competing factors (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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competing factors in Pennsylvania

9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Vicari v. Spiegelgreen
pasuperct · 2007 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2008–2010
2 sentences

2010Vicari v. Spiegel, 936 A.2d 503 , 512 n. 10 (Pa.Super.2007) (emphases added).

2008See Vicari v. Spiegal, 936 A.2d 503 (Pa. Super. 2007) at 512 n. 10, where the honorable Superior Court commented: “Although we do not condone the defendants’ untimely objection to Dr. Blum’s qualifications and find plaintiff’s waiver argument persuasive, because we have determined that Dr. Blum was indeed qualified to render his opinion, we decline to engage in an analysis of the parties’ competing waiver arguments.” While Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 607 permits the credibility of witnesses to be impeached by any evidence relevant to the issues, the law governing impeachment evidence draws a

12
K.E.M. v. P.C.S.green
pa · 2012 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025In John M., we explained that subjecting an unwilling presumed father to blood tests implicated his constitutional right to privacy, and we balanced the competing interests to determine whether an invasion of such privacy was made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each case.”); K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 813 (Orie Melvin, J., concurring) (“Protection of the child is paramount, and I lend my voice to those calling for the Legislature to specify factors to consider in making paternity determinations.”). 69 K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809 . 70 See John M. 571 A.2d at 1383 n.2;

2025In John M., we explained that subjecting an unwilling presumed father to blood tests implicated his constitutional right to privacy, and we balanced the competing interests to determine whether an invasion of such privacy was made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each case.”); K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 813 (Orie Melvin, J., concurring) (“Protection of the child is paramount, and I lend my voice to those calling for the Legislature to specify factors to consider in making paternity determinations.”). 69 K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809 . 70 See John M. 571 A.2d at 1383 n.2;

11
Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallisgreen
pa · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003Compare Dambacher, 336 Pa.Super. at 50 -51 n. 5, 485 A.2d at 423 n. 5 (referencing various strict liability risk-utility factors), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965) (negligence risk-utility factors). [7] A competing framework, known as the consumer expectations test, has come to be widely regarded as inadequate in and of itself, fairly sustainable only as one component of cost-benefit balancing.

2003Compare Dambacher, 336 Pa.Super. at 50 -51 n. 5, 485 A.2d at 423 n. 5 (referencing various strict liability risk-utility factors), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965) (negligence risk-utility factors). [7] A competing framework, known as the consumer expectations test, has come to be widely regarded as inadequate in and of itself, fairly sustainable only as one component of cost-benefit balancing.

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Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Mrd, by Pd v. Fmgreen
coloctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997But see Colorado—M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband’s paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa—Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man’s paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child’s best interest).

1997But see Colorado — M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband's paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa — Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man's paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child's best interest).

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Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
John M. v. Paula T. green
pa · 1990
1 sentence

2025In John M., we explained that subjecting an unwilling presumed father to blood tests implicated his constitutional right to privacy, and we balanced the competing interests to determine whether an invasion of such privacy was made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each case.”); K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 813 (Orie Melvin, J., concurring) (“Protection of the child is paramount, and I lend my voice to those calling for the Legislature to specify factors to consider in making paternity determinations.”). 69 K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809 . 70 See John M. 571 A.2d at 1383 n.2;

12025–2025
Swift v. Abington School District green
pacommwct · 1972
1 sentence

2018This Court held that "under the circumstances, we cannot find the lower court in error, when confronted with an involved real estate transaction, in denying the petition for approval and returning the matter to the school board where the competing factors of the market place would have a greater play and the exact nature of the various engagements could be more easily determined." Id. at 646 .

12018–2018
Brinkley v. King green
pa · 1997
2 sentences

1998The presumption of paternity should be abandoned in favor of the more flexible approach set forth in Justice Nigro’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 182-183 , wherein he states: Abandoning the strict use of [the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel] would allow our courts to examine the situation presented, to compel blood testing if the appropriate showing is made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each ease.

1998The presumption of paternity should be abandoned in favor of the more flexible approach set forth in Justice Nigro's concurring and dissenting opinion in Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 182-183 , wherein he states: Abandoning the strict use of [the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel] would allow our courts to examine the situation presented, to compel blood testing if the appropriate showing is made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each case.

11998–1998
Dye v. Geiger green
iowa · 1996
2 sentences

1997But see Colorado—M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband’s paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa—Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man’s paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child’s best interest).

1997But see Colorado — M.R.D. v. F.M., 805 P.2d 1200 (Colo.Ct.App. 1991) (party to the marriage not permitted to challenge husband's paternity beyond the five-year statute of limitations even where a competing presumption arose from blood tests that resulted in a 99.86% probability that the alleged father was the biological parent of the child); and Iowa — Dye v. Geiger, 554 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1996) (prohibiting an ex-husband from overcoming his presumptive paternity with genetic tests positively establishing another man's paternity when such rebuttal is not in the child's best interest).

11997–1997
Commonwealth v. Roots green
pa · 1978
2 sentences

1981Commonwealth v. Roots, id., 482 Pa. at 41 , 393 A.2d at 368 .

1981Commonwealth v. Roots, id., 482 Pa. at 41 , 393 A.2d at 368 .

11981–1981
Raw v. Lehnert green
pasuperct · 1976
2 sentences

1980The real parties and the real issues should be brought together in one suit so that their correlative rights and duties may be properly equated and adjudicated (see Raw v. Lehnert, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 324 , 357 A. 2d 574 (1976)), thereby avoiding the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.

1980The real parties and the real issues should be brought together in one suit so that their correlative rights and duties may be properly equated and adjudicated (see Raw v. Lehnert, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 324 , 357 A. 2d 574 (1976)), thereby avoiding the possibility of inconsistent verdicts.

11980–1980

Where else courts name it

NY 41 (1979–2024) TX 25 (1985–2022) CA 24 (1981–2024) OH 21 (1988–2026) MA 15 (1980–2026) MI 14 (1978–2022) IL 13 (1972–2025) NJ 11 (1975–2025) FL 10 (1966–2011) ND 9 (1993–2021) PA 9 (1980–2025) MT 9 (1980–2025) WA 8 (1971–2020) CT 8 (1983–2025) IA 7 (2005–2023) LA 5 (1998–2010) MO 5 (1989–2024) TN 5 (2000–2020) NM 5 (2009–2025) NC 5 (2021–2022) DC 5 (1961–2023) SD 4 (1977–2022) MN 4 (1986–2007) MD 3 (2003–2008) NH 3 (2003–2013) AZ 3 (1987–1998) ME 2 (1999–2018) UT 2 (2014–2016) KS 2 (2017–2018) GA 2 (2016–2021) OR 2 (1997–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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