influence violation in Virginia

1995However, in a prosecution under Code § 18.2-36.1(A), as in this case, the *495 Commonwealth is obligated to prove the accused drove “under the influence in violation of subdivision (ii), (in), or (iv) of § 18.2-266.” Pollard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 94, 99 , 455 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1995)(citing Code § 18.2-36.1(A)).

1995However, in a prosecution under Code § 18.2-36.1(A), as in this case, the *495 Commonwealth is obligated to prove the accused drove “under the influence in violation of subdivision (ii), (in), or (iv) of § 18.2-266.” Pollard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 94, 99 , 455 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1995)(citing Code § 18.2-36.1(A)).

2024See Hogle, 75 Va. App. at 753 (quoting Thurston v. City of Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 475, 483 (1992)).

2022He does not challenge that conviction on appeal. fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).

2022He does not challenge that conviction on appeal. fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).

2014In Cleveland v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 199, 204 , 562 S.E.2d 696, 698 (2002), this Court sustained inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge because the “judge gave a valid explanation on the record for the verdicts.” In Cleveland, the defendant was charged with driving while a habitual offender and while under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266, reckless driving as a habitual offender, driving under the influence of alcohol, and attempting to elude a police officer.

2014In Cleveland v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 199, 204 , 562 S.E.2d 696, 698 (2002), this Court sustained inconsistent verdicts rendered by a trial judge because the “judge gave a valid explanation on the record for the verdicts.” In Cleveland, the defendant was charged with driving while a habitual offender and while under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266, reckless driving as a habitual offender, driving under the influence of alcohol, and attempting to elude a police officer.

2014Code § 18.2-266 provides, in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (as we must since it was the prevailing party at the suppression hearing), the evidence shows that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Lancaster had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266. “‘[P]robable cause exists

2014Code § 18.2-266 provides, in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (as we must since it was the prevailing party at the suppression hearing), the evidence shows that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Lancaster had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266. “‘[P]robable cause exists

2014Code § 18.2-266 provides, in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (as we must since it was the prevailing party at the suppression hearing), the evidence shows that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Lancaster had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266. “‘[P]robable cause exists

2014Code § 18.2-266 provides, in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (as we must since it was the prevailing party at the suppression hearing), the evidence shows that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Lancaster had probable cause to arrest appellant for driving under the influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266. “‘[P]robable cause exists

2007See, e.g., Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593, 598 , 601 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2004) (holding an officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxication “moments after he stepped out of his car” was a sufficient evidentiary showing, even without BAC test results, to support a DUI conviction under Code § 18.2-266(ii)); Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 687, 694 , 454 S.E.2d 31, 35-36 (1995) (holding a defendant’s admission that she consumed alcoholic beverages, coupled with her appearance and lack of coordination, is sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). - 1

2007See, e.g., Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593, 598 , 601 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2004) (holding an officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxication “moments after he stepped out of his car” was a sufficient evidentiary showing, even without BAC test results, to support a DUI conviction under Code § 18.2-266(ii)); Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 687, 694 , 454 S.E.2d 31, 35-36 (1995) (holding a defendant’s admission that she consumed alcoholic beverages, coupled with her appearance and lack of coordination, is sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). - 1

2007See, e.g., Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593, 598 , 601 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2004) (holding an officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxication “moments after he stepped out of his car” was a sufficient evidentiary showing, even without BAC test results, to support a DUI conviction under Code § 18.2-266(ii)); Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 687, 694 , 454 S.E.2d 31, 35-36 (1995) (holding a defendant’s admission that she consumed alcoholic beverages, coupled with her appearance and lack of coordination, is sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). - 1

2007See, e.g., Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593, 598 , 601 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2004) (holding an officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxication “moments after he stepped out of his car” was a sufficient evidentiary showing, even without BAC test results, to support a DUI conviction under Code § 18.2-266(ii)); Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 687, 694 , 454 S.E.2d 31, 35-36 (1995) (holding a defendant’s admission that she consumed alcoholic beverages, coupled with her appearance and lack of coordination, is sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). - 1

2003For example in Goodman, we affirmed a conviction of involuntary DUI manslaughter under Code § 18.2-36.1 because the defendant's actions caused the death of another, as required under Code § 18.2-36.1(A). 1 We held that the 1 Code § 18.2-36.1 reads: A. Any person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially similar thereto unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. - 17 - defendant's actions were "aggravated" under subsection (B) because the "ap

2003For example in Goodman, we affirmed a conviction of involuntary DUI manslaughter under Code § 18.2-36.1 because the defendant's actions caused the death of another, as required under Code § 18.2-36.1(A). 1 We held that the 1 Code § 18.2-36.1 reads: A. Any person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially similar thereto unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. - 17 - defendant's actions were "aggravated" under subsection (B) because the "ap

2001Legislative intent may also be gleaned by consulting other statutes “using the same phraseology,” [Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 519, 523 , 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996)], and “statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together----” Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 252, 256 , 450 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1994).

2001Legislative intent may also be gleaned by consulting other statutes “using the same phraseology,” [Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 519, 523 , 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996)], and “statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together----” Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 252, 256 , 450 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1994).

2001Legislative intent may also be gleaned by consulting other statutes “using the same phraseology,” [Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 519, 523 , 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996)], and “statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together----” Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 252, 256 , 450 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1994).

2001Legislative intent may also be gleaned by consulting other statutes “using the same phraseology,” [Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 519, 523 , 465 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1996)], and “statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together----” Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 252, 256 , 450 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1994).

2000See McBride, 24 Va. App. at 32 , 480 S.E.2d at 127 .

2000See McBride, 24 Va. App. at 32 , 480 S.E.2d at 127 .

1999See Castillo v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 482 , 465 S.E.2d 146 (1995); Pollard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 94 , 455 S.E.2d 283 (1995).

1999See Castillo v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 482 , 465 S.E.2d 146 (1995); Pollard v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 94 , 455 S.E.2d 283 (1995).

1990Similarly, in Pine v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that where a criminal law is unconstitutional, the indictment for violating it is void because there is no crime. 121 Va. 812, 821 (1917). o See also Mitchell v. County of Hanover, 1 Va. App. 486, 489-490 (1986) (warrant for driving under the influence in violation of an invalid county ordinance failed to state "an offense and was, therefore, insufficient to form the basis of a conviction").

1990Similarly, in Pine v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that where a criminal law is unconstitutional, the indictment for violating it is void because there is no crime. 121 Va. 812, 821 (1917). o See also Mitchell v. County of Hanover, 1 Va. App. 486, 489-490 (1986) (warrant for driving under the influence in violation of an invalid county ordinance failed to state "an offense and was, therefore, insufficient to form the basis of a conviction").