judge committed prejudicial error in California

2025We conclude that “[t]he crux of the matter here is simply whether the trial judge committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury on [dissuading reporting] when the crime was not explicitly charged in the accusatory pleading.” (People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981 , 993.) As Fugit observed, “a trial court may permit amendment of the information ‘ “at any stage of the proceeding, up to and including the close of trial,” ’ if the defendant’s substantial rights are not violated (unless the new offense is not supported by evidence at the preliminary hearing). [Citations.] Moreover, there

1977In January 1970, the California Supreme Court extended the Boykin requirements (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]) on guilty pleas, as interpreted in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], to a stipulation submitting a criminal case to the court for decision on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, if under the circumstances of the particular case the submission was “. . . in fact tantamount to a plea of guilty .. ..” (Original italics.) (In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 926, fn. 10 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].)

1977In January 1970, the California Supreme Court extended the Boykin requirements (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]) on guilty pleas, as interpreted in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], to a stipulation submitting a criminal case to the court for decision on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, if under the circumstances of the particular case the submission was “. . . in fact tantamount to a plea of guilty .. ..” (Original italics.) (In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 926, fn. 10 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].)

1977In January 1970, the California Supreme Court extended the Boykin requirements (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]) on guilty pleas, as interpreted in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], to a stipulation submitting a criminal case to the court for decision on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, if under the circumstances of the particular case the submission was “. . . in fact tantamount to a plea of guilty .. ..” (Original italics.) (In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 926, fn. 10 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].)

1977In January 1970, the California Supreme Court extended the Boykin requirements (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]) on guilty pleas, as interpreted in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], to a stipulation submitting a criminal case to the court for decision on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, if under the circumstances of the particular case the submission was “. . . in fact tantamount to a plea of guilty .. ..” (Original italics.) (In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 926, fn. 10 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ].)

1974(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Appellant’s final contention is that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in the method used for voir dire examination of the jurors.

1967(See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 ].) In Jackson v. Denno, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the jury may pass on the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession only after the trial judge has first determined in a separate proceeding conducted outside the presence of the jury that the confession is voluntary.

1967(See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 ].) In Jackson v. Denno, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the jury may pass on the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession only after the trial judge has first determined in a separate proceeding conducted outside the presence of the jury that the confession is voluntary.

1967Penal Code section 1066 provides: “Before a juror is called, the defendant must be informed by the court, or under its direction, that if he intends to challenge an individual juror he must do so when the juror appears and before he is sworn. ’ ’ Defendant cites People v. Moore (1894) 103 Cal. 508 [ 37 P. 510 ] as standing for the proposition that a failure to comply with this section when defendant is not represented by counsel is per se reversible error.

1967Penal Code section 1066 provides: “Before a juror is called, the defendant must be informed by the court, or under its direction, that if he intends to challenge an individual juror he must do so when the juror appears and before he is sworn. ’ ’ Defendant cites People v. Moore (1894) 103 Cal. 508 [ 37 P. 510 ] as standing for the proposition that a failure to comply with this section when defendant is not represented by counsel is per se reversible error.

1966In the Morse ease the giving of an instruction that the trial judge had the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment was held to be error, on the ground that such an instruction “may very well induce the jury to assume that its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment ’ ’ and “the impact of the instruction must necessarily weaken the jury’s own sense of responsibility.” (P. 649.) This court, in discussing the instruction on the power of

1966In the Morse ease the giving of an instruction that the trial judge had the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment was held to be error, on the ground that such an instruction “may very well induce the jury to assume that its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment ’ ’ and “the impact of the instruction must necessarily weaken the jury’s own sense of responsibility.” (P. 649.) This court, in discussing the instruction on the power of

1966The trial judge said that he had been loath to bring up the subject but that when the direct question was asked, he felt he had to state what the facts and actual situation were; that he planned to inform the jurors, after selection had been completed, that they were not to consider his comment; and that he did not intend to repeat the explanation he had given but would merely indicate that there had been a prior verdict and that the judgment rendered thereon had been reversed. 3 Defendant contends that under the principles stated in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d

