exception would swallow rule in California

2023The “change the common law” argument Third and lastly, Tak Chun urges us to exercise our authority as a common law court, and reject the common law rule in favor of the outlier decision in Crockford’s Club, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1402 .

2023The “change the common law” argument Third and lastly, Tak Chun urges us to exercise our authority as a common law court, and reject the common law rule in favor of the outlier decision in Crockford’s Club, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1402 .

2018As the high court explained, "There is a distinction to be made between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception." ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 686 , 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 , 374 P.3d 320 .) The former properly allows the jury to evaluate the probative value of the expert's testimony, while the latter purports to transform otherwise inadmissible hearsay into competent evidence offered for its truth. ( Id . at pp. 683, 686, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102

2018As the high court explained, "There is a distinction to be made between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a statutory exception." ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 686 , 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 , 374 P.3d 320 .) The former properly allows the jury to evaluate the probative value of the expert's testimony, while the latter purports to transform otherwise inadmissible hearsay into competent evidence offered for its truth. ( Id . at pp. 683, 686, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102

2014If this were the case, the exception would swallow the rule, and the utility of the Class 3 exemption would be vitiated.” (Robinson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 958 .) *1031 Plaintiffs have not drawn our attention to any evidence showing that the utility boxes will create significant cumulative impacts in the individual locations in which they are placed.

2014If this were the case, the exception would swallow the rule, and the utility of the Class 3 exemption would be vitiated.” (Robinson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 958 .) Plaintiffs have not drawn our attention to any evidence showing that the utility boxes will create significant cumulative impacts in the individual locations in which they are placed.

2013Rather, the exception for the lone ‘legally tenable’ reading of the law applies only in situations where the law ‘can reasonably be read only one way’ [citation], such that the agency’s actions or decisions in applying the law are essentially rote, ministerial, or otherwise patently compelled by, or repetitive of, the statute’s plain language. [Citations.]” (Morning Star, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 336-337.) The question is not whether the Department has adopted an interpretation of the statute that is consistent with the law, but whether that interpretation is the only “ ‘legally tenable’ ” one

2007Were this the case, the exception would swallow the rule.” (Morning Star, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 336 .) “Rather, the exception for the lone ‘legally tenable’ reading of the law applies only in situations where the law ‘can reasonably be read only one way’ [citation], such that the agency’s actions or decisions in applying the law are essentially rote, ministerial, or otherwise patently compelled by, or repetitive of, the statute’s plain language.” (Morning Star, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 336-337; see Gov.

2004In those situations, officers would know their misconduct would have no unfavorable consequences, and simply stated, the exception would swallow the rule." ( United States v. Shugart (E.D.Tex.1995) 889 F.Supp. 963, 977 , aff'd. (5th Cir.1997) 117 F.3d 838 .) This observation applies with equal force to probation searches where there is a Fourth Amendment waiver.

2000Thus, [the federal statute], in effect, would be an empty vessel, as violations of the statute would not result in any sanction. [Citation.] Such a result is untenable, especially in light of the ‘knock and announce’ rule’s perdurance.” (Shugart; supra, 889 F.Supp. at p. 977 , italics added.) I acknowledge that a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision even more recent than Mazepink, held that “inevitable discovery” applies to knock-notice cases. ( Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d 53 (maj. opn. of Brickley, J.).) 10 The concurring justice finds the majority opinion in Stevens persuasiv

2015“Courts are reluctant to attribute to the Legislature an intent to create ‘an illogical or confusing scheme’ [citation]; legislative policy is best effectuated by avoiding those constructions which lead to mischief or absurdity.” (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984 , 998–999.) If we were to construe the statute as the FTR Parties suggest, then the exception would swallow the rule.

2014In Weingarten v. Superior Court, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 268 , the court held that the public policy exception to the tax return privilege applied because the defendant repeatedly failed to produce nonprivileged documents containing the relevant information.

2014The public policy exception to the tax-return privilege, however, “‘is narrow, and only applies “when warranted by a legislatively declared public policy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Further, the public policy must be a compelling one, and exceptions on this ground will be declared only rarely. [Citation.] Public policy favoring discovery in civil litigation is not, by itself, sufficiently compelling to overcome the privilege. [Citation.] Indeed, such an exception would swallow the rule.” (Fortunato v. Superior Court, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 483 ; see Weingarten v. Superior Court, supra, 10

2004In those situations, officers would know their misconduct would have no unfavorable consequences, and simply stated, the exception would swallow the rule." ( United States v. Shugart (E.D.Tex.1995) 889 F.Supp. 963, 977 , aff'd. (5th Cir.1997) 117 F.3d 838 .) This observation applies with equal force to probation searches where there is a Fourth Amendment waiver.

