 2023However, since the 2007 action was voluntarily discontinued, and, therefore, was not dismissed "based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" ( id. § 213[4][a]), the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2007 action based on the plaintiff's lack of standing ( see id. ). | 1 | 2 |
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2023Mellon v Stewart , 216 AD3d 720 ; GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 917 ). 2023In this Department, where a prior action was voluntarily discontinued, a lender is estopped from asserting that a debt was not validly accelerated where there was no expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the prior action based on the plaintiff's lack of standing ( Bank of NY Mellon v Stewart , at 723, citing CPLR § 213(4)). | 1 | 2 |
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Gruengreen2 sentences2026Contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff is not estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the prior action, since that action was "dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4]; see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gruen , 237 AD3d at 998). 2026Contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff is not estopped from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the prior action, since that action was "dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213[4]; see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Gruen , 237 AD3d at 998). | 1 | 1 |
Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. DiGiorgiogreen2 sentences2026Trust Co. v DiGiorgio , 237 AD3d at 901, quoting GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 916-917 ). 2026Trust Co. v DiGiorgio , 237 AD3d at 901, quoting GMAT Legal Title Trust 2014-1 v Kator , 213 AD3d at 916-917). | 1 | 1 |
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Treitelgreen2 sentences2025Mellon v Treitel , 217 AD3d at 913; cf. Everhome Mtge. 2025Mellon v Treitel , 217 AD3d at 913 ; cf. Everhome Mtge. | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Hazangreen2 sentences2025Although Chase expressly "elect[ed] to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage" in the complaint in the 2009 action, the 2009 action was dismissed based upon the Supreme Court's determination, inter alia, that Chase had failed to comply with the notice of default provision contained in paragraph 22 of the mortgage agreement, which required service of a specified default notice as a condition precedent to acceleration of the loan ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Hazan , 176 AD3d 637, 638; 1 Bergman on New York Mortgage Foreclosures § 4.04A; see also Bank of N.Y. 2025Although Chase expressly "elect[ed] to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage" in the complaint in the 2009 action, the 2009 action was dismissed based upon the Supreme Court's determination, inter alia, that Chase had failed to comply with the notice of default provision contained in paragraph 22 of the mortgage agreement, which required service of a specified default notice as a condition precedent to acceleration of the loan ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Hazan , 176 AD3d 637 , 638; 1 Bergman on New York Mortgage Foreclosures § 4.04A; see also Bank of N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Arbitration Between Gleason & Michael Vee, Ltd.green2 sentences2025The portion of Section 7 of FAPA at issue in this case is codified at CPLR 213 (4) (b): "[A] defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." [FN2] FAPA Section 10 then provides that "[t]his ac 2025The portion of Section 7 of FAPA at issue in this case is codified at CPLR 213 (4) (b): "[A] defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." [FN2] FAPA Section 10 then provides that "[t]his ac | 1 | 1 |
Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v. Gipsongreen1 sentence2025Solutions, Inc. v Gipson , 230 AD3d at 815-816). | 1 | 1 |
IPA Asset Mgt., LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellongreen1 sentence2024Even applying FAPA, the mortgage debt was not accelerated in 2013 when the prior lender filed the complaint because the complaint was dismissed based on an "expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." Under the circumstances, the purported acceleration through commencement of that action "was a nullity, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run at the time of the purported acceleration." IPA Asset Mgt., LLC v Bank of NY Mellon , 202 AD3d 1068, 1070 (2d Dept 2022). | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Heavengreen1 sentence2023CPLR 213(4)(b) now provides that "a defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." The fact that the complaint in the 2010 action was dismissed insofar as asserted against the borrower for fa | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Lila
neutral
2 sentences2025Trust Co. , 173 AD3d 704 , 707; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 983 ). "[T]he Foreclosure Abuse and Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821 [hereinafter FAPA]), amended CPLR 213(4) by adding, among other things, paragraph (a), which provides that '[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accel 2025Having determined that FAPA applies to this foreclosure action and turning to the [*3]merits underlying defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations, plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the mortgage debt was not validly accelerated pursuant to CPLR 213 (4), since the 2015 action was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to prosecute and was not dismissed based upon an expressed judicial determination that the debt was not validly accelerated ( see MTGLQ Invs., L.P v Lila , 226 AD3d 889 , 891 [2d Dept 2024])."The six-year statute of limitations in a mortgage f | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke
green
1 sentence2025Trust Co. , 173 AD3d 704 , 707; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 983 ). "[T]he Foreclosure Abuse and Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821 [hereinafter FAPA]), amended CPLR 213(4) by adding, among other things, paragraph (a), which provides that '[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accel | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Scheinberg
green
1 sentence2025The recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821) amended CPLR 213(4) by adding, inter alia, subdivision (a), which provides that "[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Caprotti v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2025Trust Co. , 220 AD3d 1126 ; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
J & JT Holding Corp. v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2025Trust Co. , 173 AD3d 704 , 707; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke , 94 AD3d 980, 983 ). "[T]he Foreclosure Abuse and Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821 [hereinafter FAPA]), amended CPLR 213(4) by adding, among other things, paragraph (a), which provides that '[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accel | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brennan v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.
green
1 sentence2025Although the July 2015 action may have been dismissed upon a determination of the Supreme Court that the defendant failed to comply with 24 CFR 203.604, such compliance was merely a condition precedent to maintaining that July 2015 action and was not a precondition for acceleration of the mortgage debt ( see Brennan v Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. , 237 AD3d 1027 , 1029-1030). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
UGH Mazing, LLC v. 21st Mtge. Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2024Corp. , 220 AD3d 686, 688 ; Reinman v Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. DeMatteis
green
1 sentence2024Mellon v DeMatteis , 222 AD3d at 8 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Genovese v. Nationstar Mtge. LLC
green
1 sentence2024CPLR 213(4), as amended by FAPA, now provides that "[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" ( id. § 213[4][a]). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
US Bank N.A. v. Medianik
green
1 sentence2024Therefore, Wells Fargo is estopped under FAPA from asserting that the debt was not validly accelerated by the commencement of the 2005 action based on lack of standing ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Medianik , 223 AD3d 935 ; Bank of N.Y. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mejias v. Wells Fargo N.A.
green
1 sentence2023CPLR 213(4)(a) provides that "[i]n any action on an instrument described under this subdivision, if the statute of limitations is raised as a defense, and if that defense is based on a claim that the instrument at issue was accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, a plaintiff shall be estopped from asserting that the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated." CPLR 213(4)(b) provides that "[i]n any act | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Iazzetta v. State
green
1 sentence1991We note that the instant case is distinguishable from the situation presented in Matter of Iazzetta v State of New York ( 105 Misc 2d 567 ), because there the court permitted the amendment of a timely interposed claim under the relation back doctrine of CPLR 203 (e) to include related causes of action which would have been time-barred at the time of the amendment. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Berens v. Planning Board
green
1 sentence1989Auth., 101 AD2d 838 , supra), particularly in view of the defend and indemnify provision of the county’s contract with Mountainview. | 1 | 1989–1989 |