influence violation in California

19 California opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
United States v. Daniel G. Chapelgreen ca9 · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023 2 sentences 2023(People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430, 435 ; People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 ; accord, United States v. Chapel (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 .) As the Trotman court explained, “[t]he rationale of both Schmerber and Cupp [v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S. 291 ], makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.” (Trotman, at pp. 437–438.) Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exist 2014(Accord, United States v. Chapel (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 .) Trotman further holds that “[t]he rationale of both Schmerber and Cupp makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.” ( Trotman, supra, at pp. 437-438 .) Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exists to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence and that an analysis of the sample will yield evidence of that crime.”	1	2
Cupp v. Murphygreen scotus · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023(People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430, 435 ; People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 ; accord, United States v. Chapel (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 .) As the Trotman court explained, “[t]he rationale of both Schmerber and Cupp [v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S. 291 ], makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.” (Trotman, at pp. 437–438.) Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exist	1	1
Brown v. Mortensengreen cal · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 , 253 P.3d 522 ]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 ].) In Brown, we were called upon to interpret an ambiguous federal express 632 preemption clause. 2014(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 , 253 P.3d 522 ]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 ].) In Brown, we were called upon to interpret an ambiguous federal express 632 preemption clause.	1	1
Farm Raised Salmon Casesgreen cal · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 , 253 P.3d 522 ]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 ].) In Brown, we were called upon to interpret an ambiguous federal express *632 preemption clause.	1	1
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohillred scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014(See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill (1988) 484 U.S. 343, 353 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 720 , 108 S.Ct. 614 ].) The influence of the presumption against preemption extends beyond the assessment of whether Congress intended to displace state law; even when an intent to displace is clear, as it is here, the presumption informs assessments of the breadth of preemption. 2014(See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill (1988) 484 U.S. 343, 353 [ 98 L.Ed.2d 720 , 108 S.Ct. 614 ].) The influence of the presumption against preemption extends beyond the assessment of whether Congress intended to displace state law; even when an intent to displace is clear, as it is here, the presumption informs assessments of the breadth of preemption.	1	1
Troppman v. Valverdegreen cal · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011(Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136, fn. 11 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ].) We construe the People’s reference to the Senate Bill Analysis as a request for judicial notice of it. 2011(Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136, fn. 11 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ].) We construe the People’s reference to the Senate Bill Analysis as a request for judicial notice of it.	1	1
Bell v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen calctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 2 sentences 1996Gikas held that a criminal court’s determination that a defendant 1214 was illegally arrested for driving under the influence did not bar the DMV from redetermining the question during administrative proceedings to suspend the driver’s license. (6 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.) During extensive introductory discussion of the statutes, the Gikas court quoted language from another opinion (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 ]), referring to legislative history of the administrative per se statutes. 1996Gikas held that a criminal court’s determination that a defendant 1214 was illegally arrested for driving under the influence did not bar the DMV from redetermining the question during administrative proceedings to suspend the driver’s license. (6 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.) During extensive introductory discussion of the statutes, the Gikas court quoted language from another opinion (Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 ]), referring to legislative history of the administrative per se statutes.	1	1
Bihn v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1946 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967 2 sentences 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence (Weiler v. United States. 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction (Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict (Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488] ; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed.	1	1
Weiler v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1945 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967 2 sentences 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed. 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed.	1	1
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1946 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967 2 sentences 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed. 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed.	1	1
Fahy v. Connecticutgreen scotus · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1967–1967 2 sentences 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed. 1967Under those cases the majority opinion in the present case errs by independently determining guilt or innocence ( Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 [ 89 L.Ed. 495, 499 , 65 S.Ct. 548 , 156 A.L.R. 496 ]), impliedly speculating on the possibility of reconviction ( Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 750, 763 [ 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1565-1566 ]), and considering the evidence without the error and thereby minimizing the influence of the error on the verdict ( Bihn v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 633, 637 [ 90 L.Ed. 1485 , 1488]; Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. 85, 88-92 [ 11 L.Ed.	1	1
