Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 California opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sandersgreen2 sentences1996We have rejected this contention in the past ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ]), and we see no persuasive reason to reconsider that determination. *860 (33) Defendant also contends the version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 read to the jury inadequately informed it of its right to consider defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition in mitigation and, in combination with other asserted penalty phase errors, requires reversal. 1996We have rejected this contention in the past ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ]), and we see no persuasive reason to reconsider that determination. *860 (33) Defendant also contends the version of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 read to the jury inadequately informed it of its right to consider defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition in mitigation and, in combination with other asserted penalty phase errors, requires reversal. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gatesgreen2 sentences1992There was no error. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) As discussed above, the jury was not misled regarding its obligation to consider all of the defense's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1226; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 460 .) Multiple use of the fact of rape (felony-murder rule, special circumstance, and aggravating circumstance) was proper. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1190 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ].) The court need not clarify the section 190.3, factor (b), 1992There was no error. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) As discussed above, the jury was not misled regarding its obligation to consider all of the defense's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1226; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 460 .) Multiple use of the fact of rape (felony-murder rule, special circumstance, and aggravating circumstance) was proper. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1190 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ].) The court need not clarify the section 190.3, factor (b), | 2 | 2 |
People v. Millsgreen2 sentences2020Error Under State Law In Mills, during the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, the trial court instructed the jury, at the prosecutor’s request and over defense counsel’s objection, that “‘[f]or the purpose of reaching a verdict in the guilt phase of this trial, you are to conclusively presume that the defendant was legally sane .…’” ( Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 676, 678–679, fn. 10, italics omitted.) Although the California Supreme Court found the error was harmless (id. at p. 681), it concluded that instructing the jury on the presumption of sanity during the guilt phase was error under 2014(See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ] [“It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) “The error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, supra, 46 *206 Cal.2d at p. 836].” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) Here, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to de | 1 | 2 |
People v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [to preserve an issue for appeal, a motion in limine is to be “made at a time before or during trial when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context”].) 75 PEOPLE v. PINEDA Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Benavidesgreen2 sentences2016Refusal to Instruct with CALJIC No. 2.40 on Traits of Character of Defendant Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury at the penalty retrial according to CALJIC No. 2.40, traits of character of defendant. 86 The court properly refused the instruction because it is, by its terms, a guilt phase instruction, and the jury was adequately instructed on consideration of defendant’s character by CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), which states in pertinent part, “You shall consider, take into account and be guided by . . . any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s ch 2016Refusal to Instruct with CALJIC No. 2.40 on Traits of Character of Defendant Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury at the penalty retrial according to CALJIC No. 2.40, traits of character of defendant. 86 The court properly refused the instruction because it is, by its terms, a guilt phase instruction, and the jury was adequately instructed on consideration of defendant’s character by CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), which states in pertinent part, “You shall consider, take into account and be guided by . . . any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s ch | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guitongreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ] [“It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) “The error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, supra, 46 *206 Cal.2d at p. 836].” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) Here, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to de 2014(See, e.g., People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 ] [“It is error to give an instruction [that], while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.”].) “The error of instruction on an inapplicable legal theory is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard of [Watson, supra, 46 *206 Cal.2d at p. 836].” (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 681 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 , 286 P.3d 754 ].) Here, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to de | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2007(E.g., People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 61 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ], and cases cited.) And counsel, as “captain of the ship,” maintains complete control of defense tactics and strategies, except that the defendant retains a few “fundamental” personal rights. 2007(E.g., People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 61 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ], and cases cited.) And counsel, as “captain of the ship,” maintains complete control of defense tactics and strategies, except that the defendant retains a few “fundamental” personal rights. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kennedygreen1 sentence2006(People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 641.) The failure to instruct the jury to disregard the guilt phase instruction to reach a verdict “ ‘regardless of the consequences’ ” did not prejudice defendant. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kippgreen2 sentences2006(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379-380 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 , 956 P.2d 1169 ]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171.) At the penalty phase, the court did not repeat the instruction; the jury was instructed to consider the statutory sentencing factors—including the expansive section 190.3, factor (k)—and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the prosecutor’s argument did not seek to exploit the notion that the “ ‘regardless of the consequences’ ” instruction applied at the penalty phase. 2006(See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379-380 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716 , 956 P.2d 1169 ]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171.) At the penalty phase, the court did not repeat the instruction; the jury was instructed to consider the statutory sentencing factors—including the expansive section 190.3, factor (k)—and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the prosecutor’s argument did not seek to exploit the notion that the “ ‘regardless of the consequences’ ” instruction applied at the penalty phase. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2005(Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 763 ; see People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 961 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 ] [no misconduct in referring to the defendant as “ ‘coiled like a snake,’ ” or to life imprisonment for the defendant being like “ ‘putting a rabid dog in the pound’ ”].) