competing principle in Ohio

2011This “principle[, however,] must be balanced against the competing principle that litigation must be brought to an end.” Id., citing Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 21 , 520 N.E.2d 564 .

2011This “principle[, however,] must be balanced against the competing principle that litigation must be brought to an end.” Id., citing Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 21 , 520 N.E.2d 564 .

2021Jones, supra, at ¶ 42 .

2021However, Burton makes no argument regarding his misdemeanor sentence, and, as set forth above, we presume that the trial court appropriately considered the felony sentencing factors. {¶15} Although Burton “is obviously unhappy with h[is] sentence and wishes the court would have weighed the factors differently, the competing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are for the sentencing court to weigh, not the court of appeals.” Stanley, 2021-Ohio-549, at ¶ 12 , citing Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, at ¶ 42 .

2022Trumbull No. 2021-T-0017, 2022-Ohio-262, ¶ 26 , citing Stanley at ¶ 12; State v. McWilson, 11th Dist.

2021Thus, this aspect of her sole assigned error lacks merit. {¶13} Second, Stanley claims that our standard of review for felony sentencing fails to provide meaningful opportunity to review a sentence and the trial court’s 3 application of the competing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and as a result, she claims her right to due process was violated. {¶14} However, “the question of the constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 , 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986).

2021Thus, this aspect of her sole assigned error lacks merit. {¶13} Second, Stanley claims that our standard of review for felony sentencing fails to provide meaningful opportunity to review a sentence and the trial court’s 3 application of the competing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and as a result, she claims her right to due process was violated. {¶14} However, “the question of the constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 , 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986).

2008Instead, the hearing officer should have examined all the evidence presented and then weighed the competing factors to determine whether a transfer was appropriate.” Id., 170 Ohio App.3d 349 , 2007-Ohio-300 , 867 N.E.2d 440, at ¶ 50 . {¶ 76} The court of appeals then considered whether there was any evidence to support the board’s order.

2008Instead, the hearing officer should have examined all the evidence presented and then weighed the competing factors to determine whether a transfer was appropriate.” Id., 170 Ohio App.3d 349 , 2007-Ohio-300 , 867 N.E.2d 440, at ¶ 50 . {¶ 76} The court of appeals then considered whether there was any evidence to support the board’s order.

2004Civ.R. 60(B) thus represents a balance between "the legal principle that there should be finality in every case, so that once a judgment is entered it should not be disturbed, and the requirements of fairness and justice, that given the proper circumstances, some final judgments should be reopened." Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Novak (1977), 53 Ohio App. 2d 289 , 291 . {¶ 19} Appellant's second claim against appellee would remain pending if the trial court's decision to grant relief in the first matter was reversed.

2002Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257 , 261 . {¶ 16} It is the duty of the Board to weigh the competing factors to determine whether a transfer is in the best interest of the students involved.

1988Id.