James v. Jamesgreen cal · 1899 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1965–1965	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
Saratoga Fire Protection District v. Hackett green calctapp · 2002 1 sentence 2024(E.g., Saratoga Fire Protection Dist. v. Hackett (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 895, 898 , 905– 906 [in eminent domain action, trial court erred in excluding evidence that property increased in value by over 50 percent in 10 months from December 1999 to October 2000].) Establishing the date of valuation controls for the influence of such factors on the calculation of an insured’s losses.	1	2024–2024
Burton v. Sanner green calctapp · 2012 1 sentence 2024“Expert testimony will be excluded “‘“when it would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information, i.e., when ‘the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.’”'” (Burton v. Sanner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 12, 19 .) As mentioned above, no case has been cited, nor have I found one allowing a toxicologist to opine as to the ‘for the purposes of driving’ portion of the under the influence analysis.	1	2024–2024
People v. Trotman green calctapp · 1989 1 sentence 2023(People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430, 435 ; People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 ; accord, United States v. Chapel (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 .) As the Trotman court explained, “[t]he rationale of both Schmerber and Cupp [v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S. 291 ], makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.” (Trotman, at pp. 437–438.) Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exist	1	2023–2023
People v. Deltoro green calctapp · 1989 1 sentence 2023(People v. Trotman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 430, 435 ; People v. Deltoro (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1425 ; accord, United States v. Chapel (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1416, 1419 .) As the Trotman court explained, “[t]he rationale of both Schmerber and Cupp [v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S. 291 ], makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determining blood alcohol content.” (Trotman, at pp. 437–438.) Thus, “a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exist	1	2023–2023
People v. Kopatz green cal · 2015 1 sentence 2021The questioning was always investigatory and never “‘hostile, menacing, or accusatory.’” (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 81 .) And as the trial court aptly observed, Mier’s demeanor was “very cordial,” and “no one raised their voice,” “no one was yelling” or “barking out commands.” Mier told appellant he was being detained in order to determine if he was under the influence, and most of the detention involved Mier’s attempt to determine whether he was.	1	2021–2021
Arnold v. Dow Chemical Company green calctapp · 2001 1 sentence 2020(Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 698, 717 ; Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) 16 Andrew explains that such an inconsistent verdict is reversible error, necessitating a new trial.	1	2020–2020
People v. McFarland green cal · 1989 1 sentence 2020(McFarland, at p. 802.) Our Supreme Court agreed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that section 654 8. prohibited sentencing on both one count of manslaughter and one count of felony drunk driving:5 “ ‘A defendant may properly be convicted of multiple counts for multiple victims of a single criminal act . . . where the act prohibited by the statute is centrally an “act of violence against the person.” ’ [Citations.] Plainly, vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence constitutes a crime of violence against the person. [Citation] [¶] Thus, we are satisfied that where, as here, a defendant c	1	2020–2020
Soule v. General Motors Corp. green cal · 1994 2 sentences 2020(Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 698, 717 ; Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) 16 Andrew explains that such an inconsistent verdict is reversible error, necessitating a new trial. 2020(Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 698, 717 ; Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 567 .) 16 Andrew explains that such an inconsistent verdict is reversible error, necessitating a new trial.	1	2020–2020
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court green calctapp · 2013 2 sentences 2019An affirmative answer to either question would constitute prejudicial legal error. ( Farmers , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 106 , 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 ["[A] discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal"].) As to the first question, we are unable to conclude from the record in this case that the trial court's consideration of the information sheet factors alone constituted legal error. 2019An affirmative answer to either question would constitute prejudicial legal error. ( Farmers , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 106 , 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 ["[A] discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal"].) As to the first question, we are unable to conclude from the record in this case that the trial court's consideration of the information sheet factors alone constituted legal error.	1	2019–2019
People v. Mathson green calctapp · 2012 1 sentence 2015(People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1312-1313 .) Defendant’s intent was therefore to do the act, which was to drive impaired.	1	2015–2015
Reid v. GOOGLE, INC. green cal · 2008 2 sentences 2014(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 , 253 P.3d 522 ]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 ].) In Brown, we were called upon to interpret an ambiguous federal express 632 preemption clause. 2014(Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 428 , 253 P.3d 522 ]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1088 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 175 P.3d 1170 ].) In Brown, we were called upon to interpret an ambiguous federal express 632 preemption clause.	1	2014–2014
People v. Ary green cal · 2011 1 sentence 2014(People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 518 ; § 1369, subd. (f).) Appellant’s evidence, through the reports and testimony of Dr. Sachinvala and Dr. Rome, of auditory hallucinations, limited mental ability, poor communication skills, and “bizarre behavior” was strongly countered by the court’s own observations of appellant’s attentive behavior in the courtroom, except when he felt he was being observed.	1	2014–2014
