regulatory taking claim in California

1993This is consonant with the judicial view that takings decisions must await as-applied challenges and are usually not ripe until the permit stage. “[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” (Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 172, 195 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 144 ]; see also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 312, fn. 6 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 261-262 , 107 S.Ct. 2378 ].) Both t

1993This is consonant with the judicial view that takings decisions must await as-applied challenges and are usually not ripe until the permit stage. “[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” (Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 172, 195 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 144 ]; see also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 312, fn. 6 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 261-262 , 107 S.Ct. 2378 ].) Both t

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2007Co. v. New York City, supra, 438 U.S. 104 (Penn Central).

2004Plaintiffs' petition thus does not seek to "attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a legislative body to ... amend a zoning ordinance." (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) [11] Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 549 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 , upon which plaintiffs rely, applied Code of Civil Procedure section 319 to a regulatory taking claim, but did so without analysis, in reliance on Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 324 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 862 , a case of physical invasion.

2004Plaintiffs' petition thus does not seek to "attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the decision of a legislative body to ... amend a zoning ordinance." (§ 65009, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) [11] Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 549 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 , upon which plaintiffs rely, applied Code of Civil Procedure section 319 to a regulatory taking claim, but did so without analysis, in reliance on Garden Water Corp. v. Fambrough (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 324 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 862 , a case of physical invasion.

1990Moreover, a prerequisite to asserting a regulatory taking claim “is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property.” (MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County (1986) All U.S. 340, 348 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 294 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 ].) “Until a property owner has ‘obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,’ ‘it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests ha[ve] been destro

1990Moreover, a prerequisite to asserting a regulatory taking claim “is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property.” (MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County (1986) All U.S. 340, 348 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 285, 294 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 ].) “Until a property owner has ‘obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,’ ‘it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests ha[ve] been destro

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2015The rationale is evident: they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property." (Loretto, 458 U.S. at p. 435, fn. 12 .) Relevant in the temporary physical invasion context are not only the three aforementioned primary factors, but also the duration of the invasion, the character of the land at issue, and the severity of the interference with the owner's rights in the parcel as a whole.

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2014Unlike the creation of a long-term lease required to 4 All statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code. 9 establish a change in ownership in this proceeding, the right to compensation for a regulatory taking claim "does not turn on strict categories of estates in real property or contractual rights." (D & M Financial Corp. v. City of Long Beach (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 (D & M Financial).) Standing is " 'determined by whether the condemnation has deprived the claimant of a valuable right rather than by whether his right can technically be called an "estate" or "interest" in

2014(See Miller, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 693 ["the owner of an unexercised option to purchase land possesses a property right which — if taken by government — is compensable"].)5 Unlike here, to establish standing, ECDS did not need to show the LOI created "a leasehold interest . . . for a term of 35 years or more." (§ 61, subd. (c)(1)(A).) 5 At oral argument, citing Miller, counsel suggested the court in the inverse condemnation proceeding necessarily concluded the LOI created a leasehold interest because that was the only compensable property interest that could be found based on the evidence.

2014Unlike the creation of a long-term lease required to 4 All statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code. 9 establish a change in ownership in this proceeding, the right to compensation for a regulatory taking claim "does not turn on strict categories of estates in real property or contractual rights." (D & M Financial Corp. v. City of Long Beach (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 (D & M Financial).) Standing is " 'determined by whether the condemnation has deprived the claimant of a valuable right rather than by whether his right can technically be called an "estate" or "interest" in

2014Unlike the creation of a long-term lease required to 4 All statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code. 9 establish a change in ownership in this proceeding, the right to compensation for a regulatory taking claim "does not turn on strict categories of estates in real property or contractual rights." (D & M Financial Corp. v. City of Long Beach (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 (D & M Financial).) Standing is " 'determined by whether the condemnation has deprived the claimant of a valuable right rather than by whether his right can technically be called an "estate" or "interest" in

2004Proc., § 319; see also id., § 318 [five-year limitation for "action for the recovery of real property"].) We recently held the five-year period, though applicable to inverse condemnation actions based on a physical taking (see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867-868 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 705 P.2d 866 ; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 374 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 ), did not apply to a regulatory taking claim based on enactment of a zoning ordinance, as such government action neither effected "a physical invasion of the land" no

2004Proc., § 319; see also id., § 318 [five-year limitation for "action for the recovery of real property"].) We recently held the five-year period, though applicable to inverse condemnation actions based on a physical taking (see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867-868 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 705 P.2d 866 ; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 374 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 ), did not apply to a regulatory taking claim based on enactment of a zoning ordinance, as such government action neither effected "a physical invasion of the land" no

2004Proc., § 319; see also id., § 318 [five-year limitation for "action for the recovery of real property"].) We recently held the five-year period, though applicable to inverse condemnation actions based on a physical taking (see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867-868 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 705 P.2d 866 ; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 374 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 ), did not apply to a regulatory taking claim based on enactment of a zoning ordinance, as such government action neither effected "a physical invasion of the land" no

2004Proc., § 319; see also id., § 318 [five-year limitation for "action for the recovery of real property"].) We recently held the five-year period, though applicable to inverse condemnation actions based on a physical taking (see, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (1985) 39 Cal.3d 862, 867-868 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 705 P.2d 866 ; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 374 , 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 ), did not apply to a regulatory taking claim based on enactment of a zoning ordinance, as such government action neither effected "a physical invasion of the land" no

1998Thus in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ], this court held that ‘a zoning action which merely decreases the market value of property does not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding uncompensated taking or damaging . . . .’ Although that was a ‘regulatory taking’ case, our reasoning applies as well to the present . . . case: we explained that ‘Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between the “damaged” property which is a requisite for a finding of compensability and the “damages” by which courts measure the compensation due.

1998Thus in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ], this court held that ‘a zoning action which merely decreases the market value of property does not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding uncompensated taking or damaging . . . .’ Although that was a ‘regulatory taking’ case, our reasoning applies as well to the present . . . case: we explained that ‘Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between the “damaged” property which is a requisite for a finding of compensability and the “damages” by which courts measure the compensation due.

1993This is consonant with the judicial view that takings decisions must await as-applied challenges and are usually not ripe until the permit stage. “[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” (Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 172, 195 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 144 ]; see also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 312, fn. 6 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 261-262 , 107 S.Ct. 2378 ].) Both t

1993This is consonant with the judicial view that takings decisions must await as-applied challenges and are usually not ripe until the permit stage. “[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” (Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, supra, 473 U.S. 172, 195 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 144 ]; see also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 312, fn. 6 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 261-262 , 107 S.Ct. 2378 ].) Both t