1966The trial judge said that he had been loath to bring up the subject but that when the direct question was asked, he felt he had to state what the facts and actual situation were; that he planned to inform the jurors, after selection had been completed, that they were not to consider his comment; and that he did not intend to repeat the explanation he had given but would merely indicate that there had been a prior verdict and that the judgment rendered thereon had been reversed. 3 Defendant contends that under the principles stated in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d

1966In the Morse ease the giving of an instruction that the trial judge had the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment was held to be error, on the ground that such an instruction “may very well induce the jury to assume that its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment ’ ’ and “the impact of the instruction must necessarily weaken the jury’s own sense of responsibility.” (P. 649.) This court, in discussing the instruction on the power of

1966In the Morse ease the giving of an instruction that the trial judge had the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment was held to be error, on the ground that such an instruction “may very well induce the jury to assume that its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment ’ ’ and “the impact of the instruction must necessarily weaken the jury’s own sense of responsibility.” (P. 649.) This court, in discussing the instruction on the power of

1962Throughout the trial the judge labored with a vociferous dislike of the ruling in People v. Gorg, supra, 45 Cal.2d 776 , which he conceives to be a partial denial of the right to jury trial.

1960To bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise; . . .’ She argues that the oral stipulation made in court was not intended to represent the final agreement of the parties; that it was only intended to serve as a memorandum to be used in drawing a final agreement settling the controversy and was intended to be subject to modifications ; that as there was no agreement filed with the clerk of the court and as the stipulation was not entered on the minutes of the court it was not b

1960To bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise; . . .’ She argues that the oral stipulation made in court was not intended to represent the final agreement of the parties; that it was only intended to serve as a memorandum to be used in drawing a final agreement settling the controversy and was intended to be subject to modifications ; that as there was no agreement filed with the clerk of the court and as the stipulation was not entered on the minutes of the court it was not b

1954(People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 552 [ 89 P. 124 ]; People v. Carter, 116 Cal.App.2d 533 [ 253 P.2d 1016 ].) Lastly, defendant contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error during the voir dire examination of the jurors when he interrupted counsel for defendant and remarked that he did not believe it was the law that every element of the crime, such as specific intent, had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

1954(People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 552 [ 89 P. 124 ]; People v. Carter, 116 Cal.App.2d 533 [ 253 P.2d 1016 ].) Lastly, defendant contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error during the voir dire examination of the jurors when he interrupted counsel for defendant and remarked that he did not believe it was the law that every element of the crime, such as specific intent, had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

1952The following language from Estate of Dupont, 60 Cal.App.2d 276 , at page 289 [ 140 P.2d 866 ], is applicable to the instant ease: “Counsel for appellants, Hollingsworth, Reid and Lamb claim that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in questioning various witnesses, and in admonishing counsel not to interrupt witnesses before their answers were complete.

1952The following language from Estate of Dupont, 60 Cal.App.2d 276 , at page 289 [ 140 P.2d 866 ], is applicable to the instant ease: “Counsel for appellants, Hollingsworth, Reid and Lamb claim that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in questioning various witnesses, and in admonishing counsel not to interrupt witnesses before their answers were complete.

1942(See People v. Pianezzi, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 269 [ 108 P. (2d) 732 ].) Second: The trial judge committed prejudicial error in receiving in evidence a diagram drawn by the prosecuting wit *169 ness subsequent to the date of the alleged acts of sexual intercourse, which diagram purported to represent defendant’s apartment, where the prosecuting witness testified the alleged acts of sexual intercourse had occurred, for the reason that such diagram constituted hearsay evidence.

1924We are cited to the recent case of People v. Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 223 [ 221 Pac. 394 ], in support of the contention that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in allowing the statement of the Ford woman to be read to the jury.

1924We are cited to the recent case of People v. Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 223 [ 221 Pac. 394 ], in support of the contention that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in allowing the statement of the Ford woman to be read to the jury.