second Marsden hearing in California

2024Defendant now contends (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to discharge appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and should have held a second Marsden hearing during trial; (2) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise defendant about the prosecution’s plea offer; (3) the trial court improperly interfered with defendant’s attempts to settle the case; (4) the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta); (5) the trial court e

2022I will represent myself.” 4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 5 This would be the second Marsden hearing in the case. 3 At that point, the court focused on the Faretta motion and allowed the prosecutor to reenter the courtroom.

2025I [would] rather represent myself than let him represent me, period.” Defendant’s first appointed counsel noticed this, explaining, “what I’m hearing here is that he feels his only option is either me or represent himself.” The trial court too noted at the second Marsden hearing that defendant “made it abundantly clear that he does not want [appointed counsel] as his attorney.” Defendant’s consistent emphasis on replacing his counsel shows he was not making “an unequivocal request, but rather a spur of the moment decision prompted by the denial of [his] motion for substitute counsel.” (People

2020(See Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 23 .) To the contrary, the record shows that during the second Marsden hearing, defendant stated he wanted to self-represent only until new counsel was appointed to his case.

2024(Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) Defendant’s final Marsden-related claim is that the trial court should have held a second Marsden hearing when it became clear mid-trial that counsel had still not given defendant all the discovery.

2015(People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 104 [“the trial court was not required to afford a hearing each time defendant made the same accusations”]; Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 [“a defendant is not entitled to keep repeating and renewing complaints that the court has already heard”].) 7 result[.]” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) This is particularly evident here, since before making its ruling, the trial court stated on the record that it had just read the very page of the Smith opinion on which the above-quoted language appears.

2024Defendant now contends (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to discharge appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and should have held a second Marsden hearing during trial; (2) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise defendant about the prosecution’s plea offer; (3) the trial court improperly interfered with defendant’s attempts to settle the case; (4) the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta); (5) the trial court e

2024Defendant now contends (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to discharge appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and should have held a second Marsden hearing during trial; (2) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise defendant about the prosecution’s plea offer; (3) the trial court improperly interfered with defendant’s attempts to settle the case; (4) the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta); (5) the trial court e

2025(McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 417 , quoting Nixon, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 192 .) But more to the point, however, even assuming the second Marsden hearing should have put counsel and the court on notice that Cardenas did not want to concede guilt of any lesser offense, that notice would have come too late, since the jury had already returned its guilty verdicts.

2025(McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 417 , quoting Nixon, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 192 .) But more to the point, however, even assuming the second Marsden hearing should have put counsel and the court on notice that Cardenas did not want to concede guilt of any lesser offense, that notice would have come too late, since the jury had already returned its guilty verdicts.

2024In support of his argument that this failure by counsel warranted Marsden relief, defendant cites one case on ineffective assistance, Coles v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1968) 389 F.2d 224 (Coles), and to one passage during the second Marsden hearing where counsel explained how difficult she expected trial to be given defendant’s numerous admissions in the text messages to the victim, during the phone call with the victim and during his pretrial interview with police.

2024“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance [of counsel] only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) Our review of the record submitted in this appeal, including the two Marsden hearings when his concerns were specifically addressed, fails to disclose evidence supporting any of the standards set out in Mai.

2023(Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 398 .) “Errors of state statutory law are analyzed pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . [Citation.] Under Watson, an error warrants reversal only if it ‘is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 398 , quoting Watson, at p. 836.) Defendant disagrees that a showing of prejudicial error is required.

2023(Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 397 .) In Henning, the court granted the defendant’s first Marsden motion where one of the grounds was “his dissatisfaction with defense counsel’s refusal to allow him to enter an NGI plea.” (Id. at pp. 394-395.) At a second Marsden hearing, the defendant stated that counsel “ ‘does not want to go along with my plea,’ ” and answered in the affirmative to the court’s question, “ ‘is it your position that you were insane at the time of the incident?’ ” (Id. at p. 395.) Even assuming that defendant unequivocally requested to enter an NGI plea, we must assess

2023As counsel 12 explained at the second Marsden hearing, “when I try to tell him anything different, that’s when he went ballistic and wouldn’t have any type of rational conversation with me.” As courts have explained, “[a] trial court is not required to conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has not made a sustained good faith effort to work out any disagreements with counsel and has not given counsel a fair opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness.” (Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 860 , italics omitted; see also Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 918 [defendant cannot

2023(Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 398 .) “Errors of state statutory law are analyzed pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . [Citation.] Under Watson, an error warrants reversal only if it ‘is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (Henning, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 398 , quoting Watson, at p. 836.) Defendant disagrees that a showing of prejudicial error is required.

2022(Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 .) A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel includes the right to have court-appointed counsel “discharged or other counsel substituted, if it is shown . . . that failure to do so would substantially impair or deny the right so guaranteed . . . .” (People v. Mitchell (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 507, 512 , quoting 157 A.L.R. 1225 , 1226.) 10 This court reviews the trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to relieve counsel for an abuse of discretion.

2022(Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 .) A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel includes the right to have court-appointed counsel “discharged or other counsel substituted, if it is shown . . . that failure to do so would substantially impair or deny the right so guaranteed . . . .” (People v. Mitchell (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 507, 512 , quoting 157 A.L.R. 1225 , 1226.) 10 This court reviews the trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to relieve counsel for an abuse of discretion.

2020We disagree and affirm the judgment. 1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). 3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 2 II.

2020The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Holding a Second Marsden Hearing A trial court must hold a Marsden hearing “‘“‘[w]hen a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate 18 representation’”’” to allow the defendant “‘“‘to explain the basis of his contention and relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.’”’” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085 .) Defendant contends the trial court violated this obligation by not holding a second Marsden hearing.

2020We disagree and affirm the judgment. 1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). 3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). 2 II.

2016According to Little, the judge “expressed hostility” toward his Marsden motion and “refused out of hand to hear it.” “When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is commonly called a Marsden motion [citation]—the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604 .) We agree with Little and conclude the court erred by refusing to give him an opportunity to state reasons for his d

2013Analysis In Sanchez, the court held that “a trial court is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing on whether to discharge counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicates after conviction a desire to withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel provided ineffective assistance only when there is „at least some clear indication by defendant,‟ either personally or through his current counsel, that defendant „wants a substitute attorney.‟ [Citation.]” (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) The court expressly disapproved of the procedure of “the app