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20 California opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree 2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree | 1 | 3 |
People v. Buycksgreen1 sentence2020(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15 ; People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859 , 872-873.) However, we will direct amendment of the determinate abstract of judgment, and also correction of the indeterminate abstract of judgment, which misidentifies the robbery as a violation of section 459 rather than section 211. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Earpgreen1 sentence2015(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 901-902 [trial court need not give duplicative instructions]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 99 [a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates other instructions].) The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1600, which made clear that robbery required the jury to find an accused had the intent to take property by force or fear. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Canizalezgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 857 (Canizalez).) A pinpoint instruction telling the jury that an individual could not be guilty of robbery if he formed the intent to steal after using force or fear would have been duplicative of the standard robbery instruction given by the court. 2015(Canizalez, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 857 .) Because the trial court could have properly refused to give the pinpoint instruction, defendant cannot show she was prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to make such a request. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coffmangreen1 sentence2015(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 901-902 [trial court need not give duplicative instructions]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 99 [a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates other instructions].) The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1600, which made clear that robbery required the jury to find an accused had the intent to take property by force or fear. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jenningsgreen1 sentence2014Rather, being an accessory is a separate criminal offense. (§ 32; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 (Jennings) [“Being an accessory to murder is not a defense to aiding and abetting the commission of murder—it is a separate criminal offense”].) A defendant may be convicted of both robbery and being an accessory to robbery if the defendant aids the principal both before and during, as well as after, the robbery is committed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2007(Id. at pp. 651-652.) Quoting People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 422-423 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 ], which addressed a robbery committed by trick or device, the court reasoned: “ ‘ “ ‘The trick or device by which the physical presence of the [victim] was detached from the property under his (possession] and control should not avail defendant in his claim that the property was not taken from the “immediate presence” of the victim.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Medina, supra, at p. 651.) The court concluded that the only reason the victim was not in the car when it was taken was b 2007(Id. at pp. 651-652.) Quoting People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 422-423 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 ], which addressed a robbery committed by trick or device, the court reasoned: “ ‘ “ ‘The trick or device by which the physical presence of the [victim] was detached from the property under his (possession] and control should not avail defendant in his claim that the property was not taken from the “immediate presence” of the victim.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Medina, supra, at p. 651.) The court concluded that the only reason the victim was not in the car when it was taken was b | 1 | 1 |
People v. Silvagreen2 sentences2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree 2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree | 1 | 1 |
People v. Webstergreen2 sentences2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree 2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree 2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hendricksgreen2 sentences2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree 2004As we stated in Silva , an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 , citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 31 , 814 P.2d 1273 .) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing "which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree | 1 | 1 |
People v. Goinsgreen2 sentences1998As one court summarized, “while petty theft is a necessarily included offense in robbery, grand theft is not necessarily included for the reason that robbery can be committed without necessarily committing grand theft.” (People v. Goins (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 923, 926 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 655 ].) If a defendant commits a robbery that includes the additional elements of grand theft, the prosecution should not have to choose between robbery and grand theft, and the jury should be allowed to convict the defendant of both crimes. 1998As one court summarized, “while petty theft is a necessarily included offense in robbery, grand theft is not necessarily included for the reason that robbery can be committed without necessarily committing grand theft.” (People v. Goins (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 923, 926 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 655 ].) If a defendant commits a robbery that includes the additional elements of grand theft, the prosecution should not have to choose between robbery and grand theft, and the jury should be allowed to convict the defendant of both crimes. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. 1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. | 1 | 1 |
People v. George B.green2 sentences1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. 1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McElroygreen1 sentence1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence1996(People v. Harris (1882) 61 Cal. 136, 137 [robbery defendant was entitled to additional challenges when he faced life imprisonment under recidivist statute].) When the Indeterminate Sentence Law was enacted in California in 1917, many statutes prescribed indeterminate life terms. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cloughgreen1 sentence1996(See, e.g., People v. Clough (1881) 59 Cal. 438, 441-442 [Robbery defendant was not entitled to additional challenges when he faced a term of “not less than one year.” (Former § 213.)].) The defendant was entitled to additional peremptory challenges only when a life sentence was required for the crime with which he was charged. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Miramongreen2 sentences1994II (1) As defined in Penal Code section 211, and as essentially incorporated in CALJIC No. 9.40 (the key robbery instruction given below), "[r]obbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." (Italics added.) Relying on the holdings in People v. Miramon (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 118, 124 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 432 ], and People v. Brown (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 1409, 1419 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 262 ] (hereafter Miramon-Brown ), the trial court below further defined the element 1994II (1) As defined in Penal Code section 211, and as essentially incorporated in CALJIC No. 9.40 (the key robbery instruction given below), "[r]obbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." (Italics added.) Relying on the holdings in People v. Miramon (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 118, 124 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 432 ], and People v. Brown (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 1409, 1419 [ 261 Cal. Rptr. 262 ] (hereafter Miramon-Brown ), the trial court below further defined the element | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Franco
