21 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2007–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worthgreen2 sentences2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to ap 2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water-Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to apply | 3 | 3 |
Hays County v. Hays County Water Planning Partnershipgreen2 sentences2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to ap 2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water-Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to apply | 3 | 3 |
Coble v. City of Mansfieldgreen2 sentences2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to ap 2009See Hays County v. Hays County Water-Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); cf. Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 394 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (concluding that a claim for an injunction against an eminent domain action was not ripe because the City of Fort Worth expressly stated that it would not exercise its eminent domain authority); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding that a regulatory taking claim was not ripe because the City of Mansfield had not acted to apply | 3 | 3 |
City of Houston v. James & Elizabeth Carlsongreen2 sentences2018“It is well settled that the Texas Constitution waives government immunity with respect to inverse-condemnation claims.” City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014); accord Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468 , 476–77 (Tex. 2012) (recognizing a regulatory taking claim is an inverse condemnation claim). 2018“Nevertheless, such a claim is predicated upon a viable allegation of taking.” Carlson, 451 S.W.3d at 830 . | 2 | 3 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green2 sentences2010Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States , 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Sheffield Dev. 2010Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Sheffield Dev. | 2 | 3 |
Armstrong v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States , 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Sheffield Dev. 2010Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); Sheffield Dev. | 2 | 3 |
CPM Trust, KLM Secure Trust and Ralph (Deceased) and Muriel Pinkus, LLC v. City of Plano, Texas and the Board of Adjustment of the City of Plano, Texasgreen2 sentences2015CPM Trust v. City of Plano, 461 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2015, no pet.). 2015CPM Trust v. City of Plano, 461 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2015, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
SHEFFIELD DEVEL. CO. INC. v. City of Glenn Heightsgreen2 sentences2019Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 672–73. 2013Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 672-73 . 6 IV. | 1 | 3 |
Duquesne Light Co. v. Baraschgreen1 sentence2022Because the 23 The Windstream and CenturyLink Appellants also argue on appeal that the PUC Parties have violated the state and federal Takings Clauses because their actions have compelled the Rural Providers to serve the public for a charge that “is so ‘unjust’ as to be confiscatory.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (holding that state scheme of utility regulation did not take property and declining to adopt “a single theory of valuation as a constitutional requirement”); see also State Farm Lloyds v. Rathgeber, 453 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. granted, j | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Lloyds v. Rathgebergreen1 sentence2022Because the 23 The Windstream and CenturyLink Appellants also argue on appeal that the PUC Parties have violated the state and federal Takings Clauses because their actions have compelled the Rural Providers to serve the public for a charge that “is so ‘unjust’ as to be confiscatory.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (holding that state scheme of utility regulation did not take property and declining to adopt “a single theory of valuation as a constitutional requirement”); see also State Farm Lloyds v. Rathgeber, 453 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. granted, j | 1 | 1 |
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.green1 sentence2021See id. at 1005–16. | 1 | 1 |
Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. Stategreen1 sentence2018“It is well settled that the Texas Constitution waives government immunity with respect to inverse-condemnation claims.” City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2014); accord Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468 , 476–77 (Tex. 2012) (recognizing a regulatory taking claim is an inverse condemnation claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coastal Habitat Alliance v. Public Utility Commission
green
2 sentences2010However, as we have noted, a plaintiff is not required to allege the deprivation of a “vested right” constituting a due-process violation to demonstrate the requisite infringement of a “legally protected interest.” Coastal Habitat Alliance, 294 S.W.3d at 287 ; see Texas Rivers Prot. 2010However, as we have noted, a plaintiff is not required to allege the deprivation of a “vested right” constituting a due-process violation to demonstrate the requisite infringement of a “legally protected interest.” Coastal Habitat Alliance, 294 S.W.3d at 287 ; see Texas Rivers Prot. | 3 | 2010–2010 |
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale
green
1 sentence2019Accordingly, for a regulatory taking claim to be ripe, there must be a “final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation v. Henry Andrew Hansen, II, M.D.
green
1 sentence2018“Further, when the motion asserts both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we first review the no-evidence grounds.” Id. 2 Appellants’ claims against the Engs were left pending in the original cause. -4- 04-17-00077-CV JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS In its motion, the City asserted three grounds challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the appellants’ regulatory taking claim. 3 We first consider each of these grounds. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences2011Millwee’s “investment-backed expectations” claim refers to one factor in the regulatory taking analysis first explained in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) and more recently restated as an analysis considering (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. 2011Millwee’s “investment-backed expectations” claim refers to one factor in the regulatory taking analysis first explained in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) and more recently restated as an analysis considering (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
green
2 sentences2007The regulatory taking test is described as a Lucas challenge because the court first attempted to articulate the justification for such a challenge in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-1017 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). 2007The regulatory taking test is described as a Lucas challenge because the court first attempted to articulate the justification for such a challenge in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-1017 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 , 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.