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21 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Texasgreen2 sentences2023The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (Moore I), in which it rejected various aspects of this Court’s analytical approach to Atkins claims, including our use of the Briseno factors. 2023The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (Moore I), in which it rejected various aspects of this Court’s analytical approach to Atkins claims, including our use of the Briseno factors. | 6 | 9 |
Ex Parte Brisenogreen2 sentences2016Briseno factors “There are other evidentiary factors which fact-finders in the criminal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder.” See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 .17 Cunningham and Proctor both 17 These factors are: Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage – his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities – think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? 2015This Court invented the Briseno factors because it deemed the clinical diagnostic criteria too “subjective.” Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 9 |
Hall v. Floridagreen2 sentences2018Not aligned with the medical community’s information, and drawing no strength from our precedent, the Briseno factors ‘creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” [Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990 ] Accordingly, they may not be used . . . to restrict qualification of an individual as intellectually disabled.’”) 52 Id. at 1051. 2018Not aligned with the medical community’s information, and drawing no strength from our precedent, the Briseno factors ‘creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” [Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990 ] Accordingly, they may not be used . . . to restrict qualification of an individual as intellectually disabled.’”) 52 Id. at 1051. | 4 | 6 |
Ex parte Mooregreen2 sentences2020Accordingly, this Court issued a new Moore decision on June 6, 2018, jettisoning the Briseno framework and “conclud[ing] that the DSM-5 should control our approach to resolving the issue of intellectual disability.” Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552, 559-60 (Tex. Crim. 2020Accordingly, this Court issued a new Moore decision on June 6, 2018, jettisoning the Briseno framework and “conclud[ing] that the DSM-5 should control our approach to resolving the issue of intellectual disability.” Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552, 559-60 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
Elroy Chester v. Rick Thaler, Directorgreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 393 (5th Cir. 2008) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using quotation marks to modify “scientific” regarding Briseno factors); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) Lizcano Dissent - 4 (sharply criticizing the Briseno factors as unscientific, stating that “the Briseno factors turn on its head the consensus’s approach to determining whether the petitioner has significant limitations in adaptive functioning”); see also John H. 2015See, e.g., Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 393 (5th Cir. 2008) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using quotation marks to modify “scientific” regarding Briseno factors); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) Lizcano Dissent - 4 (sharply criticizing the Briseno factors as unscientific, stating that “the Briseno factors turn on its head the consensus’s approach to determining whether the petitioner has significant limitations in adaptive functioning”); see also John H. | 2 | 2 |
Cathey, Eric Dewaynegreen2 sentences2015App. 2010) in which it is stated that “... this Court interprets the “about 70" language of the AAMR’s definition of mental retardation to 88 represent a rough ceiling above which a finding of mental retardation in the capital context is precluded” As suggested in Judge Price’s concurring opinion in Ex Parte Cathey, supra, and Judge Newell’s dissenting opinion in Ex Parte Lizcano, WR-68,348-03 decided April 15, 2015, which includes references to cases and articles that had been critical of the Briseno standard as unscientific, Appellant moves this Honorable Court to reexamine the criteria in ‘ 2015App. 2010) in which it is stated that “... this Court interprets the “about 70" language of the AAMR’s definition of mental retardation to 88 represent a rough ceiling above which a finding of mental retardation in the capital context is precluded” As suggested in Judge Price’s concurring opinion in Ex Parte Cathey, supra, and Judge Newell’s dissenting opinion in Ex Parte Lizcano, WR-68,348-03 decided April 15, 2015, which includes references to cases and articles that had been critical of the Briseno standard as unscientific, Appellant moves this Honorable Court to reexamine the criteria in ‘ | 1 | 2 |
Ex Parte Van Alstynegreen2 sentences2017See Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. 2017See Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Moore, Bobby Jamesgreen2 sentences2017As I stated in my dissenting opinion in Moore, “it is time for Texas to reevaluate the decade-old, judicially created standard in Ex parte Briseno in light of a shift in the consensus of the medical community regarding what constitutes intellectual disability, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Hall v. Florida indicating that courts are required to consider that consensus in assessing intellectual-disability claims.” See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 528 (Alcala, J., dissenting); Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 . 2017As I stated in my dissenting opinion in Moore, “it is time for Texas to reevaluate the decade-old, judicially created standard in Ex parte Briseno in light of a shift in the consensus of the medical community regarding what constitutes intellectual disability, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Hall v. Florida indicating that courts are required to consider that consensus in assessing intellectual-disability claims.” See Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 528 (Alcala, J., dissenting); Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Eric Catheygreen2 sentences2017App. 2004). 