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2001Such an exception would swallow the rule, leading one court to say that, for purposes of section 664.6, the decisions in Levy, supra, 10 Cal.4th 578 , 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 878 , 896 P.2d 171 , and Johnson, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1700 , 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 , "appear to reject traditional agency analysis, which holds that `"the client as principal is bound by the acts of the attorney-agent within the scope of his actual authority (express or implied) or his apparent or ostensible authority; or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client."'" ( Murphy v. Padilla (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 707, 716 , 49 Cal.Rp

2000Thus, [the federal statute], in effect, would be an empty vessel, as violations of the statute would not result in any sanction. [Citation.] Such a result is untenable, especially in light of the ‘knock and announce’ rule’s perdurance.” (Shugart; supra, 889 F.Supp. at p. 977 , italics added.) I acknowledge that a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision even more recent than Mazepink, held that “inevitable discovery” applies to knock-notice cases. ( Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d 53 (maj. opn. of Brickley, J.).) 10 The concurring justice finds the majority opinion in Stevens persuasiv

2000Thus, [the federal statute], in effect, would be an empty vessel, as violations of the statute would not result in any sanction. [Citation.] Such a result is untenable, especially in light of the `knock and announce' rule's perdurance." ( Shugart, supra, 889 F.Supp. at p. 977 ; italics added.) I acknowledge that a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision even more recent than Mazepink, held that "inevitable discovery" applies to knock-notice cases. ( Stevens, supra, 460 Mich. 626 , 597 N.W.2d 53 [maj. opn. of Brickley, J.].) [10] The concurring justice finds the majority opinion i

1994We agree with the Sixth District that avoidance of a retroactive application of Rider requires a showing that its application would impose unexpected and unreasonable hardships “apart from those the tax was intended to alleviate.” (Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers Assn., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542 .) We conclude EFA fails to show the requisite hardship to avoid applicability of Rider to this case.

1992Were we to adopt the trial court’s definition of “arbitrary,” the exception would swallow the rule and there would be a requirement of some cause in addition to the “consent search term.” (See fh. 2.) Anthony relies on Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868 ( 97 L.Ed.2d 709 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ) which was cited in People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 608 , and the recent case of U.S. v. Wryn (9th Cir.1991) 952 F.2d 1122 . *1005 Neither compels the conclusion that there is a “cause” requirement in addition to the “consent to search” term.

1992Were we to adopt the trial court’s definition of “arbitrary,” the exception would swallow the rule and there would be a requirement of some cause in addition to the “consent search term.” (See fh. 2.) Anthony relies on Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868 ( 97 L.Ed.2d 709 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ) which was cited in People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 608 , and the recent case of U.S. v. Wryn (9th Cir.1991) 952 F.2d 1122 . *1005 Neither compels the conclusion that there is a “cause” requirement in addition to the “consent to search” term.

1992Were we to adopt the trial court’s definition of “arbitrary,” the exception would swallow the rule and there would be a requirement of some cause in addition to the “consent search term.” (See fh. 2.) Anthony relies on Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868 ( 97 L.Ed.2d 709 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ) which was cited in People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 608 , and the recent case of U.S. v. Wryn (9th Cir.1991) 952 F.2d 1122 . *1005 Neither compels the conclusion that there is a “cause” requirement in addition to the “consent to search” term.

1992Were we to adopt the trial court’s definition of “arbitrary,” the exception would swallow the rule and there would be a requirement of some cause in addition to the “consent search term.” (See fh. 2.) Anthony relies on Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868 ( 97 L.Ed.2d 709 , 107 S.Ct. 3164 ) which was cited in People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 608 , and the recent case of U.S. v. Wryn (9th Cir.1991) 952 F.2d 1122 . *1005 Neither compels the conclusion that there is a “cause” requirement in addition to the “consent to search” term.

1980To be admissible under that exception, the prior offenses must be (1) “not too remote in time, (2)... similar to the offense charged, and (3)...committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness.” (People v. Thomas, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 465 .) Moreover, “the test of admissibility... is ‘whether there is some clear connection between that [prior] offense and the one charged so that it may be logically inferred that if defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty of the other.

1980To be admissible under that exception, the prior offenses must be (1) "not too remote in time, (2) ... similar to the offense charged, and (3) ... committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness." ( People v. Thomas, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 465 .) Moreover, "the test of admissibility ... is `whether there is some clear *464 connection between that [prior] offense and the one charged so that it may be logically inferred that if defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty of the other.