clear statement rule in California

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.)4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.)4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.)4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.) 4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2024(Id. at pp. 849–854.)4 The Garrison line of cases recognizes that “while the Legislature has broad authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to administer justice in an orderly fashion.” (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 854 ; see People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131 , 1146–1149, 1161–1162.) When addressing the question whether a statute that appears to command courts to proceed in a specified manner is mandatory or directory, these cases

2017(E.g., Associated Home Builders , at p. 591, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 [describing the initiative as " 'one of the most precious rights of our democratic process' "].) A clear statement rule is consistent with, and indeed, appropriately advances our duty to safeguard the exercise of the initiative power.

2017(E.g., Associated Home Builders , at p. 591, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 557 P.2d 473 [describing the initiative as " 'one of the most precious rights of our democratic process' "].) A clear statement rule is consistent with, and indeed, appropriately advances our duty to safeguard the exercise of the initiative power.

1998Such a clear statement rule not only would ameliorate clashes between nondiscrimination and free speech norms but would appropriately place the burden on the legislature to consider First Amendment values when it adopts antidiscrimination laws." (Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2411 , 2462-2463.) Here, by construing the term "business establishment" in the Unruh Civil Rights Act as not encompassing the membership and policy decisions of the Boy Scouts, we avoid a statutory con

1998Such a clear statement rule not only would ameliorate clashes between nondiscrimination and free speech norms but would appropriately place the burden on the legislature to consider First Amendment values when it adopts antidiscrimination laws." (Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2411 , 2462-2463.) Here, by construing the term "business establishment" in the Unruh Civil Rights Act as not encompassing the membership and policy decisions of the Boy Scouts, we avoid a statutory con

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1986(See People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 519-520 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 539 ] [the jury was entitled to a clear statement on the doctrine of proximate cause].) “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even when not requested, the court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the evidence adduced before the court which are necessary for the jury’s proper consideration of the case. [Citations.] At a minimum, it is the court’s du

1965A clear statement of the test appears in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 64 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ], " This Court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized . . ., and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed. . . . ” Applying this test here involves a determination of whether the objects seized were utilized in perpetrating the crimes for which the defendant was arrested and convicted.

1965A clear statement of the test appears in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 [ 64 S.Ct. 1098 , 91 L.Ed. 1399 ], " This Court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized . . ., and on the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed. . . . ” Applying this test here involves a determination of whether the objects seized were utilized in perpetrating the crimes for which the defendant was arrested and convicted.

1942(Lubarsky v. Richardson, 218 Cal. 27, 31 [ 21 P. (2d) 557 ]; 14 Cal. Jur. 889.) In Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443 [ 105 Pac. 255 ], a clear statement of the rule is found at p. 446: “As we have seen, an amended complaint was filed subsequent to the entry of the default which was never served upon appellant.

1942(Lubarsky v. Richardson, 218 Cal. 27, 31 [ 21 P. (2d) 557 ]; 14 Cal. Jur. 889.) In Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443 [ 105 Pac. 255 ], a clear statement of the rule is found at p. 446: “As we have seen, an amended complaint was filed subsequent to the entry of the default which was never served upon appellant.

1937And then taking up those subsequent cases, the court went on to say: “In McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 180, 185 [ 95 Am.

1936R. 127].) ” To the same effect are In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384, 388 [ 268 Pac. 422 ], and King v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 268 ], both resting on the clear statement of the rule found in Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506 [ 217 Pac. 73 , 29 A. L.

1936R. 127].) ” To the same effect are In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384, 388 [ 268 Pac. 422 ], and King v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 268 ], both resting on the clear statement of the rule found in Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506 [ 217 Pac. 73 , 29 A. L.

1936R. 127].) ” To the same effect are In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384, 388 [ 268 Pac. 422 ], and King v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 268 ], both resting on the clear statement of the rule found in Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506 [ 217 Pac. 73 , 29 A. L.

1936R. 127].) ” To the same effect are In re Chaus, 92 Cal. App. 384, 388 [ 268 Pac. 422 ], and King v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 268 ], both resting on the clear statement of the rule found in Hotaling v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 501, 506 [ 217 Pac. 73 , 29 A. L.