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating: “Recall in the guilt phase that the defense counsel argued to you knowing well that it wasn’t true that those blue Levi’s were the trousers that the defendant was wearing when he murdered . . . 2005(Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 763 ; see People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 961 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 ] [no misconduct in referring to the defendant as “ ‘coiled like a snake,’ ” or to life imprisonment for the defendant being like “ ‘putting a rabid dog in the pound’ ”].) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating: “Recall in the guilt phase that the defense counsel argued to you knowing well that it wasn’t true that those blue Levi’s were the trousers that the defendant was wearing when he murdered . . . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1992There was no error. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) As discussed above, the jury was not misled regarding its obligation to consider all of the defense's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1226; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 460 .) Multiple use of the fact of rape (felony-murder rule, special circumstance, and aggravating circumstance) was proper. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1190 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ].) The court need not clarify the section 190.3, factor (b), 1992There was no error. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) As discussed above, the jury was not misled regarding its obligation to consider all of the defense's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1226; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 460 .) Multiple use of the fact of rape (felony-murder rule, special circumstance, and aggravating circumstance) was proper. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1190 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ].) The court need not clarify the section 190.3, factor (b), | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Masongreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Anjellgreen2 sentences1991The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52 (4th ed. 1979).) 7 In arguing that the trial court erred in giving this instruction, defendant relies on a line of cases stating that the flight instruction should not be given when “identity is a contested issue.” (People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 499, 511 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 889 ]; People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 242 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 569 ]; People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 821 [ 1991The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52 (4th ed. 1979).) 7 In arguing that the trial court erred in giving this instruction, defendant relies on a line of cases stating that the flight instruction should not be given when “identity is a contested issue.” (People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 499, 511 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 889 ]; People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 242 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 569 ]; People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 821 [ | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Moringlanegreen | 1 | 1 |
Brookhart v. Janisgreen2 sentences1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl 1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl | 1 | 1 |
In Re Mosleygreen2 sentences1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl 1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl 1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pensingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Malgrengreen | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl 1991(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 472 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 65 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464 ].) 16 F. Failure to Secure Waiver of Right to Present Defense Lastly, defendant asserts the failure to present a guilt phase defense or closing argument (ante, part III.B.5.) was “tantamount to a guilty plea or to a Bunnell-Mosley ‘slow plea.’ ” (See Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602-605 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ]; In re Mosl | 1 | 1 |
| Bunnell v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| California v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ghentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ruizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCoy v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2024As the McCoy court explained in connection with a guilt phase defense, “[t]o gain assistance, a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel.” (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 421 .) As discussed, while a represented defendant cedes control over trial management, he retains control over certain fundamental decisions pertaining to the adjudication of his guilt. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2014(See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) The critical concept in the robbery-felony-murder instruction is the question of whether the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety — as long as that has not occurred, the jury is instructed, the commission of the robbery is ongoing. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Gainer
green
2 sentences2012He further contends the instructions were “reminiscent of’ the instructions used to coerce a verdict that this court condemned in People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ]. 2012He further contends the instructions were “reminiscent of’ the instructions used to coerce a verdict that this court condemned in People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 ]. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In Re Wilson
green
2 sentences2006Representing Robert Paul Wilson on capital murder charges, Slick failed to object to admission of conversations with a government agent that constituted "the strongest evidence" against Wilson. ( In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957 , 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) On habeas corpus, we determined that this failure "was not based on an informed and considered tactical determination but resulted instead from ignorance or an erroneous interpretation" of precedent. ( Id. at p. 955, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) Representing Paul Tuilaepa on capital murder charges, Slick failed to 2006Representing Robert Paul Wilson on capital murder charges, Slick failed to object to admission of conversations with a government agent that constituted "the strongest evidence" against Wilson. ( In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957 , 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) On habeas corpus, we determined that this failure "was not based on an informed and considered tactical determination but resulted instead from ignorance or an erroneous interpretation" of precedent. ( Id. at p. 955, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) Representing Paul Tuilaepa on capital murder charges, Slick failed to | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Tuilaepa
green
