thirty-day requirement in Ohio

17 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Sinitogreen ohio · 1975 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994We would be requiring such a step were we to read the thirty-day requirement of the latter provision into R.C. 3107.07(B) as to these fathers. {¶ 25} Moreover, this court has long recognized it to be a well-settled principle of statutory construction that "where constitutional questions are raised, courts will liberally construe a statute to save it from constitutional infirmities." State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 101 , 72 O.O.2d 54, 56 , 330 N.E.2d 896, 898 (citing State ex rel. 1994We would be requiring such a step were we to read the thirty-day requirement of the latter provision into R.C. 3107.07(B) as to these fathers. {¶ 25} Moreover, this court has long recognized it to be a well-settled principle of statutory construction that "where constitutional questions are raised, courts will liberally construe a statute to save it from constitutional infirmities." State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 101 , 72 O.O.2d 54, 56 , 330 N.E.2d 896, 898 (citing State ex rel.	2	2
State v. Bradleygreen ohioctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Cuyahoga No. 99673, 2013-Ohio-5032, ¶ 4-8 (appeal was dismissed where an invalid nunc pro tunc entry was issued since it did not operate to extend the time to file an appeal relating to matters resolved in the original judgment entry); Troyer v. Troyer, 188 Ohio App.3d 543 , 2010-Ohio-3276 , 936 N.E.2d 102 , ¶ 23- 25, 66 (7th Dist.) (where the trial court issued a “nunc pro tunc” entry adding substantive findings, appellant could address on appeal only “new rulings” from the nunc pro tunc entry and not those made in the previous judgment which was not timely appealed). 3 {¶7} For these reasons	1	1
Skillman v. Brownegreen ohioctapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶11 , quoting Grabill v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 469, 473 (10th Dist.1993)(“‘[App.R. 4(B)(5)] is designed for situations such as an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding[.]’”); Skillman, supra, at 619 (stating a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a special proceeding which affects a substantial right). {¶11} A forcible entry and detainer action decides only the right to immediate possession of the property at issue.	1	1
In re H.F.green ohio · 2008 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017See In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶11 , quoting Grabill v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 469, 473 (10th Dist.1993)(“‘[App.R. 4(B)(5)] is designed for situations such as an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding[.]’”); Skillman, supra, at 619 (stating a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a special proceeding which affects a substantial right). {¶11} A forcible entry and detainer action decides only the right to immediate possession of the property at issue. 2017See In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶11 , quoting Grabill v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 469, 473 (10th Dist.1993)(“‘[App.R. 4(B)(5)] is designed for situations such as an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding[.]’”); Skillman, supra, at 619 (stating a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a special proceeding which affects a substantial right). {¶11} A forcible entry and detainer action decides only the right to immediate possession of the property at issue.	1	1
Grabill v. Worthington Industries, Inc.green ohioctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2008-Ohio-6810, ¶11 , quoting Grabill v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 91 Ohio App.3d 469, 473 (10th Dist.1993)(“‘[App.R. 4(B)(5)] is designed for situations such as an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding[.]’”); Skillman, supra, at 619 (stating a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a special proceeding which affects a substantial right). {¶11} A forcible entry and detainer action decides only the right to immediate possession of the property at issue.	1	1
