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20 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Nixongreen2 sentences1999These and other interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at common law.” (418 U.S. at pp. 709-710 [ 94 S.Ct. at p. 3108 .) But as the court further stated: “Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” (Id., at p. 710 [ 94 S.Ct. at p. 3108 .) The court thus concluded that the executive privilege was a qualified one that had to be weighed against the “the fair administration of c 1999These and other interests are recognized in law by privileges against forced disclosure, established in the Constitution, by statute, or at common law.” (418 U.S. at pp. 709-710 [ 94 S.Ct. at p. 3108 .) But as the court further stated: “Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” (Id., at p. 710 [ 94 S.Ct. at p. 3108 .) The court thus concluded that the executive privilege was a qualified one that had to be weighed against the “the fair administration of c | 2 | 3 |
Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2024(Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441 ; see id. at pp. 1440–1441.) Although the principal argued the superintendent “was not exercising a policymaking function when he made the challenged statements,” the Morrow court quoted Copp for the proposition that “the executive privilege broadly ‘encompass[es] all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function’ decision.” (Morrow, at p. 1442.) But the opinion never explains what the term “‘discretionary acts’” is supposed to mean. 2024(Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1441 ; see id. at pp. 1440–1441.) Although the principal argued the superintendent “was not exercising a policymaking function when he made the challenged statements,” the Morrow court quoted Copp for the proposition that “the executive privilege broadly ‘encompass[es] all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function’ decision.” (Morrow, at p. 1442.) But the opinion never explains what the term “‘discretionary acts’” is supposed to mean. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008“We of course begin our efforts to determine the intent of the Legislature with an examination of the words of the statute.” (People v. Anderson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 331, 340 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 516 ].) Section 1090 provides, in relevant part: “Members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially *873 interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members.” Although the making of a public contract, typically a legislative act, is a required element in a section 2008“We of course begin our efforts to determine the intent of the Legislature with an examination of the words of the statute.” (People v. Anderson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 331, 340 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 516 ].) Section 1090 provides, in relevant part: “Members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially *873 interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members.” Although the making of a public contract, typically a legislative act, is a required element in a section | 1 | 1 |
Lockyer v. City and County of San Franciscogreen1 sentence2008(See Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1094, fn. 23 .) But the “common-law principles of legislative and judicial immunity . . . should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.” (Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, 529 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 565 , 104 S.Ct. 1970 ].) The issue here, therefore, is whether in enacting section 1090 the Legislature clearly intended to empower the executive to challenge legislative acts and, if so, whether the Legislature provided some limits on this authority. | 1 | 1 |
Pulliam v. Allengreen2 sentences2008(See Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1094, fn. 23 .) But the “common-law principles of legislative and judicial immunity . . . should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.” (Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, 529 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 565 , 104 S.Ct. 1970 ].) The issue here, therefore, is whether in enacting section 1090 the Legislature clearly intended to empower the executive to challenge legislative acts and, if so, whether the Legislature provided some limits on this authority. 2008(See Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1094, fn. 23 .) But the “common-law principles of legislative and judicial immunity . . . should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.” (Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, 529 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 565 , 104 S.Ct. 1970 ].) The issue here, therefore, is whether in enacting section 1090 the Legislature clearly intended to empower the executive to challenge legislative acts and, if so, whether the Legislature provided some limits on this authority. | 1 | 1 |
Laurence Davis v. Norman M. Littellgreen2 sentences1999(See Davis v. Littell, supra, 398 F.2d 83, 85 [attorney who advised tribal council regarding the competence and integrity of an employee is immune from liability for defamation under the executive privilege].) The rationale behind barring claims against legal counsel based on their advice to the Indian tribe which contracted for their services regarding gaming enterprises was aptly explained in Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney (8th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 536 . 1999(See Davis v. Littell, supra, 398 F.2d 83, 85 [attorney who advised tribal council regarding the competence and integrity of an employee is immune from liability for defamation under the executive privilege].) The rationale behind barring claims against legal counsel based on their advice to the Indian tribe which contracted for their services regarding gaming enterprises was aptly explained in Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney (8th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 536 . | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Districtgreen2 sentences1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor’s file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting “the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers.”]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 NJ. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 [“Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition i 1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor's file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting "the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers."]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 N.J. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 ["Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition | 1 | 1 |
Environmental Protection Agency v. Minkred2 sentences1991The cases uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting the `decision making processes of government agencies'...." ( NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 150 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 29, 47 , 95 S.Ct. 1504 ].) In adopting exemption 5, Congress's main concern, made plain in a Senate Report, was that "frank discussion of legal or policy matters" might be inhibited if "subjected to public scrutiny," and that "efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered" if, with respect to such matters, government agencies were "forced `to operate in a fishbowl.'" ( EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S 1991The cases uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting the `decision making processes of government agencies'...." ( NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 150 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 29, 47 , 95 S.Ct. 1504 ].) In adopting exemption 5, Congress's main concern, made plain in a Senate Report, was that "frank discussion of legal or policy matters" might be inhibited if "subjected to public scrutiny," and that "efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered" if, with respect to such matters, government agencies were "forced `to operate in a fishbowl.'" ( EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S | 1 | 1 |
