competing claim in District of Columbia

2023But there is a competing principle that self-defense is grounded in reasonableness and “‘rules consistent with human nature.’” Parker v. United States, 155 A.3d 835 , 844 n.15 (D.C. 2017) (quoting Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).

2000All told, then, our decisions affirming the “jurisdiction and duty” of the trial court to return property under Rule 41(g) have done so in circumstances where “[i]t makes for economy of judicial effort to have the matter disposed of in the criminal proceeding,” Wilson I, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 540 F.2d at 1104 , and where the “ancillary” nature of the hearing would not be supplanted by an “essentially ... civil action” in which the rights of “competing claimants ... [are] resolved.” Stevens, 462 A.2d at 1139 . 3 Importantly, in Wilson I, whose analysis of the corresponding federal Rule 41 a

2000All told, then, our decisions affirming the “jurisdiction and duty” of the trial court to return property under Rule 41(g) have done so in circumstances where “[i]t makes for economy of judicial effort to have the matter disposed of in the criminal proceeding,” Wilson I, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 540 F.2d at 1104 , and where the “ancillary” nature of the hearing would not be supplanted by an “essentially ... civil action” in which the rights of “competing claimants ... [are] resolved.” Stevens, 462 A.2d at 1139 . 3 Importantly, in Wilson I, whose analysis of the corresponding federal Rule 41 a

2000All told, then, our decisions affirming the “jurisdiction and duty” of the trial court to return property under Rule 41(g) have done so in circumstances where “[i]t makes for economy of judicial effort to have the matter disposed of in the criminal proceeding,” Wilson I, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 540 F.2d at 1104 , and where the “ancillary” nature of the hearing would not be supplanted by an “essentially ... civil action” in which the rights of “competing claimants ... [are] resolved.” Stevens, 462 A.2d at 1139 . 3 Importantly, in Wilson I, whose analysis of the corresponding federal Rule 41 a

2000All told, then, our decisions affirming the “jurisdiction and duty” of the trial court to return property under Rule 41(g) have done so in circumstances where “[i]t makes for economy of judicial effort to have the matter disposed of in the criminal proceeding,” Wilson I, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 540 F.2d at 1104 , and where the “ancillary” nature of the hearing would not be supplanted by an “essentially ... civil action” in which the rights of “competing claimants ... [are] resolved.” Stevens, 462 A.2d at 1139 . 3 Importantly, in Wilson I, whose analysis of the corresponding federal Rule 41 a

1997Having breached this duty to inquire, the court held that the Washington Post was not a bona fide purchaser for value, and, therefore, that it did not have a priority claim on the property. 11 ."Notice, however, may be actual, constructive, or inquiry.... [A party] is held to be on inquiry notice where [it] is aware of circumstances which generate enough uncertainty about the state of title that a person of ordinary prudence would inquire further about those circumstances." Clay, supra, 604 A.2d at 895 . 12 .

1997Having breached this duty to inquire, the court held that the Washington Post was not a bona fide purchaser for value, and, therefore, that it did not have a priority claim on the property. 11 ."Notice, however, may be actual, constructive, or inquiry.... [A party] is held to be on inquiry notice where [it] is aware of circumstances which generate enough uncertainty about the state of title that a person of ordinary prudence would inquire further about those circumstances." Clay, supra, 604 A.2d at 895 . 12 .

1991National Bank of Commerce, supra, 472 U.S. at 721-22, 727 , 105 S.Ct. at 2924-25, 2927-28 (fact that another party may have a competing claim is not a legitimate statutory defense for failing to comply with an IRS demand); Laurel County, supra, 805 F.2d at 635-36 .

1961We say, as we did in Walsh v. Crescent Hill, supra, that here “there are no such overriding considerations of law, or of principle or policy, as would lead us to hold that the ruling appealed from is basically unsound or productive of an unjust result.