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720 .) We also find that Mendez-Torres did not forfeit the challenge by failing to raise it in his opening and reply briefs because he arguably raised the issue in objecting to the prosecutor’s use of this instruction during closing arguments, because the issue presents “a pure question of law on undisputed facts,” and because the parties have fully briefed the issue. 2025(People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720 .) We also find that Mendez-Torres did not forfeit the challenge by failing to raise it in his opening and reply briefs because he arguably raised the issue in objecting to the prosecutor’s use of this instruction during closing arguments, because the issue presents “a pure question of law on undisputed facts,” and because the parties have fully briefed the issue. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Morehead
green
2 sentences2019In addition to a substantial evidence review, the Morehead court concluded that the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to amplify the robbery instruction by telling the jury that each victim's fear had to be both actual and reasonable. ( Morehead, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 .) The court then went on to hold that any error in not so instructing the jury was harmless because the evidence in the case supported a finding that their fear was indeed both actual and reasonable. ( Id. at pp. 774-777, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 .) The trial court instructed the jury as fol 2019In addition to a substantial evidence review, the Morehead court concluded that the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to amplify the robbery instruction by telling the jury that each victim's fear had to be both actual and reasonable. ( Morehead, supra , 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 .) The court then went on to hold that any error in not so instructing the jury was harmless because the evidence in the case supported a finding that their fear was indeed both actual and reasonable. ( Id. at pp. 774-777, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 .) The trial court instructed the jury as fol | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Melton
green
1 sentence2025“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his [or her] person or immediate presence, and against his [or her] will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”1 (§ 211.) Petty theft, on the other hand, is the taking of personal property of another where the value of the stolen property does not exceed $950. (§§ 484(a), 490.2(a).) “Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, which includes the additional element of force or fear.” (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 746 .) 1 The parties agree the court inadvertently omitted the term “or fear” f | 1 | 2025–2025 |
The People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Burgess, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 603-604 (Burgess II), citing People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 788 .) 2 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code. 2 Defendant subsequently filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, and the matter progressed to an evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Santana
green
2 sentences2018The giving of an argumentative instruction is evaluated for prejudice under the state harmless error standard, not under the federal harmless error standard. ( People v. Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1012 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 301 P.3d 1157 .) The evidence strongly indicated that defendants intentionally and successfully used force and intimidation to gain the advantage over their smaller victims and take their money. 2018The giving of an argumentative instruction is evaluated for prejudice under the state harmless error standard, not under the federal harmless error standard. ( People v. Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1012 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 547 , 301 P.3d 1157 .) The evidence strongly indicated that defendants intentionally and successfully used force and intimidation to gain the advantage over their smaller victims and take their money. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Mosby
green
1 sentence2016Requested Pinpoint Modification of CALCRIM No. 1600 In the trial court Ali sought to modify the standard robbery instruction, CALCRIM No. 1600, asking the court to add this language: “The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary to take property.” (People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 , fns. 2, 3.) Ali contends the language was necessary so the jury would not conclude that Ali used force sufficient for a robbery even if he “mere[ly] snatch[ed]” Biletnikoff’s car keys | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Garcia
green
1 sentence2016Requested Pinpoint Modification of CALCRIM No. 1600 In the trial court Ali sought to modify the standard robbery instruction, CALCRIM No. 1600, asking the court to add this language: “The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary to take property.” (People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 , fns. 2, 3.) Ali contends the language was necessary so the jury would not conclude that Ali used force sufficient for a robbery even if he “mere[ly] snatch[ed]” Biletnikoff’s car keys | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2016More importantly, if the jury was properly instructed, as we have found, we indulge a strong presumption that the jury followed the instructions given by the court, especially where “that presumption is supported by the actual, deliberative conduct of the . . . jury.” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1279 .) In this case the jury deliberated for approximately nine hours before reaching a verdict, and it sent three notes to the court during deliberations, including one requesting clarification of the robbery instruction (i.e., the meaning of the requirement that a defendant must have | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Hoard
green
2 sentences2007(Id. at pp. 651-652.) Later, in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], the court relied on the Medina court’s discussion of the immediate presence requirement and loosely applied the requirement to circumstances not unlike those presented here. 2007(Id. at pp. 651-652.) Later, in People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 ], the court relied on the Medina court’s discussion of the immediate presence requirement and loosely applied the requirement to circumstances not unlike those presented here. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
1 sentence2003Arthur TV. relied on Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358 , and accepted the minor’s claim that the juvenile court violated his due process rights by adjudicating the robbery under a standard of proof other than beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Carmen Centrale, Inc. v. Vázquez
green
1 sentence1998(People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [ 48 P. 718 ] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 ] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 388 ].) To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Ramkeesoon
green
1 sentence1997The robbery instruction alone “never required [the jury] to decide specifically whether defendant had formed the intent to steal after the assault.” (People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 352 , fn. omitted.) The Attorney General argues that any error in failing to instruct on theft was invited. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Robertson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.