National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1991The cases uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting the `decision making processes of government agencies'...." ( NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 150 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 29, 47 , 95 S.Ct. 1504 ].) In adopting exemption 5, Congress's main concern, made plain in a Senate Report, was that "frank discussion of legal or policy matters" might be inhibited if "subjected to public scrutiny," and that "efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered" if, with respect to such matters, government agencies were "forced `to operate in a fishbowl.'" ( EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S 1991The cases uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting the `decision making processes of government agencies'...." ( NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 150 [ 44 L.Ed.2d 29, 47 , 95 S.Ct. 1504 ].) In adopting exemption 5, Congress's main concern, made plain in a Senate Report, was that "frank discussion of legal or policy matters" might be inhibited if "subjected to public scrutiny," and that "efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered" if, with respect to such matters, government agencies were "forced `to operate in a fishbowl.'" ( EPA v. Mink, supra, 410 U.S | 1 | 1 |
Killington, Ltd. v. Lashgreen2 sentences1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor’s file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting “the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers.”]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 NJ. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 [“Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition i 1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor's file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting "the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers."]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 N.J. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 ["Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition | 1 | 1 |
Gravel v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1975The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not.” (Fn. omitted.) (See Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1974 Supp.) Witnesses, § 890, pp. 554-557.) The limitation also has been applied to legislative privilege (Gravel v. United States (1972) 408 U.S. 606, 628 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 583, 604 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628 ]) and to the executive privilege of the President of the United States (United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 ]). 1975The crimes of news sources are no less reprehensible and threatening to the public interest when witnessed by a reporter than when they are not.” (Fn. omitted.) (See Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1974 Supp.) Witnesses, § 890, pp. 554-557.) The limitation also has been applied to legislative privilege (Gravel v. United States (1972) 408 U.S. 606, 628 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 583, 604 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628 ]) and to the executive privilege of the President of the United States (United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Babets v. Secretary of Human Servicesgreen2 sentences1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor’s file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting “the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers.”]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 NJ. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 [“Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition i 1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor's file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting "the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers."]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 N.J. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 ["Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial District
green
2 sentences2003None of the cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." ( Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 82, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) Like the challenged statutes at issue in Tenorio and progeny, Penal Code section 1170.19(a)(4) purports to give a prosecutor the right to veto a decision that a 2003None of the cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." ( Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 82, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11 .) Like the challenged statutes at issue in Tenorio and progeny, Penal Code section 1170.19(a)(4) purports to give a prosecutor the right to veto a decision that a | 7 | 1996–2003 |
Esteybar v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences2001None of the cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." ( Ibid., original italics.) The Davis court distinguished Esteybar ( supra, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 ), which also involved the decision to reduce a charge from a felony to a misdemeanor, by noting that in that case t 2001None of the cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." ( Ibid., original italics.) The Davis court distinguished Esteybar ( supra, 5 Cal.3d 119 , 95 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 485 P.2d 1140 ), which also involved the decision to reduce a charge from a felony to a misdemeanor, by noting that in that case t | 3 | 1996–2001 |
Copp v. Paxton
green
2 sentences2016“Since the executive privilege is ‘an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government,’ the [United States Supreme Court] reasoned in Barr [v. Matteo (1959) 360 U.S. 564 ] that it should be extended to lower officials to the extent necessary to carry out that policy. [Citation.] ‘It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer . . . is entrusted . . . which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive 11 officer with immunity from civil defamation suits.’” (Copp 2007(Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) As such, we find Morrow’s reliance on Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 281 ] (Neary) and Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. | 2 | 2007–2016 |
Barr v. Matteo
green
2 sentences2016“Since the executive privilege is ‘an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government,’ the [United States Supreme Court] reasoned in Barr [v. Matteo (1959) 360 U.S. 564 ] that it should be extended to lower officials to the extent necessary to carry out that policy. [Citation.] ‘It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer . . . is entrusted . . . which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive 11 officer with immunity from civil defamation suits.’” (Copp 1996In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. . . .’” (Id. at pp. 571-572 [ 3 L.Ed.2d at p. 1441 ], citation omitted.) Since the executive privilege is “an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government,” the court reasoned in Barr that it should be extended to lower officials to the extent necessary to carry out that policy. | 2 | 1996–2016 |
People v. Tenorio
green
2 sentences1996None of those cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor’s exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court.” (Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 82 , italics in original.) Thus, each of the decisions cited by the Attorney General respects the principle that underlies People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at page 94: When the jurisdict 1996None of those cases suggests that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion prior to the filing of such charges improperly subordinates the judicial branch to the executive in violation of the Constitution, even though the prosecutor's exercise of such charging discretion inevitably affects the sentencing or other dispositional options available to the court." ( Davis v. Municipal Court, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 82 , italics in original.) Thus, each of the decisions cited by the Attorney General respects the principle that underlies People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at page 94: When the jurisdic | 2 | 1988–1996 |