3 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017). 4 Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)(observing that the United States Suprem e Court unanim ously agreed that the Briseno factors violated the Eighth Am endm ent); see also id. at 1049 (m aj. opinion) (noting that our evaluation of IQ scores is irreconcilable with Hall v. Florida because it allows for factors unique to the individual to narrow the test- specific standard-error range); see also id. at 1050 (m aj. opinion) (noting that the m edical com m unity focuses adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits rather than adaptive strengths and th 2017App. 2004). 3 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017). 4 Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)(observing that the United States Suprem e Court unanim ously agreed that the Briseno factors violated the Eighth Am endm ent); see also id. at 1049 (m aj. opinion) (noting that our evaluation of IQ scores is irreconcilable with Hall v. Florida because it allows for factors unique to the individual to narrow the test- specific standard-error range); see also id. at 1050 (m aj. opinion) (noting that the m edical com m unity focuses adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits rather than adaptive strengths and th | 1 | 1 |
Bobby Hines v. Rick Thaler, Directorgreen2 sentences2015App. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring) (focusing on the facts of the crime to deny Atkins claim); Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App’x 357, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (similar). 2015App. 2006) (Johnson, J., concurring) (focusing on the facts of the crime to deny Atkins claim); Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App’x 357, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (similar). | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Quartermangreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 393 (5th Cir. 2008) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using quotation marks to modify “scientific” regarding Briseno factors); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) Lizcano Dissent - 4 (sharply criticizing the Briseno factors as unscientific, stating that “the Briseno factors turn on its head the consensus’s approach to determining whether the petitioner has significant limitations in adaptive functioning”); see also John H. 2015See, e.g., Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 393 (5th Cir. 2008) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using quotation marks to modify “scientific” regarding Briseno factors); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) Lizcano Dissent - 4 (sharply criticizing the Briseno factors as unscientific, stating that “the Briseno factors turn on its head the consensus’s approach to determining whether the petitioner has significant limitations in adaptive functioning”); see also John H. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Hearngreen1 sentence2015See id. | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Quartermangreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Chester, 666 F.3d at 346-347 (“on their face, nothing about [the Briseno factors] contradicts Atkins”); Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580 , 587 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (“nothing in Briseno” is “inconsistent with Atkins”). - 138 - This Court “has clearly taken a path that differs from the other states” on this issue. 2015See, e.g., Chester, 666 F.3d at 346-347 (“on their face, nothing about [the Briseno factors] contradicts Atkins”); Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580 , 587 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (“nothing in Briseno” is “inconsistent with Atkins”). - 138 - This Court “has clearly taken a path that differs from the other states” on this issue. | 1 | 1 |
In re Allengreen1 sentence2015E.g., In re Allen, 462 S.W.3d 47, 51-52 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Flores, Ex Parte Gerardogreen2 sentences2015See Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d 626, 634-35 (Tex. Crim. 2015See Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d 626, 634-35 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences2015Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 82, 86 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 2015 WL 3751733, at *15-16 (Pa. 2015). - 139 - use of a standardized clinical assessment to evaluate adaptive functioning. 2015Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 82, 86 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 2015 WL 3751733, at *15-16 (Pa. 2015). - 139 - use of a standardized clinical assessment to evaluate adaptive functioning. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Bracey, E.green2 sentences2015Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 82, 86 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 2015 WL 3751733, at *15-16 (Pa. 2015). - 139 - use of a standardized clinical assessment to evaluate adaptive functioning. 2015Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 58 A.3d 62, 82, 86 (Pa. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 2015 WL 3751733, at *15-16 (Pa. 2015). - 139 - use of a standardized clinical assessment to evaluate adaptive functioning. | 1 | 1 |
William Wiley v. Christopher Epps, Commissionergreen2 sentences2014But see Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 216-18 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the authors of the Vineland test express that retrospective interviews are permissible in certain circumstances). 65 One of the Briseno factors asks whether “those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?” 135 S.W.3d at 8 . 2014But see Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 216-18 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the authors of the Vineland test express that retrospective interviews are permissible in certain circumstances). 65 One of the Briseno factors asks whether “those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?” 135 S.W.3d at 8 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Brisenogreen2 sentences2016Briseno factors “There are other evidentiary factors which fact-finders in the criminal trial context might also focus upon in weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder.” See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 .17 Cunningham and Proctor both 17 These factors are: Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage – his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities – think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? 2015This Court invented the Briseno factors because it deemed the clinical diagnostic criteria too “subjective.” Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 9 |
