9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State, Indiana Civil Rights Com'n v. INIgreen2 sentences2013See State, Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 946 (Ind. 1999) (finding that the language of statutory provision which states “the commission shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the election is made, file a civil action” suggested that the thirty day requirement was mandatory, not directory). 2013See State, Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 946 (Ind.1999) (finding that the language of statutory provision which states “the commission shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the election is made, file a civil action” suggested that the thirty day requirement was mandatory, not directory). | 2 | 2 |
Vandergriff v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Vandergriff v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1053, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Shell Oil Co. v. Meyergreen1 sentence1999“The first and often the only step in resolving an issue of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute.” Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 972 (Ind.1998). “ ‘[N]othing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature’ as ascertained from ‘the plain and obvious meaning’ of the words of the statute.” Indiana Bell Tel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Tina T.
green
1 sentence2020Like criminal courts, however, they should be prompt and should enter their final dispositions within a reasonable time.” Id. [21] The record reveals the court admitted the February 14, 2020 psychological assessment near the end of the May 14, 2020 hearing and indicated that it Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-1431 | December 30, 2020 Page 8 of 11 needed to read the report and would take the matter under advisement. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Michael A. Miller v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2018Instead, it was remanded only for the trial court "to apply the appropriate legal standard to the existing evidence." Miller II , 77 N.E.3d at 1197 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Virgil
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 79-80 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Indiana Family & Social Services Administration v. Meyer
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 79-80 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Russell v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1996The court also cited its own precedent stating that "the rules of appellate procedure do not apply to reviews of worker's compensation claims." Id. (citing Russell v. Johnson (1943) 220 Ind. 649 , 46 N.E.2d 219 ). 1996The court also cited its own precedent stating that "the rules of appellate procedure do not apply to reviews of worker's compensation claims." Id. (citing Russell v. Johnson (1943) 220 Ind. 649 , 46 N.E.2d 219 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sheets v. Disabilities Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996The court first noted that the Worker's Compensation statute had long been interpreted as imposing the thirty-day requirement with respect to the filing of both a record and an assignment of errors. 602 N.E.2d at 506 . 1996The court first noted that the Worker's Compensation statute had long been interpreted as imposing the thirty-day requirement with respect to the filing of both a record and an assignment of errors. 602 N.E.2d at 506 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Long v. State
green
1 sentence1991In Dudley, 480 N.E.2d 881 , and Long v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284 , this Court found that the passage of fifty-seven days and thirty-six days, respectively, between the finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence did not require reversal or modification of the defendants' sentences because the delay was for the purpose of affording time for the probation officer to file the presentence report and the sentencing court to consider that report. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dudley v. State
green
1 sentence1991In Dudley, 480 N.E.2d 881 , and Long v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 284 , this Court found that the passage of fifty-seven days and thirty-six days, respectively, between the finding of guilt and the imposition of sentence did not require reversal or modification of the defendants' sentences because the delay was for the purpose of affording time for the probation officer to file the presentence report and the sentencing court to consider that report. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.