People v. McNeal green cal · 2009 1 sentence 2013For someone with an extremely low ratio of 1,100 to 1, for example, use of the 2,100-to-l partition ratio would overstate blood-alcohol content by almost 50 percent.” (McNeal, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1198 .) Moreover, we noted: “Evidence showing the defendant had a low partition ratio, and thus a lower concentration of blood alcohol than was reported, could also support an inference that he was not under the influence in violation of the generic DUI law.” (Id.., at pp. 1198-1199.) We acknowledged that, in light of this and evidence of variability of partition ratios in the general population,	1	2013–2013
State v. Burling green neb · 1987 2 sentences 2009(See State v. Burling (1987) 224 Neb. 725 [ 400 N.W.2d 872, 876-877 ].) 10 Evidence showing the defendant had a low partition ratio, and thus a lower concentration of blood alcohol than was reported, could also support an inference that he was not under the influence in violation of the 1199 generic DUI law. 2009(See State v. Burling (1987) 224 Neb. 725 [ 400 N.W.2d 872, 876-877 ].) 10 Evidence showing the defendant had a low partition ratio, and thus a lower concentration of blood alcohol than was reported, could also support an inference that he was not under the influence in violation of the 1199 generic DUI law.	1	2009–2009
People v. Calzada green calctapp · 1970 2 sentences 2003(See People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 [felony driving under the influence in violation of former Veh.Code, § 23105 did not merge with the resulting homicide because felony was complete when defendant began driving and was thus "distinct" and "independent" from homicide].) The "independent felonious design" test, which turns on the purpose of the defendant's actions, does not fit well with negligent conduct, and its outcome here would also be uncertain, given appellant's statements that he merely intended to frighten away the victims. 2003(See People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 606 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 912 [felony driving under the influence in violation of former Veh.Code, § 23105 did not merge with the resulting homicide because felony was complete when defendant began driving and was thus "distinct" and "independent" from homicide].) The "independent felonious design" test, which turns on the purpose of the defendant's actions, does not fit well with negligent conduct, and its outcome here would also be uncertain, given appellant's statements that he merely intended to frighten away the victims.	1	2003–2003
People v. Hansen red cal · 1994 2 sentences 2003(Compare People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [defendant who discharged firearm at inhabited dwelling had independent felonious design of intimidating occupant] and 315, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (maj. opn. [intimidation of occupant would be an independent purpose]) with id. at p. 330, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [defendant had no felonious purpose beyond mere assault].) As for deterrence, felony-murder prosecutions based on grossly negligent discharge of a firearm woul 2003(Compare People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [defendant who discharged firearm at inhabited dwelling had independent felonious design of intimidating occupant] and 315, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (maj. opn. [intimidation of occupant would be an independent purpose]) with id. at p. 330, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [defendant had no felonious purpose beyond mere assault].) As for deterrence, felony-murder prosecutions based on grossly negligent discharge of a firearm woul	1	2003–2003
People v. Washington green cal · 1965 2 sentences 2003(Compare People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [defendant who discharged firearm at inhabited dwelling had independent felonious design of intimidating occupant] and 315, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (maj. opn. [intimidation of occupant would be an independent purpose]) with id. at p. 330, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [defendant had no felonious purpose beyond mere assault].) As for deterrence, felony-murder prosecutions based on grossly negligent discharge of a firearm woul 2003(Compare People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 318, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [defendant who discharged firearm at inhabited dwelling had independent felonious design of intimidating occupant] and 315, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (maj. opn. [intimidation of occupant would be an independent purpose]) with id. at p. 330, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [defendant had no felonious purpose beyond mere assault].) As for deterrence, felony-murder prosecutions based on grossly negligent discharge of a firearm woul	1	2003–2003
Gikas v. Zolin green cal · 1993 1 sentence 1996Therein, Gikas characterized suspending licenses as “sanctions” and mentioned the “deterrent” effect of license suspension statutes. ( 6 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) The true role of this dictum was merely to set the stage for interpreting the statutes and for discussing collateral estoppel.	1	1996–1996
People v. Lance W. green cal · 1985 1 sentence 1989Since we are compelled by section 28, subdivision (d) to follow federal constitutional authority (In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873, 887 ), 5 we must conclude that a formal arrest is not a precondition to the warrantless extraction of blood so long as probable cause exists to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence and that an analysis of the sample will yield evidence of that crime. 6 The rationale of *438 both Schmerber and Cupp makes it clear that probable cause to arrest a defendant is the constitutional equivalent of an actual arrest for the limited purpose of determ	1	1989–1989

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152 (4) CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 23153 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 84 (1927–2025) AL 69 (1847–2015) OH 30 (1982–2024) VA 21 (1896–2024) CA 19 (1965–2024) PA 9 (1996–2026) GA 8 (1990–2024) MO 8 (1860–2017) CO 6 (2010–2024) CT 6 (1988–2019) IA 5 (1939–2021) FL 4 (1927–2023) OR 4 (1915–2019) ND 4 (1994–2020) MS 4 (1994–2008) KS 4 (1994–2011) WV 3 (2013–2020) MN 3 (1986–2014) ID 3 (1993–1994) WA 3 (1997–2010) HI 3 (1930–1989) MT 2 (2008–2015) ME 2 (1984–1985) IL 2 (1986–2006) DE 2 (1987–1993) TN 2 (2001–2006) LA 2 (1921–1950) IN 2 (1999–2004) NM 2 (1973–1975) MD 2 (1940–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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