State ex rel. Pendell v. Adams County Board of Electionsgreen ohio · 1988 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014Bd. of Elections, 40 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1988). {¶9} Civ.R. 58(B) directs the clerk of courts to serve the parties with notice of the judgment within three days of entering the judgment upon the journal. {¶10} Here, appellant has neither complied with the thirty-day rule set forth in App.R. 4(A) nor alleged that there was a failure by the trial court clerk to comply with Civ.R. 58(B).	1	1
Hanson Machinery Co. v. Limbachgreen ohio · 1986 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 1 sentence 1998See Hanson Machinery Co. v. Limbach (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 209 , 210-11 .	1	1
Richardson Brothers, Inc. v. Dave's Towing Servicegreen ohioctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 1 sentence 1985See, generally, Richardson Brothers, Inc. v. Dave’s Towing Service (1983), 14 Ohio App. 3d 1 ; and McKinnis v. Stropes (App. 1980), 19 O.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
Akron Standard Division of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Lindley green ohio · 1984 2 sentences 2001Failure to comply fully with either of these requirements properly leads to dismissal of the appeal, since substantial compliance has not occurred. * * * The verification requirement serves no such essential purpose, however, and thus is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id. at 12 , 11 OBR at 10, 462 N.E.2d at 420-421 . 1998The thirty-day requirement is an appellate statute of limitations." Id.	3	1989–2001
Troyer v. Troyer green ohioctapp · 2010 2 sentences 2020Cuyahoga No. 99673, 2013-Ohio-5032, ¶ 4-8 (appeal was dismissed where an invalid nunc pro tunc entry was issued since it did not operate to extend the time to file an appeal relating to matters resolved in the original judgment entry); Troyer v. Troyer, 188 Ohio App.3d 543 , 2010-Ohio-3276 , 936 N.E.2d 102 , ¶ 23- 25, 66 (7th Dist.) (where the trial court issued a “nunc pro tunc” entry adding substantive findings, appellant could address on appeal only “new rulings” from the nunc pro tunc entry and not those made in the previous judgment which was not timely appealed). 3 {¶7} For these reasons 2020Cuyahoga No. 99673, 2013-Ohio-5032, ¶ 4-8 (appeal was dismissed where an invalid nunc pro tunc entry was issued since it did not operate to extend the time to file an appeal relating to matters resolved in the original judgment entry); Troyer v. Troyer, 188 Ohio App.3d 543 , 2010-Ohio-3276 , 936 N.E.2d 102 , ¶ 23- 25, 66 (7th Dist.) (where the trial court issued a “nunc pro tunc” entry adding substantive findings, appellant could address on appeal only “new rulings” from the nunc pro tunc entry and not those made in the previous judgment which was not timely appealed). 3 {¶7} For these reasons	1	2020–2020
State v. Pough, Unpublished Decision (7-23-2004) green ohioctapp · 2004 1 sentence 2017Trumbull No. 2003-T-0129, 2004-Ohio-3933 (Pough III), finding that the petition was untimely and Pough could not prevail since he was convicted as a result of entering a guilty plea.	1	2017–2017
State v. Ingram, Unpublished Decision (10-9-2003) green ohioctapp · 2003 1 sentence 2009No. 03AP-149, 2003-Ohio-5380 . {¶ 5} Furthermore, pursuant to App. R. 4(A): {¶ 6} "A party shall file the notice of appeal required by App. R. 3 within thirty days of the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed * * *." {¶ 7} In addition to the fact that the appealed judgment denying the motion for judicial release is not a final appealable order, appellant's notice of appeal of the judgment was filed seven days beyond the thirty-day requirement in App. R. 4(A).	1	2009–2009
In Re Noda, Unpublished Decision (2-10-2006) neutral ohioctapp · 2006 1 sentence 2009Id. {¶ 5} The sole exception to the thirty-day requirement is set forth in App. R. 5(A), which states that once the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal has expired, an appeal can only be maintained by leave of the appellate court.	1	2009–2009
Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc. green ohio · 2006 1 sentence 2007WOLFF, P.J., and GRADY, J., concur. 1 Although Klepinger prevailed in administrative proceedings before the Industrial Commission and Alterra filed the notice of appeal, "[i]n the R.C. 4123.512 appeal process the obligation to file the petition falls squarely on the employee-claimant." Fowee v. Wesley Hall, Inc. , 108 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , 2006-Ohio-1712 . 2 When Zuljevic was decided, the thirty-day requirement was found in R.C. § 4123.519 .	1	2007–2007
