competing claim in Massachusetts

2004As stated above in Lafayette Place, supra, 427 Mass, at 517, when parties have progressed beyond that stage “a competing principle applies: a contract should be interpreted ‘so as to make it a valid and enforceable undertaking rather than one of no force and effect.’ Rules of contract must not preclude parties from binding themselves in the face of uncertainty.” In Goren v. Royalty Investments, Incorporated, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 137 (1987), Justice Kass captured the situation quite well.

2004After noting that “(i]f . . . the parties have agreed upon all material terms, it may be inferred that the purpose of a final document which the parties agree to execute is to serve as a polished memorandum of an already binding contract,” id. at 140 , he went on to say That is not to say that parties to a preliminary agreement may not provide that they do not intend to be bound until the transaction is buttoned up by a more detailed and formal agreement.

2026The statute sought to quiet title to these "sundry narrow strips of land that formed the boundaries of other tracts." Rowley, supra. Quieting title in this manner has "the salutary effect of promoting repose; by creating a robust presumption that the adjacent land owner acquired title to the way, the statute 5 serves to discourage others from trying to search ancient deed records for 'lost' fee interests upon which a competing claim to title could be based." Kubic v. Audette, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 289 , 302 (2020), S.C., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 228 (2023).

2019Perhaps more importantly, the intensity or nature of use required to demonstrate the requisite level of control is context-driven: "The actual use and enjoyment of the property as the average owner of similar property would use and enjoy it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership, 12 establishes adverse possession in the absence of evidence that his possession is under a license or tenancy." Shaw, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at 156-157 , quoting 3 Am.

2009See, e.g., General Builders Supply Co. v. Arlington Co-Op. Bank, 359 Mass. 691, 697 (1971) (bank recorded mortgage discharge by mistake; “Since the facts on which the bank bases its claim for reformation were not a matter of record in the registry of deeds for the district in which the land in question was located, they do not bind persons who, without actual notice of such facts, subsequently become purchasers for value of an interest in the land”); Emmons v. White, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 54 , 66 n.12 (same); In re Daylight Dairy Products, Inc., 125 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1991) (same).

2004As stated above in Lafayette Place, supra, 427 Mass, at 517, when parties have progressed beyond that stage “a competing principle applies: a contract should be interpreted ‘so as to make it a valid and enforceable undertaking rather than one of no force and effect.’ Rules of contract must not preclude parties from binding themselves in the face of uncertainty.” In Goren v. Royalty Investments, Incorporated, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 137 (1987), Justice Kass captured the situation quite well.

1998When parties have progressed beyond that stage, however, a competing principle applies: a contract should be interpreted “so as to make it a valid and enforceable undertaking rather than one of no force and effect.” Shayeb v. Holland, supra at 432 .

1996Coan, supra at 224 ; Goren, supra at 141 ; Rosenfleld, supra at 216.

1995However, the plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence showing “the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design." Back, 375 Mass. at 642 .