breach and a liquidated claim in California

2025(See Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 901, 906 (Chesapeake); Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 520 [noting “the additional requirement for prejudgment interest under section 3287 that plaintiff’s entitlement to damages vest ‘upon a particular day’ ”].) If the requirements are satisfied, then “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 293 (Watson).) “California cases uniform

2025(Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279 , 293–294 (Watson) [discussing certainty requirement]; Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 520 [noting “additional” vesting requirement].) If these two requirements are met, “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson, at p. 293.) ICT challenges the first requirement here, arguing that International’s damages were not certain or capable of being made certain by calculation to recover prejudgment interest under sec

2025Absent certain exceptions inapplicable here, a plaintiff entitled to recover damages that are certain in both timing and amount also “is entitled” to prejudgment interest: “A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover 16 interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.” (Civil Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) Where damages are certain in timing and amount, a tria

2015Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) "Under [Civil Code] section 3287, subdivision (a) the court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim." (North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 828 (North Oakland).) "Damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, or ascertainable, for purposes of the statute if the defendant actually knows the amount of damages or could calculate that amount from information reasonably available to the defendant. [Citation.] In contrast, dam

2014“Under section 3287, subdivision (a) the court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 828 .) “The policy underlying authorization of an award of prejudgment interest is to compensate the injured party—to make that party whole for the accrual of wealth which could have been produced during the period of loss.” (Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1790 ; accord, Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49

2014“Under section 3287, subdivision (a) the court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 828 .) “The policy underlying authorization of an award of prejudgment interest is to compensate the injured party—to make that party whole for the accrual of wealth which could have been produced during the period of loss.” (Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1790 ; accord, Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49

2025Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1314-1315 (Glassman); see Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 34 ; Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 293 .) “‘Damages are deemed certain or capable of being made certain within the provisions of subdivision (a) of [Civil Code] section 3287 where there is essentially no dispute between the 13 parties concerning the basis of computation of damages if any are recoverable . . . .’” (Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 948, 958 ; see In re Marriage of Wiese (202

2023(North Oakland, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830–831.) “ ‘ “ ‘Damages are deemed certain or capable of being made certain within the provisions of [section 3287(a)] where there is essentially no dispute between the parties concerning the basis of computation of damages[,] if any are recoverable[,] but whether their dispute centers on the issue of liability giving rise to damage.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he test for recovery of prejudgment interest under [section 3287(a)] is whether defendant actually know[s] the amount owed or from reasonably available information could the defe

2024Rafalian’s contention has merit. 37 Civil Code “[s]ection 3287, subdivision (a), allows a person to recover prejudgment interest on ‘damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation[,]’ from the day such damages are certain or capable of being made certain. ‘[T]he court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.’ [Citation.] Prejudgment interest is an element of damages, not a cost.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 43 ; accord, Glassman v. Safeco Ins.

2023This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.” “ ‘[T]he court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.’ ” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 43 (Warren).) Because the award of prejudgment interest involves the construction of provisions in the Civil Code, our review is de novo.

2025(See Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 901, 906 (Chesapeake); Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 520 [noting “the additional requirement for prejudgment interest under section 3287 that plaintiff’s entitlement to damages vest ‘upon a particular day’ ”].) If the requirements are satisfied, then “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 293 (Watson).) “California cases uniform

2025(Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279 , 293–294 (Watson) [discussing certainty requirement]; Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 520 [noting “additional” vesting requirement].) If these two requirements are met, “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson, at p. 293.) ICT challenges the first requirement here, arguing that International’s damages were not certain or capable of being made certain by calculation to recover prejudgment interest under sec

2025(See Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 901, 906 (Chesapeake); Leff v. Gunter (1983) 33 Cal.3d 508, 520 [noting “the additional requirement for prejudgment interest under section 3287 that plaintiff’s entitlement to damages vest ‘upon a particular day’ ”].) If the requirements are satisfied, then “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 293 (Watson).) “California cases uniform

2010(Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 901, 907 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 348 ] (Chesapeake Industries).) The test for determining certainty under section 3287(a) is whether the defendant knew the amount of damages owed to the claimant or could have computed that amount from reasonably available information.

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2014When a judgment is reversed, “restitution must be made of all that has been received under it, and no further liability should be imposed.” (City of Oakland v. Buteau (1934) 219 Cal. 745, 858 ; see Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619 [“[r]estitution must be made of all that was received under the erroneous judgment, but no further liability should be imposed”]; see also FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics (Fed.Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 931, 939-940 [denying recovery of “business losses” suffered during pendency of subsequently vacated preliminary injunction, noting that “the

2021The Award of Prejudgment Interest Must Be Modified Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), provides, “A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.” “Under this provision, the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (W

2013(Cf. Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal.3d 410, 412-413 [statute of limitations tolled in personal injury claim when worker sought workers compensation benefits for same injury against same defendant within limitations period].) 4 Rathee argued that interest follows “both a breach and a liquidated claim.” 7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2010Code, § 3287, subd. (a); hereafter section 3287(a).) “[0]ne purpose of section 3287[(a)], and of prejudgment interest in general, is to provide just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the award during the prejudgment period — in other words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 663 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 863 P.2d 179 ].) Under section 3287(a), “the court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (

2010Code, § 3287, subd. (a); hereafter section 3287(a).) “[0]ne purpose of section 3287[(a)], and of prejudgment interest in general, is to provide just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the award during the prejudgment period — in other words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 663 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109 , 863 P.2d 179 ].) Under section 3287(a), “the court has no discretion, but must award prejudgment interest upon request, from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (