presumed harm rule in Texas

2015We have never not probably cause the *689 jury to render an im- extended a presumed harm rule to instructions on proper verdict. 211 S.W.3d at 758–59. defensive theories such as unavoidable accident, and we decline to do so now....

2015P. 44.1, 61.1; even in multiple-theory-of-liability cases Urista, 211 S.W.3d at 757 . like Casteel, the presumed harm analysis is Because we hold that Casteel’s pre- not automatic.

2015Morrison, 381 S.W.3d at 536 ("Casteel error may be preserved without specifically mentioning Casteel."); Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 691 ("[Appellant] did not have to cite or reference Casteel specifically to preserve the right for the appellate court to apply the presumed harm analysis . . . .").

2014Morrison, 381 S.W.3d at 536 (“Casteel error may be preserved without specifically mentioning Casteel.”); Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 691 (“[Appellant] did not have to cite or,reference Casteel specifically to preserve the right for the appellate court to apply the presumed harm analysis _”).

2024On the one hand, many of our decisions include statements that the presumed-harm rule applies when a theory or allegation is “invalid” because it lacks evidentiary support.36 But we harm rule because error in asking the jury to decide the plaintiff’s contributory negligence did not cause doubt or confusion about the jury’s failure to find that defendant was negligent). 36 See Benge, 548 S.W.3d at 475 (“[W]hen the question allows a finding of liability based on evidence that cannot support recovery, the same presumption-of-harm rule must be applied.”); Morrison, 381 S.W.3d at 537 (“A broad-form

2024On the one hand, many of our decisions include statements that the presumed-harm rule applies when a theory or allegation is “invalid” because it lacks evidentiary support.36 But we harm rule because error in asking the jury to decide the plaintiff’s contributory negligence did not cause doubt or confusion about the jury’s failure to find that defendant was negligent). 36 See Benge, 548 S.W.3d at 475 (“[W]hen the question allows a finding of liability based on evidence that cannot support recovery, the same presumption-of-harm rule must be applied.”); Morrison, 381 S.W.3d at 537 (“A broad-form

2015The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the submission of broad form questions, and has rejected attempts to expand the presumed harm analysis of Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000), beyond those cases involving multiple theories of liability and multiple elements of damages.

2014The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the submission of broad form questions, and.has rejected attempts to expand the presumed harm analysis of Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000), beyond those cases involving multiple theories of liability and multiple elements of damages.

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024Instead, it “inquired about a single theory: negligence.” Id. 33 See, e.g., Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 865 (applying Casteel’s presumed- harm rule when a broad-form question allowed the jury to consider an independent contractor’s acts for which the defendant could not be legally liable); Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (applying presumption when an erroneous apportionment question permitted the jury to consider an invalid allegation when allocating legal responsibility among the parties); Harris County, 96 S.W.3d at 233–34 (rejecting court of appeals’ restriction of Casteel to “the submission of an inva

2024On the one hand, many of our decisions include statements that the presumed-harm rule applies when a theory or allegation is “invalid” because it lacks evidentiary support.36 But we harm rule because error in asking the jury to decide the plaintiff’s contributory negligence did not cause doubt or confusion about the jury’s failure to find that defendant was negligent). 36 See Benge, 548 S.W.3d at 475 (“[W]hen the question allows a finding of liability based on evidence that cannot support recovery, the same presumption-of-harm rule must be applied.”); Morrison, 381 S.W.3d at 537 (“A broad-form

2020Benge, 548 S.W.3d at 475–76; Romero v. KPH Consol., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212 , 227–28 (Tex. 2005); see also Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388 ; accord Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984), quoted in Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 227–28.

2006Unavoidable accident is not an alternative theory of liability but is “an inferential rebuttal issue that requires plaintiffs to prove the nonexistence of an affirmative defense,” Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.1984), or “seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue,” Select Ins.

2006Unavoidable accident is not an alternative theory of liability but is "an inferential rebuttal issue that requires plaintiffs to prove the nonexistence of an affirmative defense," Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.1984), or "seeks to disprove the existence of an essential element submitted in another issue," Select Ins.

1984See Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 , 839 n. 2 (Tex.1979).

1984See Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 , 839 n. 2 (Tex.1979).