William Wiley v. Christopher Epps, Commissionergreen2 sentences2014But see Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 216-18 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the authors of the Vineland test express that retrospective interviews are permissible in certain circumstances). 65 One of the Briseno factors asks whether “those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?” 135 S.W.3d at 8 . 2014But see Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 216-18 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the authors of the Vineland test express that retrospective interviews are permissible in certain circumstances). 65 One of the Briseno factors asks whether “those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?” 135 S.W.3d at 8 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Sosa
green
2 sentences2015One of the Briseno factors specifically asks, “Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?” Id. 2015One of the Briseno factors specifically asks, “Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?” Id. | 4 | 2015–2015 |
Moore v. Texas
green
2 sentences2023Consequently, we remanded this case on June 28, 2017, with instructions for the habeas judge to “[hold] a live hearing to further develop evidence and make a new recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual disability.” The United States Supreme Court thereafter decided Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (Moore II). 2023Consequently, we remanded this case on June 28, 2017, with instructions for the habeas judge to “[hold] a live hearing to further develop evidence and make a new recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual disability.” The United States Supreme Court thereafter decided Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (Moore II). | 2 | 2020–2023 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2016I note here that the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Moore case to decide "[wjhether it violates the Eighth Amendment and [the Supreme Court’s] decisions in Hall v. Florida, [— U.S.-,] 134 S.Ct. 1986 , [188 L.Ed,2d 1007] (2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , [ 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 ] (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.” Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, cert. granted June 6, 2016. . 2016I note here that the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Moore case to decide "[wjhether it violates the Eighth Amendment and [the Supreme Court’s] decisions in Hall v. Florida, [— U.S.-,] 134 S.Ct. 1986 , [188 L.Ed,2d 1007] (2014), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , [ 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 ] (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.” Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, cert. granted June 6, 2016. . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Marek v. Lane
green
2 sentences2015Similarly, like the Supreme Court in Atkins, Briseno’s analysis of intellectual disability considered the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), but since the Atkins and Briseno decisions, that manual has been superseded by the Fifth Edition, the DSM-5.9 Rather than rely exclusively on the older scientific standards as this Court does today by continuing to apply an unmodified Briseno standard, this Court, like the Supreme Court in Hall, should, at a minimum, consider how the developments in the scientific standards du 2015Similarly, like the Supreme Court in Atkins, Briseno’s analysis of intellectual disability considered the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), but since the Atkins and Briseno decisions, that manual has been superseded by the Fifth Edition, the DSM-5.9 Rather than rely exclusively on the older scientific standards as this Court does today by continuing to apply an unmodified Briseno standard, this Court, like the Supreme Court in Hall, should, at a minimum, consider how the developments in the scientific standards du | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Messere v. White
green
2 sentences2015Likewise, the Court refused to reconsider Briseno in light of Hall in Cathey as well. 451 S.W.3d at 19-20, 26-27 .25 The Fifth Circuit has also refused to reconsider the continued validity of this Court’s approach in light of Hall, declaring that Hall “in no way affects … 25 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cathey, 83 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 22, 2015), but that case did not squarely present the question whether Hall forecloses continued use of the Briseno factors because the petitioner had also failed to meet the first prong of the definition of intellectual disability, 451 S.W.3d at 19 2015Likewise, the Court refused to reconsider Briseno in light of Hall in Cathey as well. 451 S.W.3d at 19-20, 26-27 .25 The Fifth Circuit has also refused to reconsider the continued validity of this Court’s approach in light of Hall, declaring that Hall “in no way affects … 25 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Cathey, 83 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 22, 2015), but that case did not squarely present the question whether Hall forecloses continued use of the Briseno factors because the petitioner had also failed to meet the first prong of the definition of intellectual disability, 451 S.W.3d at 19 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.