Saroyan v. Burkett
green
1 sentence2013(Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 708-710 .) Further, “the executive privilege broadly „encompass[es] all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function‟ decision.” (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442 .) “„Because a public official‟s duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his . . . management of the public business, . . . public statements by such officials are covered by the “official duty” duty privilege.‟” (Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
green
1 sentence2013(Saroyan v. Burkett (1962) 57 Cal.2d 706, 708-710 .) Further, “the executive privilege broadly „encompass[es] all discretionary acts essential to the proper exercise of an executive function‟ decision.” (Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1442 .) “„Because a public official‟s duty includes the duty to keep the public informed of his . . . management of the public business, . . . public statements by such officials are covered by the “official duty” duty privilege.‟” (Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Neary v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences2007(Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) As such, we find Morrow’s reliance on Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 281 ] (Neary) and Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. 2007(Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 .) As such, we find Morrow’s reliance on Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 281 ] (Neary) and Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)
green
2 sentences2001Romero Petitioner also relies on People v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 515-516 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 , to conclude that the Legislature cannot grant discretionary authority to the trial court in some circumstances and to the prosecutor under other circumstances. 2001Romero Petitioner also relies on People v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 515-516 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 , to conclude that the Legislature cannot grant discretionary authority to the trial court in some circumstances and to the prosecutor under other circumstances. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gaming Corporation of America Golden Nickel Casinos, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney, a Partnership, in Re Dorsey & Whitney, a Partnership
green
2 sentences1999(See Davis v. Littell, supra, 398 F.2d 83, 85 [attorney who advised tribal council regarding the competence and integrity of an employee is immune from liability for defamation under the executive privilege].) The rationale behind barring claims against legal counsel based on their advice to the Indian tribe which contracted for their services regarding gaming enterprises was aptly explained in Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney (8th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 536 . 1999There the federal appellate court rejected claims general counsel could be liable in tort for allegedly making a management company appear unsuitable as manager for the tribe’s gaming operations during the licensing process. ( 88 F.3d at p. 540 .) The court explained, “[t]ribes need to be able to hire agents, including counsel, to assist in the process of regulating gaming. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Swidler & Berlin v. United States
green
2 sentences1999Its significance was recently clarified in Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) 524 U.S. 399 [ 118 S.Ct. 2081 , 141 L.Ed.2d 379 ]. 1999Its significance was recently clarified in Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) 524 U.S. 399 [ 118 S.Ct. 2081 , 141 L.Ed.2d 379 ]. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Royer v. Steinberg
green
2 sentences1996The university, however, is a constitutional department of state government. [Citations.] Its regents possess such general rule and policymaking powers as are necessary to control the university’s operation. [Citation.] To the extent, however, that [defendant] is the agent of the regents . . . , he may indeed fall into the category of a state official who engages in policymaking. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court held, however, that the release of the report was a ministerial act outside the privilege conferred by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a). *843 Only one decision, Royer v. Steinberg 1996(Royer v. Steinberg, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 501 .) Under these precedents, we hold that the executive privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (a), may extend to a county official of Paxton’s rank. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho)
green
2 sentences1996(See also People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 66 ; Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 127 .) As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is grave doubt whether the statute before us could be construed as the district attorney would construe it without overruling Tenorio and rejecting the principle underlying that decision. 1996(See also People v. Superior Court ( On Tai Ho ), supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 66 ; Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 127 .) As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is grave doubt whether the statute before us could be construed as the district attorney would construe it without overruling Tenorio and rejecting the principle underlying that decision. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hamilton, Superintendent v. Verdow
green
2 sentences1991(See, e.g., Hamilton v. Verdow (1980) 287 Md. 544 [ 414 A.2d 914, 922 , 10 A.L.R.4th 333 ] [investigative report prepared for the Governor concerning a state mental hospital entitled to confidentiality to protect "deliberative communications between officials and those who assist them in formulating ... governmental action."]; Doe v. Alaska Superior Ct., Third Jud. 1991(See, e.g., Hamilton v. Verdow (1980) 287 Md. 544 [ 414 A.2d 914, 922 , 10 A.L.R.4th 333 ] [investigative report prepared for the Governor concerning a state mental hospital entitled to confidentiality to protect "deliberative communications between officials and those who assist them in formulating ... governmental action."]; Doe v. Alaska Superior Ct., Third Jud. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Nero v. Hyland
green
2 sentences1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor's file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting "the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers."]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 N.J. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 ["Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition 1991Dist. (1986 Alaska) 721 P.2d 617, 622-623 [Governor's file concerning a candidate for appointment to state office entitled to confidentiality under the executive privilege protecting "the deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers."]; Nero v. Hyland (1978) 76 N.J. 213 [ 386 A.2d 846, 853 ] [executive privilege protects character investigation report on candidate for state government prepared at the request of the Governor]; Killington, Ltd. v. Lash, supra, 572 A.2d at p. 1374 ["Both the constitutional and common-law roots of the [executive] privilege strongly require its recognition | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo
green
2 sentences1987(Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, supra, 430 F.Supp. 405, 409 .) There is no evidence that the framers of our Constitution recognized a relationship between the two provisions. 1987(Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, supra, 430 F.Supp. 405, 409 .) There is no evidence that the framers of our Constitution recognized a relationship between the two provisions. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.