2 sentences2006Representing Robert Paul Wilson on capital murder charges, Slick failed to object to admission of conversations with a government agent that constituted "the strongest evidence" against Wilson. ( In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957 , 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) On habeas corpus, we determined that this failure "was not based on an informed and considered tactical determination but resulted instead from ignorance or an erroneous interpretation" of precedent. ( Id. at p. 955, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) Representing Paul Tuilaepa on capital murder charges, Slick failed to 2006Representing Robert Paul Wilson on capital murder charges, Slick failed to object to admission of conversations with a government agent that constituted "the strongest evidence" against Wilson. ( In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957 , 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) On habeas corpus, we determined that this failure "was not based on an informed and considered tactical determination but resulted instead from ignorance or an erroneous interpretation" of precedent. ( Id. at p. 955, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 , 838 P.2d 1222 .) Representing Paul Tuilaepa on capital murder charges, Slick failed to | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2006Asked by petitioner's attorney to recall petitioner's "reaction ... to your informing him of your intending not to call witnesses or put on a guilt-phase defense," Slick answered he recalled only petitioner's "reaction ... in general during the entire time I represented him." Following up, the attorney asked Slick to describe petitioner's "response to your defense during the whole time you represented him." Slick answered by recounting his having told petitioner that they were "going to lose" the guilt trial and petitioner having reacted negatively. [5] "The Court [Referee]: You indicated that 2006Asked by petitioner's attorney to recall petitioner's "reaction ... to your informing him of your intending not to call witnesses or put on a guilt-phase defense," Slick answered he recalled only petitioner's "reaction ... in general during the entire time I represented him." Following up, the attorney asked Slick to describe petitioner's "response to your defense during the whole time you represented him." Slick answered by recounting his having told petitioner that they were "going to lose" the guilt trial and petitioner having reacted negatively. [5] "The Court [Referee]: You indicated that | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Frierson
green
2 sentences2006In sum, did Slick override a clearly expressed desire of petitioner to put on a guilt phase defense, and, if so, would that defense have been credible? ( People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 814-815 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 73 , 705 P.2d 396 .)" The referee heard testimony from 15 witnesses over 14 court days and considered several boxes of documentary exhibits. 2006In sum, did Slick override a clearly expressed desire of petitioner to put on a guilt phase defense, and, if so, would that defense have been credible? ( People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 814-815 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 73 , 705 P.2d 396 .)" The referee heard testimony from 15 witnesses over 14 court days and considered several boxes of documentary exhibits. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Welch
green
1 sentence2005(Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 763 ; see People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 961 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 ] [no misconduct in referring to the defendant as “ ‘coiled like a snake,’ ” or to life imprisonment for the defendant being like “ ‘putting a rabid dog in the pound’ ”].) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating: “Recall in the guilt phase that the defense counsel argued to you knowing well that it wasn’t true that those blue Levi’s were the trousers that the defendant was wearing when he murdered . . . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In re Jones
green
1 sentence2004(See In re Jones, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 588 .) Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Brown, J., and Moreno, J., concurred. 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 Our resolution of the issue renders it unnecessary to consider respondent’s exceptions to the referee’s findings. 3 As respondent points out, however, LaPan did testify that he suggested the appointment of the hypnotist, although Patterson’s testimony indicated that the hypnotist was appointed primarily to evaluate a guilt phase defense of unconsciousness. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Visciotti
green
1 sentence1996(People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 56 & fn. 23.) | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Clair
green
2 sentences1993He maintains that the error was compounded by the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that "as the judge indicated to you earlier in the original instructions that he gave you, any decision that you make [in] this case must be based on a conscientious and objective consideration of both the facts and the law, and you should not make your decision based on any sympathies or passions or prejudices or emotions, either for the defendant or against him." We do not find it reasonably likely ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 ) that the jurors were misled about the scope of their 1993He maintains that the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that “as the judge indicated to you earlier in the original instructions that he gave you, any decision that you make [in] this case must be based on a conscientious and objective consideration of both the facts and the law, and you should not make your decision based on any sympathies or passions or prejudices or emotions, either for the defendant or against him.” We do not find it reasonably likely (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 ) that the jurors were misled about the scope of their | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence1992There was no error. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 528 [ 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) As discussed above, the jury was not misled regarding its obligation to consider all of the defense's mitigating evidence. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1224-1226; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 460 .) Multiple use of the fact of rape (felony-murder rule, special circumstance, and aggravating circumstance) was proper. ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1188-1190 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 , 743 P.2d 301 ].) The court need not clarify the section 190.3, factor (b), | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mills v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1992(See Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 384 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 ].) As previously explained, we do not regard such oversight as error, particularly since other instructions informed the panel “each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value that the juror deems appropriate to each and all of the [aggravating and mitigating] factors on which you have been instructed.” (CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1984).) The court also told the jury, “To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the 1992(See Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 384 , 108 S.Ct. 1860 ].) As previously explained, we do not regard such oversight as error, particularly since other instructions informed the panel “each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value that the juror deems appropriate to each and all of the [aggravating and mitigating] factors on which you have been instructed.” (CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1984).) The court also told the jury, “To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Tahl green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1991(See generally Boy-kin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 460 P.2d 449 ].) In People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584 , “[d]efense counsel presented no opening statement, cross-examined only a few of the prosecution’s witnesses and those not extensively, . . . called neither defendant nor any other witnesses, . . . and made no closing argument.” 17 (Id., at p. 592.) Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Mosk thoroughly explicated our reasons for not compelling an express waiver under such circumstances: “In People v. Murphy (1 1991(See generally Boy-kin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 460 P.2d 449 ].) In People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584 , “[d]efense counsel presented no opening statement, cross-examined only a few of the prosecution’s witnesses and those not extensively, . . . called neither defendant nor any other witnesses, . . . and made no closing argument.” 17 (Id., at p. 592.) Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Mosk thoroughly explicated our reasons for not compelling an express waiver under such circumstances: “In People v. Murphy (1 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Hendricks green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Murphy green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.