21 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1965–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McGuigen Estategreen2 sentences1974See McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475 , 131 A.2d 124 (1957); Comments of the Joint State Government Commission, Comment to § 7(1), 20 P.S. 1974See McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475 , 131 A.2d 124 (1957); Comments of the Joint State Government Commission, Comment to § 7(1), 20 P.S. | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2024Id. at 735 (internal footnote omitted). 2024Id. at 735 (internal footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Heilmangreen1 sentence2026The purpose of the thirty-day rule with respect to extradition proceedings is to prevent a person from languishing in jail without judicial supervision.” Commonwealth v. Heilman, 433 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. Super. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Valentinegreen1 sentence2023See also Commonwealth v. Valentine, 928 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2007) (applying the thirty-day rule). | 1 | 1 |
Stockton v. Stocktongreen1 sentence2013Even if considered as a motion subject to the thirty day rule, as this court noted in Fulton v. Bedford County Tax Claim Bureau, 942 A.2d 240 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008): After expiration of the 30-day period, ... the court may only open or vacate an order upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a fatal defect on the face of the record or some other evidence of “extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” Stockton v. Stockton, 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Pa.Super.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Bellis v. Board of Pensions & Retirementgreen1 sentence2012In that case, “[E]mployer knew that Claimant considered the thirty-day clause to be a crucial term and condition of employment ...”, and “[t]he proposed contract ... stated that [Claimant] was to perform the more difficult job of graphic satellite coordinator for less pay....” Id., 634 A.2d at 821. | 1 | 1 |
Klugman v. Gimbel Bros.green1 sentence1988Generally, judgments regularly entered in adverse proceedings cannot be opened or vacated after they have become final, unless there has been fraud or some other circumstance “so grave or compelling as to constitute ‘extraordinary cause’ justifying intervention of the court. ” Id., 350 Pa.Superior Ct. at 245, 504 A.2d at 337 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Klugman v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 198 Pa.Superior Ct. 268, 272, 182 A.2d 223, 225 (1962)). | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence1988Generally, judgments regularly entered in adverse proceedings cannot be opened or vacated after they have become final, unless there has been fraud or some other circumstance “so grave or compelling as to constitute ‘extraordinary cause’ justifying intervention of the court. ” Id., 350 Pa.Superior Ct. at 245, 504 A.2d at 337 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Klugman v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 198 Pa.Superior Ct. 268, 272, 182 A.2d 223, 225 (1962)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rowegreen2 sentences1980See Commonwealth v. Rowe, 264 Pa.Super. 67 , 398 A.2d 1060 (1979). 1980See Commonwealth v. Rowe, 264 Pa.Super. 67 , 398 A.2d 1060 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Baum Estategreen2 sentences1969Since the section which we are considering is remedial in nature, we have held that it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." Baum Estate, 418 Pa. 404, 410-11 , 211 A. 2d 521, 524 (1965) (emphasis added). 1969Since the section which we are considering is remedial in nature, we have held that it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." Baum Estate, 418 Pa. 404, 410-11 , 211 A. 2d 521, 524 (1965) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moore Nomination Petition
green
2 sentences1978Our Supreme Court considered *486 an analogous argument in the case of In re Moore, 447 Pa. 526 , 291 A.2d 531 (1972). 1978Our Supreme Court considered *486 an analogous argument in the case of In re Moore, 447 Pa. 526 , 291 A.2d 531 (1972). | 2 | 1977–1978 |
Estate of Easterday Appeal of: Easterday
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Holmes
green
1 sentence2015Equal protection of the laws requires that the Appellant receive relief pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (2007). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fulton v. Bedford County Tax Claim Bureau
green
1 sentence2013Even if considered as a motion subject to the thirty day rule, as this court noted in Fulton v. Bedford County Tax Claim Bureau, 942 A.2d 240 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008): After expiration of the 30-day period, ... the court may only open or vacate an order upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a fatal defect on the face of the record or some other evidence of “extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” Stockton v. Stockton, 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Pa.Super.1997). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Accu-Weather, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
2 sentences2012In that case, "[E]mployer knew that Claimant considered the thirty-day clause to be a crucial term and condition of employment ...", and "[t]he proposed contract... stated that [Claimant] was to perform the more difficult job of graphic satellite coordinator for less pay...." Id., 634 A.2d at 821 . 2012In that case, "[E]mployer knew that Claimant considered the thirty-day clause to be a crucial term and condition of employment ...", and "[t]he proposed contract... stated that [Claimant] was to perform the more difficult job of graphic satellite coordinator for less pay...." Id., 634 A.2d at 821 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
J.B. Steven, Inc. v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1995Steven, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 360 , 627 A.2d 278 (1993). 2 In J.B. 1995Steven, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 360 , 627 A.2d 278 (1993). 2 In J.B. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 463 v. City of Johnstown
green
2 sentences1994Consistent with [International Association of Firefighters v. City of Johnstown, 468 Pa. 96 , 360 A.2d 197 (1976) ], a party whose representative has acquiesced in the extension of proceedings beyond the thirty days specified in section 4(b) may not be permitted to nullify an award rendered by the binding arbitration procedures mandated by Act 111. 1994Consistent with [International Association of Firefighters v. City of Johnstown, 468 Pa. 96 , 360 A.2d 197 (1976) ], a party whose representative has acquiesced in the extension of proceedings beyond the thirty days specified in section 4(b) may not be permitted to nullify an award rendered by the binding arbitration procedures mandated by Act 111. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1981Commonwealth v. Murphy, 236 Pa.Super. 37 , 344 A.2d 662 (1975). 1981Commonwealth v. Murphy, 236 Pa.Super. 37 , 344 A.2d 662 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Commonwealth v. Ehret
neutral
2 sentences1980Department of Transportation v. Ehret, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 131 , 405 A.2d 1355 (1979). 1980Department of Transportation v. Ehret, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 131 , 405 A.2d 1355 (1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.