Endsley v. Endsley green ohioctapp · 1993 2 sentences 2006In Endsley v. Endsley (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 306 , we found that "the statute's thirty-day requirement [is] directory rather than mandatory," and that the parent had not been prejudiced by CSB's failure to comply with the statute's requirements. 2006Id. at 308 . ("Because the time limit is directory, we do not believe the failure to file within thirty days constituted any more than harmless error.") In Endsley , we found it pertinent that the parents were given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to appear. {¶ 8} Herein, we are confronted with analogous facts.	1	2006–2006
Huber Heights Circuit Courts, Ltd. v. Carne green ohio · 1996 1 sentence 2006Huber Heights Circuit Courts, Ltd. v. Carne (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 306 , 307 . {¶ 13} PFD also argues that R.C. 5717.01 is ambiguous in that it does not explicitly provide that the thirty-day requirement applies to the notice of appeal to be filed with the BOR because the BOR is not mentioned in 5717.01 until two sentences after the portion stating that an appeal "may be taken to the board of tax appeals within thirty days. . . ." This argument is not persuasive.	1	2006–2006
In re Tunstall green ohctcomplcuyaho · 1939 2 sentences 2001However, our review of the two cases relators have cited in support of their two arguments, In re Removal of Osuna (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 339 and In re Tunstall (1939), 28 Ohio L.Abs. 635 , 1939 Ohio Misc. 2001However, our review of the two cases relators have cited in support of their two arguments, In re Removal of Osuna (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 339 and In re Tunstall (1939), 28 Ohio L.Abs. 635 , 1939 Ohio Misc.	1	2001–2001
In Re Removal of Osuna green ohioctapp · 1996 1 sentence 2001However, our review of the two cases relators have cited in support of their two arguments, In re Removal of Osuna (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 339 and In re Tunstall (1939), 28 Ohio L.Abs. 635 , 1939 Ohio Misc.	1	2001–2001
State v. Mapson green ohioctapp · 1987 1 sentence 2001Therefore, she filed her notice of appeal within the thirty-day requirement of App.R. 4. 3 Because post-conviction relief proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal in nature ( State v. Mapson (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 390 ), the Rules of Civil Procedure apply.	1	2001–2001
State v. Dickerson green ohio · 1989 2 sentences 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 . 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 .	1	1994–1994
Magyar v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America neutral ohio · 1938 1 sentence 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 .	1	1994–1994
Cincinnati Auto Parts Co. v. Hawke green ohio · 1950 1 sentence 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 .	1	1994–1994
Wilson v. Kennedy green · 1949 2 sentences 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 . 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 .	1	1994–1994
State Ex Rel. Prospect Hospital, Inc. v. Ferguson neutral ohio · 1938 1 sentence 1994Prospect Hosp., v. Ferguson [1938], 133 Ohio St. 325 , 10 10 January Term, 1994 O.O. 493 , 13 N.E.2d 723 , and Wilson v. Kennedy [1949], 151 Ohio St. 485 , 40 O.O. 500 , 86 N.E.2d 722 ); State v. Dickerson (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 206 , 543 N.E.2d 1250 .	1	1994–1994

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TN 66 (1993–2026) TX 22 (1913–2024) PA 21 (1965–2026) MS 18 (1996–2025) OH 17 (1985–2020) MO 17 (1988–2020) FL 16 (1983–2025) NJ 12 (1997–2026) IA 10 (1985–2024) WI 9 (1979–2018) CT 9 (1922–2020) IN 9 (1991–2020) MD 6 (1951–2024) NY 6 (1884–2025) MA 5 (1975–2012) AR 5 (1994–2009) NC 5 (2005–2025) IL 4 (1970–2014) VI 4 (2011–2013) LA 4 (1958–2017) AZ 4 (1997–2019) GA 3 (1983–2016) NM 3 (2003–2021) KS 3 (1976–2008) DC 3 (1995–2017) VA 3 (1999–2001) ID 2 (1997–2001) WV 2 (2018–2018) UT 2 (1983–2000) KY 2 (2020–2020) AK 2 (1993–1996) CO 2 (1992–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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